Subcategories

• Proportional Representation
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  @cfrank

  Here's a simple example to show proportionality. This example works the same no matter what the measure of support. Basically, all these measures are clones of STV but without vote splitting. The measures I'm talking about are score, smallest pairwise win, and strongest beatpath. Also, I should say that I don't really know if the measures would work for sorting.

  Setup:
  2 parties: A, B.
  2 seats.
  100 voters.
  quota: 50 voters.

  Round 1:
  The votes are A 55, B 45.
  The best quotas of 50 voters give A 50 and B 45.
  A gets a seat. The quota of 50 A-voters are removed.

  Round 2:
  Now we count the remaining voters, A 5, B 45.
  B gets a seat.

• Multi-winner Bloc
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  C

  @masiarek A is the only Nash equilibrium, while not a Condorcet winner it is in my opinion the only sensible winner of the election (being the only weak Condorcet winner). Every other candidate has another candidate that is preferred over them by a majority.

  Once A is elected, if they are removed from the running for second place, then B becomes a Condorcet loser and C becomes a Condorcet winner. If you continue with this process, either maximizing the rank of a remaining Condorcet winner and minimizing the rank of a remaining Condorcet loser, you arrive at the rank A,C,D,E,B. This process fails or is nondeterministic when there is a strong Condorcet cycle or more than one weak Condorcet winner.

  That ranking might not be your favorite, but it’s the most stable in terms of game theory. It’s strange that some voters didn’t use the full range of scores but in a rank order system that doesn’t matter.

  Another thing that one should keep in mind is that voting is for large populations. If the population is small, making social agreements is definitely way better for everyone!