@toby-pereira said in Entropy-Statistic-Weighted Approval Voting:
While I don't think it would be a good method in practice
The 2 most popular voting systems in practice are IRV and plurality. Anything is a good method in practice
@toby-pereira said in Entropy-Statistic-Weighted Approval Voting:
While I don't think it would be a good method in practice
The 2 most popular voting systems in practice are IRV and plurality. Anything is a good method in practice
@jack-waugh said in What Multiwinner Method To Push For Local Boards?:
Is monotonicity equally so important for the multiwinner context as it is in the single-winner context?
Yesâ€”it makes no sense that, if I give a candidate an extra star, we respond by deciding the candidate is "too good to win" now. It also makes honest voting impossible (because ranking A over B is no longer the same as giving A more support, so you can't give A the correct level of support without knowing everyone else's exact ballot).
@toby-pereira said in Easy-to-explain Proportional (Multiwinner) elections:
By the way, Satisfaction Approval Voting can only be described as semi-proportional. You're wasting part of your vote on candidates that aren't elected. It's like SNTV except that you can split your vote up. They both have similar problems to FPTP.
They might be easy to explain, but they're not worth explaining!
You're right, of course, but that's why I like to bring up SAV as an "obvious" system with an obvious flaw (spoilers). Then I explain how PAV/SPAV fix that flaw with a minor change--split a vote only after a candidate is elected, not before.
@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Also for a score-based method, I'm still not convinced that STAR is the method. I said on the Election Methods list the other day that while basically all methods fail Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), STAR seems to do so in a more wilful way. I'll just quote myself:
That's kind of interesting, because I took you as saying the opposite (which is also my understanding of STAR): that STAR doesn't have to fail IIA (or clone-independence), but intentionally chooses to do so because this leads to a slightly better outcome. With STAR, the optimal strategy is for every party to run 2 candidates, which gives every voter at least two choices they can feel comfortable with.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where both Biden and Kamala Harris were listed separately on the ballot so I could rank Harris higher (and help her win the runoff). Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I disapprove of him for reasons of competence. (But I'm sure as hell not supportive of any other candidate...) With STAR, every voter should have at least two choices they consider tolerable.
Personally, I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have a general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a "primary" where we pick the best nominee by majority vote.
I'd just like to say this looks great and I'm very interested in seeing more! Quantile-normalization like this is very common in statistics. This has one especially nice advantageâ€”it eliminates the "arbitrary number" criticism often made of score voting, which is that voters can assign arbitrary scales to their feelings of support/opposition for candidates that might not line up. Quantile normalization gives an equivalent, statistically well-defined scale for every voter.
Thank you so much for this post! It's great
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
There are several possible methods of converting an approval method to a score method, but the KP-transformation keeps the Pareto dominance relations between candidates and allows the methods to pass the multiplicative and additive versions of scale invariance, so my current thinking is that this is the optimal score conversion.
I'm not 100% sure about this myselfâ€”won't any transformation of the ballots discard some information? I'm not sure if applying the KP transform to range retains the core-approximation properties that make PAV so appealing (i.e. 2-approximation of the core, and satisfying core with enough similar candidates).
@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Ranked Robin
We are planning to come back to the original intention around Ranked Robin, which is to stop branding Condorcet as a whole bunch of systems to fight between, and move to calling them one system, Ranked Robin, with a variety of "tie breaking protocols" a jurisdiction's special committee on niche election protocols could choose between. Honestly, specifying Copeland vs RP vs Minimax is way beyond the level of detail that should even be written into the election code or put to the voters.
Equal Vote's point with the Ranked Robin was never to say that Copeland is better than Ranked Pairs is better than Smith/Minimax. The point is that these are all equivalent in the vast, vast majority of scaled elections and that Condorcet as a whole is top shelf so it should be presented to voters as a better ranked ballot option. Ranked voting advocates should support it. The main reason Condorcet is not seriously considered is because of analysis paralysis and a total lack of interest in branding and marketing for simplicity and accessibility.
So then "Ranked Robin" is just supposed to refer to Condorcet methods in general?
I think that's a good strategy, but the presentation on the website made me think that Ranked Robin means Copeland//Borda specifically.
@masiarek said in "Problematic" Ballot Exhaustion examples - RCV IRV:
We need three small, illustrative elections to demonstrate each â€˜problematicâ€™ box separately (avoid â€˜Less Problematicâ€™ Exhausted Ballots).
Really I'd just hammer IRV over and over again on participation failure. Exhausted ballots are a non-issue.
We need to find better names than "monotonicity" and "participation" that are easy to explain. Monotonicity is a complicated six-syllable word that, in everyday speech, literally means "boringness"â€”no wonder nobody cares. Rename it the basic @#$%ing sanity criterion.
Advertisement: a candidate is declared the winner and starts celebrating; then somebody comes up and explains they've found extra votes for the candidate, and the candidate suddenly loses. End with "Last year, Nick Begich lost the Alaska election because voting authorities thought he had too many votes. How could voting for someone make them lose? Don't let it happen here. Vote no on IRV."
@cfrank said in What does STAR Voting do when 2nd place is tied?:
If we were being engineers about choosing a high quality candidate to win the election, we could even compute the distribution of scores, take the candidates whose scores exceed some elbow point, and find the Condorcet winner among those candidates with the top scoring candidate as the backup if no Condorcet winner exists. Thatâ€™s basically a generalization of STAR with a dynamic front-runner selection method.
What about a 50% cutoff? That would also dramatically reduce the incentive for turkey-raisingâ€”no point in pushing up a bad candidate to help them make the runoff, since now that doesn't eliminate another contender.
