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    • C

      Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise
      Election Policy and Reform • • cfrank

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      @isocratia yeah that kind of thing really seems counterproductive, and strange.

    • rob

      Election security under IRV
      Single-winner • • rob

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      rob

      @jack-waugh said in Election security under IRV:

      I guess Rob's vision here is that in the first count (as distinct from a hand recount), the precinct will have the voters cast their ballots through scanners, and a system set up and tested in advance by IT people will publish the data, without necessarily doing matching (although it could). So then anyone with IT skills and a computer and an Internet connection could replicate the tally.

      To be clear, in a perfect world we'd use a condorcet method where each precinct could submit a pairwise matrix and that would be good enough to determine the outcome 100% of the time.

      Technically not all Condorcet methods this is true for, but at least it is true if there is a Condorcet winner.

      But yeah, the main point I was making is that, as long as they publish the full ballot data within a reasonable period of time (which the vast majority do), any attempt to cheat in the ways suggested would probably result in someone going to jail. I have not seen a reasonable way someone could do this effectively and avoid having it be detected

      If the concern is not cheating, but just some random mistakes along the way, ok, different thing. I tend to think those tend to cancel out. Better voting machines help, paper trail helps, etc. I think any desire for absolute perfection in this regard is outweighed by the massive problems caused by the choose-one method. I mean, we are literally watching democracy fall apart in front of our eyes.

      What is happening here, within this communicty, is that some of us are trying to fight two enemies (choose-one and RCV-Hare), which is simply bound to fail. I'd rather join forces with the RCV-Hare folks and defeat the true enemy, choose-one.

    • J

      Polling Ourselves
      Advocacy • • Jack Waugh

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      Tally in Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}:

      (Ossipoff + Waugh = total)

      same order as I listed the nominees

      100 + 100 = 200 Approval 100 + 000 = 100 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking allowed 000 + 099 = 099 STAR 001 + 100 = 101 Score{2, 1, 0} 050 + 099 = 149 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0} 050 + 100 = 150 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0} 000 + 001 = 001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked pairs, winning votes 000 + 090 = 090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot) 000 + 000 = 000 quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100 000 + 100 = 100 0-9 score

      Reorder by descending totals:

      100 + 100 = 200 Approval 050 + 100 = 150 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0} 050 + 099 = 149 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0} 001 + 100 = 101 Score{2, 1, 0} 100 + 000 = 100 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking allowed 000 + 100 = 100 0-9 score 000 + 099 = 099 STAR 000 + 090 = 090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot) 000 + 001 = 001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked pairs, winning votes 000 + 000 = 000 quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100

      Approval beats the runner-up by 25%, he exclaimed.

    • C

      SP Voting: Explanatory Video
      Voting Methods • • cfrank

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      @cfrank Then whichever party has more candidates than the other is advantaged. This makes the clone failures even worse

    • C

      BTR-score
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • Casimir

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      GregW

      @casimir said in BTR-score:

      That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable.

      Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent.

      Thank you, your quote helped the article, a plurality votes as a limited resource does explain some of the current rancor.

      People diss voting systems that have not yet been used in public elections, even though the two systems with the most current use, plurality and IRV, have been found wanting.

    • C

      Quantile-Normalized Score
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • cfrank

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      @jack-waugh said in Quantile-Normalized Score:

      Which voters are going to have their votes diluted by such a procedure?

      In reply to this, you might be interested to note that, based at least on my own observations of the symmetrized version, it is the bullet-voters and min-maxers who will have the advantages of their tactical behavior reduced in favor of a broader consensus, in a fashion very similar to what would be expected in a Condorcet method. However, the method is not Condorcet compliant, I found a counter-example.

    • J

      STAR vs. Score
      Single-winner • • Jack Waugh

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      rob

      @jack-waugh said in STAR vs. Score:

      But systems that lead people to think (correctly or not) that strategy in nomination is no longer helpful to their cause, will likely lead to races having more than three candidates.

      You are right that STAR isn't as good with more than three candidates.

      What it comes down to, from my perspective, is that to reduce the incentive to strategically exaggerate (*), you need to minimize any reliance on "strength of preference."

      STAR does this by doing a pairwise comparison as the last step. A pairwise comparison by its nature doesn't consider strength of preference (as you can see when it is a 2-candidate race in simple FPtP).

      Condorcet methods try to do it all with pairwise comparisons. This reduces incentive to exaggerate even further. But since we can't guarantee there will be a Condorcet winner, we'll never get it to zero.

