I think there are many of us here who prefer some voting system or another over approval voting. I also think there is room for improvement. However, approval voting has a huge advantage in its simplicity and potential for integration into existing infrastructure. This is totally besides the comparisons to make in terms of game theoretical stability with Condorcet methods and expressivity with Score or others.

My thought is that, if we are really going to make progress by consolidating our support behind a single voting system, then realistically, Approval voting fits the bill. That isn’t to say that it should be the final destination for voting reform, but it would absolutely be a major step forward. While IRV is something of a tokenism, Approval would be an actual game changer.

Any thoughts about this are welcome.

This is a minor attempt to modify Condorcet methods in a simple way to become more responsive to broader consensus and supermajority power. It’s sort of like the reverse of STAR and may already be a system that I don’t know the name of. In my opinion, the majority criterion is not necessarily a good thing in itself, since it enables tyrannical majorities to force highly divisive candidates to win elections, which is why I’ve been trying pretty actively to find some way to escape it.

For the moment I will assume that a Condorcet winner exists in every relevant case, and otherwise defer the replacement to another system.

First, find the Condorcet winner, which will be called the “primary” Condorcet winner. Next, find the “secondary” Condorcet winner, which is the Condorcet winner from the same ballots where the primary Condorcet winner is removed everywhere.

Define the Borda difference from B to A on a ballot as the signed difference in their ranks. For example, the Borda difference from B to A on the ballot A>B>C>D is +1, and on C>B>D>A is -2.

If A and B are the primary and secondary Condorcet winners, respectively, then we tally all of the Borda differences from B to A. If the difference is positive (or above some threshold), then A wins, and if it is negative or zero (or not above the threshold), then B wins.

For example, consider the following election:

A>B>C>D [30%]
A>B>D>C [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

In this case, A is a highly divisive majoritarian candidate and is the primary Condorcet winner. B is easily seen to be the secondary Condorcet winner. The net Borda difference from B to A is

(0.3+0.21)-2(0.4+0.09)<0

Therefore B would be chosen as the winner in this case.

Some notes about this method:
It certainly does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion, nor does it satisfy the majority criterion. These are both necessarily sacrificed in an attempt to prevent highly divisive candidates from winning the election. It does reduce to majority rule in the case of two candidates, and it does satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion, as well as monotonicity and is clearly polynomial time. It can also be modified to use some other metric in the runoff based on the ballot-wise Borda differences.

Continuing with the above example, suppose that the divisive majority attempts to bury B, which is the top competitor to A.
This will change the ballots to something like

A>C>D>B [30%]
A>D>C>B [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

And if the described mechanism is used in this case, we will find instead that C is elected. So burial has backfired if B is "honestly" preferred over C by the divisive majority, and they would have been better off indicating their honest preference and electing B.

And again, suppose that the divisive majority decides to bury the top two competitors to A, namely B and C, below D, keeping the order of honest preference between them. We will find

A>D>B>C [30%]
A>D>B>C [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

In this case, the secondary Condorcet winner is D, and the mechanism will in fact elect D, again a worse outcome for the tactical voters.

Finally, suppose that they swap the order of honest preference and vote as

A>D>C>B [30%]
A>D>C>B [21%]
C>B>D>A [40%]
D>B>C>A [9%]

Still this elects D.

As a general description, this method will elect the Condorcet winner unless they are too divisive, in which case it will elect the secondary Condorcet winner, which will necessarily be less divisive. I believe that choosing the runoff to be between the primary and secondary Condorcet winners should maintain much of the stability of Condorcet methods, while the Borda runoff punishes burial and simultaneously addresses highly divisive candidates.

This is a concept I had in mind which may already have been described, although not all of the logistics are necessarily hashed out and there may be issues with it. The idea is described below, but first I want to make a connection to “cake-cutting.” The standard cake-cutting problem is when two greedy agents are going to try to share a cake fairly without an external arbiter. An elegant solution is a simple procedure where one agent is allowed to cut the cake into two pieces, and the other agent is allowed to choose which piece to take for themselves. The first agent will have incentive to cut the cake as evenly as discernible, since the second agent will try to take whichever piece is larger. In the end, neither agent should have any misgivings about their piece of cake.