2 years later
I think Saari showed in his book that Cycle Cancellation//Condorcet is equivalent to Borda!
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
But - under AB, 150 people have approved A and 150 have approved B. Under CD, 199 have approved C and 103 have approved D. So CD is a disproportional result in that the 103 D voters wield a disproportionate amount of power in parliament. Or perhaps more relevantly, the D party has only about 1/3 of the support but half the power. AB would be more balanced in that respect. Methods that use a measure of proportionality rather than satisfaction (e.g. Phragmen) would tend to elect AB.
Right. I suppose that's what I meant by disliking the idea of making an underrepresented group worse-off just to make the overrepresented one even worse-off.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
COWPEA isn't really a voting method as such though (it's more of a theoretical thing), but COWPEA Lottery could be used as a method. Optimal PAV Lottery would be computationally too hard to be a method I think, although theoretically interesting.
That's surprising. I know there are local councils and similar that use weighted votes, but I can't imagine any legislature or council (especially a small one) using a random method.
@toby-pereira said in What Multiwinner Method To Push For Local Boards?:
Well, SPAV is purely approval whereas SPAV + KP is scores, so which ends up being more proportional might depend on exactly how you define proportional and also how people vote in practice. There's always been the question with score voting of whether some voters will lose out by casting a more honest ballot but losing out strategically.
Thus my question in another thread, about whether Harmonic voting might lose the stable winner set properties of PAV. The stable winner set seems like it could provide some very strong strategy-resistance properties, similar to Condorcet in single-winner elections.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
99: AC
51: AD
99: BC
51: BD
1: C
1: D
I'm not really seeing what the problem with electing C & D here is supposed to be It seems like a gain for only 2 voters, so I might be missing something, but I'm not seeing what would make that bad.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
Right, but it's debatable whether a voter's utility is purely determined by approved candidates elected.
I'll briefly set aside the "approved" part and focus on score voting more broadly (since voters rarely have dichotomous preferences).
I'm not sure why the distribution of like this would particularly matter. The way I'd model is that each candidate is assigned a utility equal to the (importance-weighted) probability that they'll break a tied vote in my favor. I'm not sure why it would be better for me to have a legislator who casts votes that represent my interests less often, or why it would be better for me to have a legislator supported by fewer voters.
@jack-waugh said in What Multiwinner Method To Push For Local Boards?:
Is monotonicity equally so important for the multiwinner context as it is in the single-winner context?
Yesâ€”it makes no sense that, if I give a candidate an extra star, we respond by deciding the candidate is "too good to win" now. It also makes honest voting impossible (because ranking A over B is no longer the same as giving A more support, so you can't give A the correct level of support without knowing everyone else's exact ballot).
@gregw said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
@lime said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
I basically agree, but I think we should probably try to squeeze out at least a "Combined approval voting" (-1, 0, 1) option to make Burr candidates a bit less harmful.
Would -1, 0, 1 lose the Majority Criterion? If so would that make much difference in compliance with state constitutions?
I don't really think of Woodall's majority-favorite property as being applicable to cardinal systems, since it's based on comparisons of candidates. I also doubt it's written into any state constitutions.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
OK, I'm not sure how the KP-transformation would affect these things. Do you specifically think it's likely to be any worse than any other transformation, or is it general concerns about any transformation that hasn't been demonstrated to pass these things?
General concern about transformations. My worry is transforming score ballots to approval ballots discards information about which voter gave which ratings, so I'm not sure it will preserve the stable winner set properties of PAV.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
In any case, I definitely think PAV + KP is better than RRV or SDV because of its scale invariance, and I don't see any particular advantages of these methods over it.
Oh, definitely, harmonic voting is great! (Although it needs a less intimidating name.)
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
By the way, COWPEA fails the multiwinner Pareto criterion in the example I gave above, so might have core failings as well. Certainly in the IIB version of core (where you ignore voters who are indifferent between competing sets and just look at the proportion who favour each one of those who have a preference), it would fail. But I don't see this as a failing of COWPEA, just a different PR philosophy.
This is a much bigger hangup for me personally. If everyone agrees a different committee would be better, then leveling-down (making some people worse-off, just to make the outcome more equal/proportional) strikes me as wrong.
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
@lime said
I'm not 100% sure about this myselfâ€”won't any transformation of the ballots discard some information? I'm not sure if applying the KP transform to range retains the core-approximation properties that make PAV so appealing (i.e. 2-approximation of the core, and satisfying core with enough similar candidates).
Can you remind me exactly what these mean?
And I'm glad you liked the post!
K-approximation means K Hare quotas would prefer another committee (instead of just 1).
And if every candidate has infinitely many clones, you can guarantee the method will choose from the core (see here).
I'm wondering if some method can keep these properties in the score voting case.
Thank you so much for this post! It's great
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
There are several possible methods of converting an approval method to a score method, but the KP-transformation keeps the Pareto dominance relations between candidates and allows the methods to pass the multiplicative and additive versions of scale invariance, so my current thinking is that this is the optimal score conversion.
I'm not 100% sure about this myselfâ€”won't any transformation of the ballots discard some information? I'm not sure if applying the KP transform to range retains the core-approximation properties that make PAV so appealing (i.e. 2-approximation of the core, and satisfying core with enough similar candidates).
Agreed with Toby, PAV is solid.
OTOH, I'll point out if they're using STV already that STV is by far the most complicated proportional representation algorithm out there, if they actually understand it and haven't just tricked themselves into thinking they understand it.
To see whether they understand it, ask if they use Warren, Meek, or Wright's method. (If they say Gregory's method, you can hijack the committee by building a coalition of strategic voters. )