      However, my position all along has been that getting it all the way to zero would be nice, but isn't necessary. If you get it close enough to zero, attempts to be strategic will have just as much chance of backfiring as they have of helping. A Condorcet method, including one with a very simple "tie breaking" formula, is good enough. STAR may or may not be good enough. Score is not good enough. Again, this is my opinion, but I it does come from a pretty solid game theoretical foundation.

      * technically, incentive to exaggerate isn't the only thing we are trying to reduce. We also want to reduce vote splitting, which creates the incentive to strategically nominate, which in turn causes partisanship and polarization. Finally, we also want to aspire to "one person one vote", so each person has equal voting power. All of these things are accomplished by reducing the consideration of "strength of preference" in the tabulation.

    • Ex dente leonem

      ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • Ex dente leonem

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      @jack-waugh I think anything except the minimum for unmarked candidates makes it too easy to mark bullet burials. But I don’t know.

    • ?

      Rule X extended to score ballots
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • A Former User

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      @Ted-Stern Are you referring to this?

      Consider this 5 winner example with clones for each candidate
      Red: 61% vote A:5, B:3, C:0
      Blue: 39% vote A:0, B:3, C:5
      RRV Gives ['A1', 'C1', 'A2', 'B1', 'B2']
      MES Gives ['A1', 'A2', 'A3', 'C1', 'B1']
      SSS Gives ['A1', 'B1', 'B2', 'B3', 'B4']
      Allocated score Gives ['A1', 'B1', 'A2', 'B2', 'A3']
      STV Gives ['A1', 'A2', 'A3', 'C1', 'C2']

      The code I ran (which I can share) was taken from the electowiki page written by the inventor Piotr Skowron and I confirmed with him personally that the result was correct. I suspect you have a bug.

    • GregW

      The Alaskan Top Four Model & iEBs
      Advocacy and Current Events • • GregW

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      @lime said in The Alaskan Top Four Model & iEBs:

      Although, I will say SPAV with Jefferson is probably a better system for a primary than something like PAV, because a primary should always select the candidates with the most votes; the goal is to maximize the probability that the best candidate will make it to the runoff, rather than optimizing the average overall representativeness.
      Also, I think SPAV is fairly simple, but might be too complicated for a simple primary compared to cumulative voting. (Also also, any Condorcet winner should probably be guaranteed a spot.)

      Yes, the idea is to nominate the best candidate, average overall representativeness could result in a boring general election.

      I think voters would like cumulative voting. There would be a slight possibility of a strategic block voting campaign. If a party had that enough support to pull that off they would probably win the general election in any event.

    • R

      Successive Rank Voting
      New Voting Methods and Variations • single-winner ordinal • • robertpdx

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      @Jack-Waugh I mean that partisan voters will rank their candidate first and the main opposition last. So one (or both?) of the top contenders is likely to be eliminated early.

    • ?

      Way too many categories
      Meta Discussion • • A Former User

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      @toby-pereira thanks for the "lumpers vs. splitters" description, made me chuckle. It'd be nice if there was an interface that both lumpers and splitters could appreciate, like something that kept the tags and categories collapsed or expanded based on how you last set it.

      In the context of this forum, maybe it could make sense to keep the most "general" categories and move everything else to tags? People would still need to agree on what counts as general though.

      Some issues with tags though: they have a length limit, and the interface for browsing them and adding them isn't as organized or alluring (colorful) as the category browser.

    • J

      RCV IRV Hare
      Single-winner • • Jack Waugh

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      OK, it looks like Peltola won.

    • Sass

      New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • Sass

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      @jack-waugh That would be identical to Borda.

    • rob

      My proposal for this forum
      Meta Discussion • • rob

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      @michaelossipoff Great. But I think readers are likely not to notice the activity in this thread, which started as a set of proposals about forum governance by a participant now banned. To try to get more attention, let's move the discussion of voting on voting systems to https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/466/polling-ourselves . I posted my updated nominations there, for one of the categories. Thanks for reviving the topic of voting on voting systems.

