I think there are many of us here who prefer some voting system or another over approval voting. I also think there is room for improvement. However, approval voting has a huge advantage in its simplicity and potential for integration into existing infrastructure. This is totally besides the comparisons to make in terms of game theoretical stability with Condorcet methods and expressivity with Score or others.

My thought is that, if we are really going to make progress by consolidating our support behind a single voting system, then realistically, Approval voting fits the bill. That isn’t to say that it should be the final destination for voting reform, but it would absolutely be a major step forward. While IRV is something of a tokenism, Approval would be an actual game changer.

Any thoughts about this are welcome.

This is a minor attempt to modify Condorcet methods in a simple way to become more responsive to broader consensus and supermajority power. It’s sort of like the reverse of STAR and may already be a system that I don’t know the name of. In my opinion, the majority criterion is not necessarily a good thing in itself, since it enables tyrannical majorities to force highly divisive candidates to win elections, which is why I’ve been trying pretty actively to find some way to escape it.

For the moment I will assume that a Condorcet winner exists in every relevant case, and otherwise defer the replacement to another system.

First, find the Condorcet winner, which will be called the “primary” Condorcet winner. Next, find the “secondary” Condorcet winner, which is the Condorcet winner from the same ballots where the primary Condorcet winner is removed everywhere.

Define the Borda difference from B to A on a ballot as the signed difference in their ranks. For example, the Borda difference from B to A on the ballot A>B>C>D is +1, and on C>B>D>A is -2.

If A and B are the primary and secondary Condorcet winners, respectively, then we tally all of the Borda differences from B to A. If the difference is positive (or above some threshold), then A wins, and if it is negative or zero (or not above the threshold), then B wins.

For example, consider the following election:

A>B>C>D [30%]
A>B>D>C [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

In this case, A is a highly divisive majoritarian candidate and is the primary Condorcet winner. B is easily seen to be the secondary Condorcet winner. The net Borda difference from B to A is

(0.3+0.21)-2(0.4+0.09)<0

Therefore B would be chosen as the winner in this case.

Some notes about this method:
It certainly does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion, nor does it satisfy the majority criterion. These are both necessarily sacrificed in an attempt to prevent highly divisive candidates from winning the election. It does reduce to majority rule in the case of two candidates, and it does satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion, as well as monotonicity and is clearly polynomial time. It can also be modified to use some other metric in the runoff based on the ballot-wise Borda differences.

Continuing with the above example, suppose that the divisive majority attempts to bury B, which is the top competitor to A.
This will change the ballots to something like

A>C>D>B [30%]
A>D>C>B [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

And if the described mechanism is used in this case, we will find instead that C is elected. So burial has backfired if B is "honestly" preferred over C by the divisive majority, and they would have been better off indicating their honest preference and electing B.

And again, suppose that the divisive majority decides to bury the top two competitors to A, namely B and C, below D, keeping the order of honest preference between them. We will find

A>D>B>C [30%]
A>D>B>C [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

In this case, the secondary Condorcet winner is D, and the mechanism will in fact elect D, again a worse outcome for the tactical voters.

Finally, suppose that they swap the order of honest preference and vote as

A>D>C>B [30%]
A>D>C>B [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

Still this elects D.

As a general description, this method will elect the Condorcet winner unless they are too divisive, in which case it will elect the secondary Condorcet winner, which will necessarily be less divisive. I believe that choosing the runoff to be between the primary and secondary Condorcet winners should maintain much of the stability of Condorcet methods, while the Borda runoff punishes burial and simultaneously addresses highly divisive candidates.

This is a concept I had in mind which may already have been described, although not all of the logistics are necessarily hashed out and there may be issues with it. The idea is described below, but first I want to make a connection to “cake-cutting.” The standard cake-cutting problem is when two greedy agents are going to try to share a cake fairly without an external arbiter. An elegant solution is a simple procedure where one agent is allowed to cut the cake into two pieces, and the other agent is allowed to choose which piece to take for themselves. The first agent will have incentive to cut the cake as evenly as discernible, since the second agent will try to take whichever piece is larger. In the end, neither agent should have any misgivings about their piece of cake.