So this is my attempt to apply that kind of procedure to political parties and representatives. Forgive my lack of education regarding how political parties work:

• There should be a government body that registers political parties and demands the compliance of all political parties to its procedures in order for them to acquire seats for representation;
• (Eyebrow raising, but you might see why...) Every voter must register as a member of exactly one political party in order to cast a ballot (?);
• Each political party A is initially reserved a number of seats in proportion to the number of voters with membership in A; the fraction of seats reserved for A is P(A). however
• For each pair of political parties A and B (where possibly B=A), a fraction of seats totaling P(A~B):=P(A)P(B) will be reserved for candidates nominated by A, and elected by B; these seats will be called ambassador seats from A to B when B is different from A, and otherwise will be called the main platform seats for A;
• Let there be a support quota Q(A~B) for the number of votes needed to elect ambassadors from A to B, and call P(A~B) the ambassador quota of party A for B. If E(A~B) is the fraction of filled A-to-B ambassador seats (as a fraction of all seats), I.e. nominees from A who are actually elected by members of B, then A will only be allowed to elect P(A~A)*min{min{E(A~B)/P(A~B), E(B~A)/P(B~A)}: B not equal to A} of its own nominees. That is, the proportion of reserved main-platform seats that A will be allowed to fill is the least fraction of reserved ambassador seats it fills in relation to every other party, including both the ambassadors from A to other parties, and the ambassadors from other parties to A.

This procedure forces parties to also nominate candidates that compromise between different party platforms in order to obtain seats for any main-platform representatives. If a party fails to meet its quota for interparty compromises, it will lose representation. On the flip side, this set up will also establish high incentives for other parties to compromise with them in order to secure their own main-platform representation. In total, this system would give parties high incentives to compromise with each other and find candidates in the middle ground, which will serve as intermediaries between their main platforms.

Basically, here the outlines indicate seats open to be filled by candidates who are nominated by the corresponding party, and the fill color indicates seats open for election by the corresponding party:

Seats with outlines and fills of non-matching color are ambassador seats, and seats with matching outline and color are main platform seats. In terms of party A, by failing to nominate sufficiently-many candidates who would meet the support quota Q(A~B) to become elected as ambassadors from A to B, or by failing to elect enough ambassadors from B to A, party A restricts its own main platform representation and that of B simultaneously. By symmetry the reciprocal relationship holds from B to A. Therefore all parties are entangled in a dilemma: to secure main-platform representation, parties must nominate a proportional number of candidates who are acceptable enough to other parties to be elected as ambassadors.

To see that all needed seats are filled in the case of a stalemate, where parties refuse to nominate acceptable candidates to other parties and/or refuse to elect ambassadors, the election can be redone with the proportions being recalculated according to the party seats that were actually filled.

The support quotas collectively serve as a non-compensatory threshold to indicate sufficient levels of inter-party compromise. Ordinary PR is identical to PR with ambassador quotas but with all support quotas set to zero, whereby there is no incentive to nominate compromise candidates.

The purpose of this kind of procedure is twofold: firstly, it should significantly enhance the cognitive diversity of representatives, and secondly, it should significantly strengthen more moderate platforms (namely those of the ambassadors) that can serve as intermediaries for compromises between the main platforms of parties. Every party A has a natural “smooth route” from its main platform to the main platform of every other party: The main platform of A should naturally be in communication with ambassadors from A to B, who should naturally communicate with ambassadors from B to A, who should naturally communicate with the main platform of B.

Also, this procedure gives small parties significant bargaining power in securing representation. Large parties will have much more representation to lose than the small parties that are able to secure seats if the small parties refuse to elect any ambassadors, so rationally speaking, large parties should naturally concede to nominating sufficiently many potential ambassadors whose platforms are closer to the main platforms of those small parties. The same rationale holds for the potential ambassadors nominated by small parties, who also should tend to have platforms closer to the main platform of the small party.

Finally, this system creates significant incentives for voters to learn about the platforms of candidates from other parties who stand to reserve seats for representatives.

@lime the point of this post isn’t to argue that approval voting is superior to other methods or that modifications wouldn’t improve approval voting, it’s to point out that despite other methods being potentially superior, standard approval voting is probably the most realistic target for near future steps toward substantially reformed voting.

Unfortunately, more choices does mean the system is more complicated. You can observe that the addition of even a very simple, marginal modification as you suggest already raises questions. Every question about a method is an opportunity for distrust to be exploited, even if the method is ultimately better. Plurality is terrible, but almost nobody had questions about it, and that’s why it’s stuck around for so long. Do you see what I mean? I may be a bit jaded, but I’m hoping to be realistic.

I don’t mean to be a downer, but my point is a bit sad: in terms of what people would prefer, such as more choices or buttons, what we have to deal with is exactly the fact that people are having a hard time getting what they prefer. The political status quo is strongly opposed to voting reform, it will have to relinquish substantial power and accountability to the people under an effective voting system. There’s a reason only flawed tokenisms like IRV have passed through legislature in recent times. In fact, there is a history of voting reforms being enacted and then reversed.

