@cfrank said in election by jury (www.electionbyjury.com/manifesto):

@clay, there is no purpose in continuing this discussion with you. Your approach to discourse is unlikely to convince others, and it is not because you are right while everyone else is wrong. A good-faith response to a serious objection is to examine the premise and answer the question—not repeatedly declare the questioner confused.

I have meticulously dismantled your arguments point by point.

for example, you made the classic fallacy of thinking my arguments require interpersonal utility comparisons. but harsanyi's observation is that you don't need this at all. The outcome with the highest group utility will also have the highest expected utility for you in your own utility scale without any need to have the different utilities in common units.

when you think about it for a second this is trivially obvious from grade school level mathematics. but I actually cited a voluminous link about it written by a math PhD who is widely regarded as the foremost expert in this field and you STILL just ignored it.

My point here was not just "convincing", it is trivially obviously true. and you're in a forum that is literally called "voting theory"—yet you have chosen to not just spend a little time reading about the foundational principles of the field that literally any expert in the field is familiar with. you should really reflect on this. this would be like going into a climate change debate and saying climate change isn't happening because there was an unusually bad winter storm somewhere. anybody familiar with the topic would absolutely roast you for failing to grasp a multitude of basic scientific concepts that anybody up for a debate should have invested the time learning about.

for what it's worth, i've decided to keep my name the americanized shentrup and not legally change it back to the original german spelling, for several reasons. so i'll be changing my online profiles over time LOL.

@toby-pereira said in score voting is king, condorcet not so much:

It's been said that score suffers worse with one-sided strategy than other methods. That is - if the supporters of one candidate strategise more than the supporters of another, then the result will be more skewed (favour the strategisers) under score than some other methods. Would you agree with that, and do you see it as a problem?

I ran it on a spatial bimodal electorate with a realistic (half-random) viability signal, average strategy pinned at 90%, comparing symmetric (90% of each faction strategizes) against the most lopsided split possible at that level (100% of one faction, 80% of the other).

method 90/90 symmetric 100/80 asymmetric change Score (0–5) 0.943 0.933 −0.010 Approval 0.926 0.921 −0.005 STAR 0.914 0.905 −0.009 Ranked Pairs 0.874 0.859 −0.016 Schulze 0.863 0.840 −0.022

So at a fixed strategy level, adding maximum asymmetry costs Score about a point, and costs the Condorcet methods more, Ranked Pairs −0.016, Schulze −0.022. Approval is the most robust of all. The ordering of who's hurt is the reverse of the claim: one-sided strategy is harder on the ranked methods here than on the cardinal ones.

I'd agree the underlying property is real, score does respond to one-sided exaggeration. But two things keep it from being a problem in practice. The optimal score strategy is just threshold voting (approve/max everyone above your expected value of the winner), which is close to a sincere ballot, so the distortion per unit of asymmetry is small. And every method has an asymmetric-strategy weakness; the ranked methods' version is burial, which diverges much further from sincerity and does more damage, which is what the table shows.

2886b1d8-338c-4f1c-b37b-c3a7b9ff865c-image.png

The first two voters fail to use the endpoints of the range available to them. Do you expect such behavior in political elections that matter? I think comparisons of voting systems based on hypothetical examples should begin with the voters' valuations of the possibilities normalized. I don't know that it's worth studying examples where voters voluntarily give up power. We as students of these systems need all the time and attention we can put on cases where the purpose of the election is to resolve strong political disagreement among the voters. We need elections to work well when the voters are struggling for political power. Such voters would use the endpoints of the range unless they are not properly informed as to how the system works.