So this is my attempt to apply that kind of procedure to political parties and representatives. Forgive my lack of education regarding how political parties work:

• There should be a government body that registers political parties and demands the compliance of all political parties to its procedures in order for them to acquire seats for representation;
• (Eyebrow raising, but you might see why...) Every voter must register as a member of exactly one political party in order to cast a ballot (?);
• Each political party A is initially reserved a number of seats in proportion to the number of voters with membership in A; the fraction of seats reserved for A is P(A). however
• For each pair of political parties A and B (where possibly B=A), a fraction of seats totaling P(A~B):=P(A)P(B) will be reserved for candidates nominated by A, and elected by B; these seats will be called ambassador seats from A to B when B is different from A, and otherwise will be called the main platform seats for A;
• Let there be a support quota Q(A~B) for the number of votes needed to elect ambassadors from A to B, and call P(A~B) the ambassador quota of party A for B. If E(A~B) is the fraction of filled A-to-B ambassador seats (as a fraction of all seats), I.e. nominees from A who are actually elected by members of B, then A will only be allowed to elect P(A~A)*min{min{E(A~B)/P(A~B), E(B~A)/P(B~A)}: B not equal to A} of its own nominees. That is, the proportion of reserved main-platform seats that A will be allowed to fill is the least fraction of reserved ambassador seats it fills in relation to every other party, including both the ambassadors from A to other parties, and the ambassadors from other parties to A.

This procedure forces parties to also nominate candidates that compromise between different party platforms in order to obtain seats for any main-platform representatives. If a party fails to meet its quota for interparty compromises, it will lose representation. On the flip side, this set up will also establish high incentives for other parties to compromise with them in order to secure their own main-platform representation. In total, this system would give parties high incentives to compromise with each other and find candidates in the middle ground, which will serve as intermediaries between their main platforms.

Basically, here the outlines indicate seats open to be filled by candidates who are nominated by the corresponding party, and the fill color indicates seats open for election by the corresponding party:

Seats with outlines and fills of non-matching color are ambassador seats, and seats with matching outline and color are main platform seats. In terms of party A, by failing to nominate sufficiently-many candidates who would meet the support quota Q(A~B) to become elected as ambassadors from A to B, or by failing to elect enough ambassadors from B to A, party A restricts its own main platform representation and that of B simultaneously. By symmetry the reciprocal relationship holds from B to A. Therefore all parties are entangled in a dilemma: to secure main-platform representation, parties must nominate a proportional number of candidates who are acceptable enough to other parties to be elected as ambassadors.

To see that all needed seats are filled in the case of a stalemate, where parties refuse to nominate acceptable candidates to other parties and/or refuse to elect ambassadors, the election can be redone with the proportions being recalculated according to the party seats that were actually filled.

The support quotas collectively serve as a non-compensatory threshold to indicate sufficient levels of inter-party compromise. Ordinary PR is identical to PR with ambassador quotas but with all support quotas set to zero, whereby there is no incentive to nominate compromise candidates.

The purpose of this kind of procedure is twofold: firstly, it should significantly enhance the cognitive diversity of representatives, and secondly, it should significantly strengthen more moderate platforms (namely those of the ambassadors) that can serve as intermediaries for compromises between the main platforms of parties. Every party A has a natural “smooth route” from its main platform to the main platform of every other party: The main platform of A should naturally be in communication with ambassadors from A to B, who should naturally communicate with ambassadors from B to A, who should naturally communicate with the main platform of B.

Also, this procedure gives small parties significant bargaining power in securing representation. Large parties will have much more representation to lose than the small parties that are able to secure seats if the small parties refuse to elect any ambassadors, so rationally speaking, large parties should naturally concede to nominating sufficiently many potential ambassadors whose platforms are closer to the main platforms of those small parties. The same rationale holds for the potential ambassadors nominated by small parties, who also should tend to have platforms closer to the main platform of the small party.

Finally, this system creates significant incentives for voters to learn about the platforms of candidates from other parties who stand to reserve seats for representatives.

@lime the point of this post isn’t to argue that approval voting is superior to other methods or that modifications wouldn’t improve approval voting, it’s to point out that despite other methods being potentially superior, standard approval voting is probably the most realistic target for near future steps toward substantially reformed voting.

Unfortunately, more choices does mean the system is more complicated. You can observe that the addition of even a very simple, marginal modification as you suggest already raises questions. Every question about a method is an opportunity for distrust to be exploited, even if the method is ultimately better. Plurality is terrible, but almost nobody had questions about it, and that’s why it’s stuck around for so long. Do you see what I mean? I may be a bit jaded, but I’m hoping to be realistic.

