@toby-pereira yes it’s a bit particular, that’s the part that’s designed to preserve participation. The +1 advantage plus tie break conferred to the adversary is essentially to prevent any single vote from changing the outcome of the participation criterion-satisfying method. It still needs proof or more auditing and adjustment. But it was motivated empirically by finding examples of participation failure without introducing the advantage and some other aspects.
I think voters could have an anonymous ID given to them upon voting, it would have to be done with encryption. You’re right that in this case we would have to preclude latecomers, which I think would be fine. I think it could be done securely without an extra trip. This whole situation really makes “recounts” potential difficult though.
Having the “sincere” rank be attached to the original ballot might also be an option, but voters would somehow need to know that the second ballot would not be used in the first election, for instance. The only way they can know for sure is if they don’t provide it until after the first election winners are revealed. That could also be done with encryption.
In terms of preserving participation, the final runoff may not even be necessary. I’m trying to combine two things that can be looked at separately.
Also thanks for reading and your thoughts! I’m starting to wonder about how to guarantee the Condorcet loser criterion while still preserving participation. As of now though I think the method is essentially approval but with significantly stronger Condorcet-like guarantees.
EDIT: I just learned that there is an impossibility theorem about participation, independence of clones, and Condorcet loser. My guess is that the context and proof are similar to Arrow’s theorem, but the details I don’t know.
