Successive Rank Voting
Again, what about Coombs?
Evidently "PDX" has come to mean Portland, Oregon, by virtue of being the code both of its airport and its railroad station.
All voting methods which pass Later No Harm fail Favorite Betrayal Criteria,
Also worth pointing out that you must have "later No Harm" (non-compromising) or the chicken dilemma. Later no harm can cause you to get the wrong winner when everybody is honest but Chicken Dilemma stratigies only have pay off if the strategy is used effectively and can also cost you. In STAR the cost of the alternative vs the favorite is 1/5. ie if you want to minimally score a lesser evil you would give them a 1. This makes the chicken dilemma 5 times less incentivized than in Approval.
If you want to take this to the extreme you could argue that giving the lesser evil 1/5 of our favorite is too much. We could do STAR on a [0,100] scale or even more. Clearly this would allow more expression at the cost of complexity. If it was a zero to 1 million then I am sure your complaint about STAR would vanish. Fundamentally I do not think your issue is with STAR itself but in this one scenario where 5-STAR is not expressive enough. Where is the line where you would make a cut off on the ganularity?
SaraWolk last edited by
@Keith It's worth noting that we considered STAR 0-9 and other scales, but 0-5 is the sweet spot; best for cognitive load, great outcomes, and better strategic resilience. The bigger the scale the bigger the impacts of tactical voting would be.
Practical considerations like ballot design have to be taken into account too. In order to prevent spoiled voided ballots due to bad handwriting and people whose 1s look like 7s and so on you really need a row of bubbles. To many bubbles is not good. Too few choices is also not good.
SaraWolk last edited by SaraWolk
In STAR Voting your vote goes to the finalist you prefer. Its constitutional, fully, and dovetails well with the Oregon constitution's wording and history. We have never had any problems or concerns raised on this by our lawyers, by the constitutional review that was done for our ballot initiatives, and there were no concerns on this raised when the Oregon Legislative Committee drafted HB 3250 STAR Voting for Oregon.
We are not sure if Approval would have problems, but as mandated, in STAR your vote only even goes to one candidate and that only happens once, in the runoff.
Here's the relevant text from their own initiative, Section 3-5:
(5) Each ballot cast shall be tallied to determine, for each office, which of the two candidates identified in subsection (4)(b) of this section receives the vote of each elector that
cast a ballot in the election. For the purpose of vote tallying under this subsection:
(a) The candidate who received the higher score from an elector, as calculated under
subsection (4) of this section, shall receive the vote from that elector.
(b) If the two candidates received the same score from an elector, neither candidate may
receive the vote of that elector.
(c) The individual who receives the most votes, as calculated under this subsection, is
nominated or elected to the office.
What State are you in?
@SaraWolk Sorry I haven't had time to formulate an answer to your replies, and even this reply will be minimal.
One comment I have is that it IS possible to ensure a majority if all voters express a preference when there is no harm (to more favored candidates) in doing so. The Portland election used plurality voting and allowed write-in candidates, so it was not a true runoff between two candidates. I think RCV/IRV would have produced a majority. In what sense do you mean that IRV does not count every ballot in the runoff?
I would like to know your criticism of the last method I proposed:
http://www.classicalmatter.org/Election Science/BAIR Voting.pdf
It is Bucklin voting for three rounds, and if no candidate has a majority then there is a "true" runoff between the two most approved candidates. By "true" runoff I mean that every voter may express a preference without risk to more favored candidates.
I think your arguments against later-no-harm do not apply if the voter can choose between later-no-harm and no friend betrayal.
@Jack-Waugh Coombs has some appeal, but I think it has a similar problem to the coercive Bucklin voting that I considered before: voters will not rank their lower choices honestly.
voters will not rank their lower choices honestly
By "lower choices", do you mean the candidates they absolutely hate the most, or those in the middle? Would you give an example of the voter's rating of the candidates and their dishonest ranking? Are you using my proposed refinement, where a candidate's being unranked by a voter would count against that candidate? A ballot that leaves any candidates unranked would count against every unranked candidate that is still in the running, but not against the last-explicitly-ranked candidate.
@Jack-Waugh I mean that partisan voters will rank their candidate first and the main opposition last. So one (or both?) of the top contenders is likely to be eliminated early.