    • C

      Are Equal-ranking Condorcet Systems susceptible to Duverger’s law?
      Voting Theoretic Criteria • • cfrank

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      @rob said in Are Equal-ranking Condorcet Systems susceptible to Duverger’s law?:

      So what is that algorithm? I mean, it could be Condorcet, and I have no problem with that, but I can't see how the term "proportional representation" applies. It just sounds like multi-winner.... there isn't anything proportional about it.
      The only way the term "proportional representation" would apply (by my understanding of the term) is if we assume that there are some number of parties, and each candidate and each voter is in one and only one party. If a 3rd of the voters are in the Bull Moose party, then a third of those elected should be in the Bull Moose party. The further you get away from that, the less "proportional representation" seems to be a meaningful descriptor.
      All of my complaints regarding PR (and with so many people's insistence that it is so much better than single winner methods such as Condorcet methods) are based on the assumption that voter X below is considered to have "better representation" if d, f and e are elected (because candidate d is very close to voter X), than if a, b and c are elected.

      For the algorithm, you will be aware of Single Transferable Vote, which gives PR without any mention of parties. If voters happen to vote along party lines, it gives party PR, of course. That's just one example, without having to mention obscure methods invented by people on this forum.

      And as for a, b, c versus d, e, f, I discussed that in the other thread here. I'm not sure it's worth quoting though because it's quite long.

    • SaraWolk

      The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform
      Voting Methods • • SaraWolk

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      @sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:

      Our paper found that burial is strongly disincentivized in STAR.

      Yes, that's exactly the problem. We're talking about the same issue from two different perspectives. The issue is that burial is so strongly disincentivized that it's catastrophic. (Much like how the death penalty for littering would be very good at disincentivizing littering, but very bad for society.)

      STAR punishes burial by blowing up the country, which creates a game of chicken. The mixed Nash equilibrium of chicken involves blowing up the country with some small (but positive) probability.

      The example given isn't a "strategic" vote in any way. That would be an extremely risky vote that would be as likely to elect Hitler as it would be to help ensure your favorite won the runoff. By definition if the turkey candidate is strong enough to make the runoff then it's strong enough to be a real threat to your favorite.

      Risky? Yes. But it's still plausibly strategic, if you think Bush will back down.

      This is especially bad since it's the kind of strategy I think candidates and campaigns will try to encourage (regardless of how bad the outcomes are). Candidates coordinate strategy; voters take cues from campaigns and political elites (which is why the two major-party nominees are always the top-2 winners). If voters were individually strategic and self-interested, the low probability of a tie means nobody would vote.

      The strategy I showed above would probably be bad for society or even for individual voters, because it has a good shot at backfiring and electing Hitler. However, it can be good for Gore's probability of winning, if Gore thinks Bush will back down.

      Empirically, this happens all the time. Adam Schiff spent millions trying to boost the Republican in California over Katie Porter. The DNC keeps intervening in Republican primaries to try and get them to nominate extremists. They keep doing this because they think it's good for their own personal chances of winning the election, not because they think it's good for the country overall. And generally, they're right—even though it risks electing Hitlers, it still helps them win seats.

    • C

      Mathematical Paradigm of Electoral Consent
      Research • • cfrank

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      @brozai I see, yes according to what I've learned about it QV tends to incorporate the strengths of interests and not just the proportion of people with those interests. Depending on what is desired that may be a good thing or a bad thing. There has also been research on its resistance to collusion and it seems to hold up very well, which is a property that I definitely like.

      I found this presentation very interesting:

      Youtube Video

      One point brought up by an audience member during the Q&A was that QV seems to illuminate the relative preferences of the electorate, which show up in the presenter's data as approximate Gaussian distributions and the grouping together of different strata of right-wing and left-wing groups, which does not occur without the quadratic cost.

    • C

      Rank with cutoff runoff 2.0
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • cfrank

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      @sarawolk yes more or less a thought experiment, trying to address some dissonance between the possibility of a Condorcet winner having low support and a support (approval) winner being different from the Condorcet winner even when one exists.

      In this case, I mean that a candidate is either supported or not supported by a voter according to the support cutoff of their ballot. I’m using the word “support” rather than “approval,” because I don’t think approval is an appropriate word philosophically (or mathematically). The positive emotional connotation of “approve” is all that bothers me. “Support” seems more emotionally neutral and has a mathematical meaning that aligns well with what is happening in the system, for example, “the support of a distribution.”

      https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Support_(mathematics)

      The quantity of support of a candidate is simply the number of voters who formally support that candidate on their ballot.

      Here is another attempt at a modification. In sequence, if there is a Condorcet loser, they are eliminated. If there is no Condorcet loser, a candidate with the least quantity of support is eliminated, with ties broken by rank runoff if possible. Repeat until one candidate remains.

