@masiarek no trouble from me on that account. I just wanted to reiterate my understanding of the paper: it seems like, at best, the authors may have identified an alternative way to define what is equivalently IRV. Even granting that IRV is the unique voting method that satisfies some specific property (which in the case of their stated property is itself suspect), the property itself is not established as good to begin with, as @Toby-Pereira makes clear. In fact, as far as I can tell, it’s the exact reverse; I.e., “since IRV is bad, so must be the property.”
If the property is independently and coherently defined, it may still be mathematically useful to establish that demanding it is equivalent to demanding IRV. But no normative conclusion about IRV follows from that equivalence alone. Treating the characterization itself as a normative defense of IRV would be a non sequitur.