I don’t mean to be a downer, but my point is a bit sad: in terms of what people would prefer, such as more choices or buttons, what we have to deal with is exactly the fact that people are having a hard time getting what they prefer. The political status quo is strongly opposed to voting reform, it will have to relinquish substantial power and accountability to the people under an effective voting system. There’s a reason only flawed tokenisms like IRV have passed through legislature in recent times. In fact, there is a history of voting reforms being enacted and then reversed.

I just learned about this now. It’s a Smith compliant method, and is participation compliant up until necessary randomization.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximal_lotteries

Basically, you form the majority margin matrix Mij over candidates. Then consider the two player game where each player chooses one candidate: if player 1 chooses i, and player 2 chooses j, then player 1 gets Mij and player 2 gets -Mij.

This game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which is a distribution over candidates. A maximal lottery selects a candidate at random according to one such mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In this sense, a maximal lottery is a mixed “candidate” that cannot be challenged by a majority.

Occasionally maximal lotteries are non-unique, but they often are. A trivial case is when a Condorcet winner exists, in which case the maximal lottery selects the Condorcet winner as a pure strategy. Orthogonally, if there is an odd number of voters, and if preferences are strict, the maximal lottery is always unique. Otherwise, symmetries like multiple dominance components in the Smith set can induce degeneracies.

Still, any maximal lottery satisfies probabilistic notions of participation, where participation cannot reduce the chances of a preferred outcome for a voter.

I think this is nearly the “right” notion of compliance. There is only slight room in choosing which maximal lottery to implement. For example, in case of degeneracy, one could choose a maximal lottery that optimizes expected score. Or, maybe compute Jeffrey’s prior over maximal lotteries, and then sample a maximal lottery accordingly.

What thoughts do others have?

@rob especially if the state is a swing state, making it more difficult for the large parties to secure voters for their platform I think would be a significant influence forcing large parties and their candidates to more scrutinizingly determine the real interests of voters in those states. It may dilute the interests of less competitive states, but since the competitive states are crucial to obtaining the presidency, the large parties will still have to invest strongly in the interests of voters in those states in order to compete with alternatives (and obviously each other) for the crucial swing points. This may lead to something like an arms race of concessions, which happened in New Zealand in 1996 and led to the national adoption of a PR system, according to Arend Lijphart. Obviously that's quite a leap for the U.S., but maybe a less extreme analogue is not so far-fetched.

Maine is one of the thirteen most competitive states for elections according to a 2016 analysis (Wikipedia: Swing state), so I’m not sure their recent establishment is actually strategically foolish, although it’s possible that it wasn’t fully thought through. I agree it isn't clear.

I think it will definitely be interesting to observe how the current political apparatus responds to Maine--and apparently, more recently, and strangely, Alaska:

https://news.yahoo.com/alaska-is-about-to-try-something-completely-new-in-the-fall-election-193615285.html

Since Alaska is far from competitive, I do think this transition was in fact foolish for the reasoning you stated, but it remains to be seen. If we saw a state like Florida transition to a system like Maine's, it would be very interesting to study the relative differences between federal treatments of Florida, Maine, and Alaska as a case study for how "swingy-ness" might influence the effect of such voting system transitions. If Maine experiences an increase in federal power, it would be a good case for the remaining swing states to make a similar transition. If that occurred, the swing states would become a platform foothold for alternative parties to grow.

@k98kurz I don’t think there should be any uncertainty in the default for a voter’s ballot.

@democrates I meant a Condorcet winner only among the front runners (for example, the candidates with the top K scores, here we are taking K=2). If there is no Condorcet winner among them, then we can choose the top scoring candidate.

In your case, if two candidates have the same second-greatest score, and the three front runners form a Condorcet cycle, then you can use the scores to break the tie. If this was used, then Jill Stein would have won the election.

That isn’t “the correct” solution (there is no such thing), but it is somewhat less arbitrary than flipping a coin or operating by alphabetical order, neither of which has anything to do with relevant information that is readily available on the ballots.

If we were being engineers about choosing a high quality candidate to win the election, we could even compute the distribution of scores, take the candidates whose scores exceed some elbow point, and find the Condorcet winner among those candidates with the top scoring candidate as the backup if no Condorcet winner exists. That’s basically a generalization of STAR with a dynamic front-runner selection method.