I just learned about this now. It’s a Smith compliant method, and is participation compliant up until necessary randomization.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximal_lotteries

Basically, you form the majority margin matrix Mij over candidates. Then consider the two player game where each player chooses one candidate: if player 1 chooses i, and player 2 chooses j, then player 1 gets Mij and player 2 gets -Mij.

This game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which is a distribution over candidates. A maximal lottery selects a candidate at random according to one such mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In this sense, a maximal lottery is a mixed “candidate” that cannot be challenged by a majority.

Occasionally maximal lotteries are non-unique, but they often are. A trivial case is when a Condorcet winner exists, in which case the maximal lottery selects the Condorcet winner as a pure strategy. Orthogonally, if there is an odd number of voters, and if preferences are strict, the maximal lottery is always unique. Otherwise, symmetries like multiple dominance components in the Smith set can induce degeneracies.

Still, any maximal lottery satisfies probabilistic notions of participation, where participation cannot reduce the chances of a preferred outcome for a voter.

I think this is nearly the “right” notion of compliance. There is only slight room in choosing which maximal lottery to implement. For example, in case of degeneracy, one could choose a maximal lottery that optimizes expected score. Or, maybe compute Jeffrey’s prior over maximal lotteries, and then sample a maximal lottery accordingly.

What thoughts do others have?

@rob especially if the state is a swing state, making it more difficult for the large parties to secure voters for their platform I think would be a significant influence forcing large parties and their candidates to more scrutinizingly determine the real interests of voters in those states. It may dilute the interests of less competitive states, but since the competitive states are crucial to obtaining the presidency, the large parties will still have to invest strongly in the interests of voters in those states in order to compete with alternatives (and obviously each other) for the crucial swing points. This may lead to something like an arms race of concessions, which happened in New Zealand in 1996 and led to the national adoption of a PR system, according to Arend Lijphart. Obviously that's quite a leap for the U.S., but maybe a less extreme analogue is not so far-fetched.

Maine is one of the thirteen most competitive states for elections according to a 2016 analysis (Wikipedia: Swing state), so I’m not sure their recent establishment is actually strategically foolish, although it’s possible that it wasn’t fully thought through. I agree it isn't clear.

I think it will definitely be interesting to observe how the current political apparatus responds to Maine--and apparently, more recently, and strangely, Alaska:

https://news.yahoo.com/alaska-is-about-to-try-something-completely-new-in-the-fall-election-193615285.html

Since Alaska is far from competitive, I do think this transition was in fact foolish for the reasoning you stated, but it remains to be seen. If we saw a state like Florida transition to a system like Maine's, it would be very interesting to study the relative differences between federal treatments of Florida, Maine, and Alaska as a case study for how "swingy-ness" might influence the effect of such voting system transitions. If Maine experiences an increase in federal power, it would be a good case for the remaining swing states to make a similar transition. If that occurred, the swing states would become a platform foothold for alternative parties to grow.

@k98kurz I don’t think there should be any uncertainty in the default for a voter’s ballot.

@democrates I meant a Condorcet winner only among the front runners (for example, the candidates with the top K scores, here we are taking K=2). If there is no Condorcet winner among them, then we can choose the top scoring candidate.

In your case, if two candidates have the same second-greatest score, and the three front runners form a Condorcet cycle, then you can use the scores to break the tie. If this was used, then Jill Stein would have won the election.

That isn’t “the correct” solution (there is no such thing), but it is somewhat less arbitrary than flipping a coin or operating by alphabetical order, neither of which has anything to do with relevant information that is readily available on the ballots.

If we were being engineers about choosing a high quality candidate to win the election, we could even compute the distribution of scores, take the candidates whose scores exceed some elbow point, and find the Condorcet winner among those candidates with the top scoring candidate as the backup if no Condorcet winner exists. That’s basically a generalization of STAR with a dynamic front-runner selection method.

There are other ways to proceed. For example, we could remove Condorcet losers, then try to find the Condorcet winner of all remaining candidates, iteratively eliminating the lowest scoring candidate until a Condorcet winner emerges.

@k98kurz mirroring @Lime, I think any advantage conferred to one candidate over any other in an election should be granted on an opt in basis. A voter shouldn’t have to opt out from conferring an advantage to a candidate.

@toby-pereira I’m sure the courts will conjure up whatever question-begging definition of vote they need to for whatever ruling they decided on beforehand. I think getting the reasonable notions settled on to facilitate progress without constitutional amendments will require more lawyering than only appeals to reason. It’s unfortunate that Maine’s constitution encoded plurality into its state voting law, I think it’s important to know what other states might have this same kind of language issue in their constitutions.