    • rob

      STAR-like method ("reverse STAR"?)
      Single-winner • • rob

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      @jack-waugh said in STAR-like method ("reverse STAR"?):

      @rob said in STAR-like method ("reverse STAR"?):

      To me the most fair method would give every voter equal influence on the outcome.

      I am in emphatic agreement. I suspect the lack of this equality is a very key tool that the ruling class uses to keep the rest of us down. I do not know how to articulate the sufficient conditions for equality of influence. I believe that one of the necessary conditions, however, is Frohnmayer balance.

      I haven’t seen a solid argument for why being “Frohnmayer balanced” automatically is better. There are many balanced methods that are terrible. But it, alone, shouldn't be the goal. A good method probably achieves it.

      Vote splitting is the real enemy, and having it balanced (e.g. For and Against voting) doesn't eliminate vote splitting per se, but it tries to balance it between "clustering" vote splitting and "declustering" vote splitting. Clustering is what you get with plain old plurality, where you want to reduce similar candidates, incentivizing parties and primaries. For and against adds a declustering effect on top of that. But it's a fairly crude one, since it is still plurality.

      As for recursive IRV, you could make it immediately Frohnmayer balanced simply by doing some sort of Borda count at the deepest level. I'd be willing to bet that, if you did, it would still converge to the same result. I will try it, though, it should be super easy to do.

      I actually haven't “proven” anything regarding recursive IRV, but I do have it fully implemented now, thanks to a good bit of help from chatGPT, which made it so much easier. It's actually surprisingly fast, even when going way deeper than I'd expect is needed. I'd still like to build some sort of visualizer for it that's better than just a big dump of Json which is what I currently have.

      However, although not a proof per se, I can walk through the logic a bit of why I think it is superior to anything else out there in terms of fairness. In general I will talk about it as if it recurses to Infinity, even though in practice, it should be completely unnecessary to go more than a couple levels deep for real world purposes.

      First the background. We may all have different ideas of what fairness is, but to me it is all about removing vote splitting. Vote splitting is when irrelevant alternatives disproportionately draw votes away from relevant candidates. STAR, IRV, and Condorcet methods all attempt to remove irrelevant alternatives, but each have their flaws. With Condorcet methods, obviously there isn't always a Condorcet winner and that is the singular flaw (in that case, it “kicks the can down the road”, leaving you to find another way to settle who the winner is). With STAR, you're using score totals to guess what the irrelevant alternatives are, and that isn’t a lot more than a guess and is absolutely subject to vote splitting at stage one. With IRV you are using a process of elimination to estimate which are irrelevant. Since IRV depends on (inverse) plurality to determine who to eliminate, it also is subject to vote splitting at the elimination stage.

      However, IRV, for all the complaints about it, does do one thing correctly, and that is that the process of elimination that it uses is always better than not using it, in terms of increasing the accuracy and resistance to vote splitting of the final result. That alone doesn't set it apart from other methods, but it just needs to be pointed out: process of elimination is always a good thing in terms of reducing the vote splitting effect, compared to using plurality directly.

      And that last point is what recursive IRV taps into. If, in seeking a final winner, we get better results than plurality by using the process of elimination, why can’t we use the process of elimination to get better results than plurality for deciding who to eliminate? We’re always using plurality, but with each increased level of recursion, we are making it more indirect. The more indirect the usage of plurality, the better the result.

      So recursive Irv, unlike every other voting method I know, can apply its effect over and over until we decide it's “good enough.” In that way, it’s analogous to how we address the computer science problem “binary representations of floating point numbers can never exactly represent certain numbers, like 1/3”. While true in theory, we can just add enough bits and the problem gets less and less significant. If 32 bit floats aren’t good enough, use 64 bit. If 64 bit isn’t good enough, use 128 bit. There is no limit to how many times you can increase the number of bits, and each time you, say, double them, the precision is increased by a predictable amount. It is a straightforward problem to increase the precision. While it has costs, obviously, you don’t need to reinvent anything if you need more precision, you just apply more of the same.

      All my tests shows that recursive IRV will find a Condorcet winner, if they exist, very quickly. I’ve never seen it take more than one extra recursion level. But it doesn’t “seek out the Condorcet winner”, instead, finding the Condorcet winner is a byproduct of a process that makes the method more accurate, more resistant to vote splitting. But since that process still works in the absence of a Condorcet winner, we have something that never has to fall back on some ugly and imperfect kludge.