There are other ways to proceed. For example, we could remove Condorcet losers, then try to find the Condorcet winner of all remaining candidates, iteratively eliminating the lowest scoring candidate until a Condorcet winner emerges.

@k98kurz mirroring @Lime, I think any advantage conferred to one candidate over any other in an election should be granted on an opt in basis. A voter shouldn’t have to opt out from conferring an advantage to a candidate.

@toby-pereira I’m sure the courts will conjure up whatever question-begging definition of vote they need to for whatever ruling they decided on beforehand. I think getting the reasonable notions settled on to facilitate progress without constitutional amendments will require more lawyering than only appeals to reason. It’s unfortunate that Maine’s constitution encoded plurality into its state voting law, I think it’s important to know what other states might have this same kind of language issue in their constitutions.

@toby-pereira that’s a great point. But say that were an “abstain” option. Then being compelled to enter a voting booth may put a person who would only have cast a nontrivial ballot if convenient into a position where they’re likely to cast that ballot anyway, because the inconvenience becomes a sunk cost.

In that instance, participation in the social sense would be compulsory, but not in the formal sense. At the same time, it makes the choice to abstain a more directly interpretable act of protest. In principle, abstain options could even include rationale. If abstaining were still formally allowed, I’m not sure I would find it unappealing if showing up to vote (or submitting a mail-in ballot) were like filing taxes.

As many of you may know, Australia has implemented compulsory voting. This measure dramatically increased voter turnout and appears to have improved representation for less affluent citizens. It also obviously had influence on policy.

My first instinct was that compulsory voting violates individual expressive freedom and political choice, and may be impractical. If an electoral system is ineffective or corrupt, coerced participation removes abstention as a form of political refusal and institutional rejection.

However, I think it is better to understand the evidence and the actual tradeoffs involved. I am wondering whether, and to what extent, compulsory voting addresses concerns about representation, justice, and effective government compared with voluntary voting.

Does anybody have a more refined understanding of its implications?

Hi @Jan—sounds fun

Since there are only five of you, I would not necessarily over-optimize the voting method. The harder problem is probably not the final vote, but reducing a large game list into a manageable and legible shortlist.

For choosing which games to bring, I would start with a simple structured survey. For each game, collect a few pieces of information, such as owner(s), expected duration, genre, who already knows it, who wants to play it, and maybe a 0–5 interest score from each person.

Then I would use that information to filter the list before doing any final selection. For example, remove games with very low total interest, games that are too long or too short for the trip, games too many people strongly dislike, or games that duplicate the same niche unless several people want them. If you can define those niches, you could even rank the games in each niche to help with pruning.

Since you want each person to bring the same number of games, you could then choose the top-rated games within each owner’s collection, with some manual adjustment to avoid too much overlap. Once you have a proposed list, you could also let the group ratify it before finalizing, using a simple majority or supermajority vote (or better yet, unanimous consensus), with room for minor adjustments.

For deciding what to play once you are there, I’d use something simple: score voting, approval voting, or even “everyone rates their current interest from 0–5, play the highest total unless there is an obvious objection.” Because the group is small and friendly, post-vote discussion is still cheap and probably useful. In the off-chance there’s a stalemate or something, you could have a fallback voting method.

In other words, I would use voting to organize preferences and as a fallback, not to replace conversation and negotiation. A formal voting method matters much more when the electorate is large, strategic, or anonymous, i.e. when collective conversation is inefficient or unproductive. For five friends, a transparent scoring/filtering process plus ordinary negotiation is probably better than a complicated multiwinner rule, in my opinion.

Still, using a voting system and seeing how things shake out can be fun in itself. So if you do want to go down that route, I’m sure others here would be able to offer interesting suggestions, especially on the PR front. And if you proceed with any voting systems, it would be interesting to hear about how you decided to manage the selection and any of the results!

@jack-waugh I'd like to find an explicit example eventually if possible. I haven't fully formalized the criterion as I imagine it yet. In terms of the loose "mere existence" criterion, there are definitely examples, since the modification can be applied to any voting system, and if you consider any voting system non-additive, then we can use that one.
For the updated concept, I think both the concept itself and the concept of what it means for a system to be additive need improved formalization. Do you think you can suggest what it means for a system to be additive mathematically?

@jack-waugh I was reflecting on the balance criterion, and considered a direction for formalization of it that might protect against the adversarial construct I described some years ago.