@clay, this appears to undermine itself at several important points. You claim to have completely debunked Kant, but then concede that your definitional move yields only a stalemate, that the genealogical critique cuts equally against your own foundation, that “free and fully informed” may smuggle in normativity, and that Kantian constitutivism remains a live dispute. Those concessions are incompatible with the claimed total refutation. I recommend writing the argument as explicit premises and implications; the problems should become apparent.

Even if we admit preference sovereignty, its own formulation is severely self-limiting. It applies only where all affected parties would freely and unanimously choose an outcome while fully informed, which is already immediately divorced from any dilemma that involves conflicting interests. Consequently, that principle in itself does not imply aggregate utility maximization in cases of conflicting interests.

To derive aggregate utility maximization, Harsanyi introduces additional assumptions through an identity-lottery construction. That construction can make aggregate utility numerically equivalent to the expected utility of a hypothetical identity-uncertain chooser, but it does not make that quantity identical to each actual person’s utility, nor does it establish why taking Harsanyi’s hypothetical standpoint is normatively authoritative.

What you have, in effect, is a selected collection of normative operations—idealized preference under conditions of rationality, freedom, and full information; identity uncertainty; expected-utility reasoning; and interpersonal aggregation—that define your ethical framework. Choosing different operations can and does yield competing ethical theories that you have not eliminated.

To be clear, some of those operations are at least superficially appealing. The preference-sovereignty principle is almost a tautological no-brainer within its stated scope, and the arguments that follow once we accept the normative premises built into Harsanyi’s construction may be perfectly valid. But those premises are exactly where justification is lacking, where competing alternatives are abundant, and where legitimate disagreement obviously exists.

We are clearly not getting anywhere, so I’ll offer my ultimate relevant point on this subject and stop. I think the election-by-jury concept is an interesting and reasonable proposal with compelling arguments in its support, and that while there are also completely valid concerns, it’s also plausible that those concerns could be effectively addressed with more collaborative examination and careful approaches to implementation. It has controversial aspects, but it isn’t a wholly radical idea. I think there are also legitimate generalizations that are equally interesting and reasonable topics of discussion.

@clay you can plug your ears and say La La La all you like. Kantian ethics is a perfectly legitimate alternative to utilitarian ethics.

@clay Kant does a fair job of that, in direct contest with utilitarian ethics, through his categorical imperative, as one example. If you engaged with ethics as deeply as you claim, you would be well aware of that.

@clay “real philosophers” say many different things about almost everything. I’ll repeat the main point that you did not address: What you have not explained is why an “ought” proposition cannot likewise describe a higher-order property of a broader configuration involving agents, actions, alternatives, and consequences.

Youtube Video

@clay sure, if we all agree to hook ourselves up to the National Brain Swapping Initiative’s Brain-Swapper 2000 every time a new policy decision is made, you’re pretty much on the money.

@clay “aggregate utility maximization objectively gives everyone more of whatever it is they subjectively prefer.”

Unless there is a known feasible option that maximizes every individual’s utility simultaneously, with no interpersonal tradeoffs, that is simply false. Aggregate utility maximization maximizes the sum or expected sum of utilities, not each person’s utility.

@clay, well then, at least we can be highly confident that you subjectively prefer aggregate utility maximization—and, on your account, that neither you nor anyone else has any substantive, non-preference-based reason to adopt that position.

@clay that does not answer the question. You rejected “ought” because it does not refer to an objective physical law of nature. “Preference” does not refer to one either. Saying that preferences are subjective and can be inferred from behavior simply replaces your original criterion with behavioral elicitation.

Granting that preferences are descriptively real, it still does not follow that satisfying or aggregating them is good. That is the normative premise you keep declining to examine.

You appear to accept that a preference can be a legitimate higher-order description of some material configuration. What you have not explained is why an “ought” proposition cannot likewise describe a higher-order property of a broader configuration involving agents, actions, alternatives, and consequences.

Anyway, this is beyond the scope of this forum.

@clay, can you show me any actual objective physical law of nature that the word ‘preference’ could possibly refer to?

@masiarek no trouble from me on that account. I just wanted to reiterate my understanding of the paper: it seems like, at best, the authors may have identified an alternative way to define what is equivalently IRV. Even granting that IRV is the unique voting method that satisfies some specific property (which in the case of their stated property is itself suspect), the property itself is not established as good to begin with, as @Toby-Pereira makes clear. In fact, as far as I can tell, it’s the exact reverse; I.e., “since IRV is bad, so must be the property.”

If the property is independently and coherently defined, it may still be mathematically useful to establish that demanding it is equivalent to demanding IRV. But no normative conclusion about IRV follows from that equivalence alone. Treating the characterization itself as a normative defense of IRV would be a non sequitur.