The idea is to enforce not just existence of “opposite” ballots, which can be too weak, but to demand something like, “There is a public, computationally-tractable ‘reversal’ operation on ballots, induced by the ballot semantics (in some way…), such that every ballot and its reversal cancel under the outcome rule.”

Certain symmetry operations such as permuting/relabeling candidates should commute with the reversal. The above would prohibit the “password attack” mechanism I described, because the ballot reversal operation in that case is neither public nor generally computable.

I’m refraining from demanding additivity in the score-like sense to see whether the property of direct interest can be formalized in some way without it.

Just food for thought.

@robla that's a fair point, thank you for your response. In terms of the two-stage aspect in the US, I feel it is more of a de facto party-driven apparatus on top of the actual formal system, in contrast to France for instance where the two stages are the formally recognized method. You're probably also right that ranking more than a handful of candidates is generally pretty unpleasant. In any case I could be wrong about the difficulty of the sell, which would be good.

Approval top-two primary seems like it might be a decent option for single winner, although I figure it doesn't satisfy clone independence, which is pretty unfortunate.
For the fixed approval threshold, you're suggesting that if no candidate obtains the threshold, then the top two proceed?

"...under such a system, they might hire large analytics teams to ensure that both parties advance a sea of clones to drown out the other parties." Yes, exactly.
I was also thinking if there is a threshold, 50% should be imposed, since that guarantees some weak level of majoritarianism which seems important and that ordinary approval can lack.

In terms of single-winner, I'm on board with 50% approval threshold followed by a final round approval. I think that's really simple and seems to solve many problems.
In principle, it even could let people be lazy and not even bother with the second round if they decide that their first approval ballot is satisfactory enough for them.

Youtube Video

Proportional representation in districts, elimination of partisan gerrymandering, and rank-based voting were mentioned.

https://apnews.com/article/fargo-north-dakota-voting-democracy-bdda17efb891a5f910423394d554c41e

Status quo arguments need to be dismantled.

For example, the argument by Rep. Koppelman (R) is that approval voting produces “vanilla” winners. As in, he argues that polarizing or more ideologically extreme candidates (his word was “principled”) are preferable. To whom? And by what measure? Laid bare: therefore, cities should not even be allowed to vote using anything other than (ostensibly?) a polarizing system like choose-one. Koppelman and others making this kind of argument must be pressed to define exactly what they mean by “principled.”

This is not a neutral administrative argument. It is a value judgment imposed upon the voters of Fargo by their state lawmakers, despite Fargo voters having adopted approval voting by ballot initiative, and despite that voluntary change having no impact whatsoever on any other districts.

Taken seriously, this argument treats broad voter acceptability as a defect rather than a democratic virtue. But suppose even this were true—still, approval voting does not prevent voters from approving a polarizing candidate. What it prevents is a polarizing factional candidate winning merely because the rest of the electorate is split among more broadly acceptable alternatives.

Apparently, some supporters of the ban even stated that approval voting was “confusing.” This cannot be taken as a serious objection in context: the basic instruction is simply to vote for every candidate one approves of, and the count is simple addition.

The remaining argument is state uniformity. Gov. Armstrong (R) later stated, arguing against approval voting in Fargo:

• “Now more than ever, we need a consistent, efficient and easy-to-understand voter experience across our entire state to maintain trust in our election system.”

This does not actually show approval voting is inefficient or hard to understand. Approval voting is counted by simple addition, and its basic instruction is straightforward. The only remaining argument is statewide uniformity. But that is an insufficient justification when the local variation is voter-approved and affects no other jurisdiction. Uniformity is not a self-justifying principle. The purported function of uniformity must be interrogated.

The stated concerns for voter experience and trust are especially hollow, as they were used to nullify a voting system Fargo voters adopted for themselves.

These arguments are not neutral logical objections. They are contemptible rationalizations for state preemption: “uniformity” used to nullify local democracy, “confusion” asserted against one of the simplest possible voting rules, and “principled candidates” used as a euphemism for protecting factional advantage. State representatives should not be able to unjustly override a voter-approved local election system while disguising factional preferences as neutral administrative concerns.

@toby-pereira could be “choose however many” but that doesn’t roll off the tongue per se.

@wolftune that's reasonable, I think the "approval" ("choose-any") community would have to converge on that but it's worth pushing. All the nomenclature we use should definitely be standardized.