@Keith said in S-TM: If there was two candidates supported by the largest bloc of about 40% of the voters they would still fight with eachother. Yes, but they would still both be supported by that 40% because they both don't want to do things that make them lose that block. Positive the fact that they try to have the block bigger and bigger, but if the block is for example "Republican", it will remain "Republican" (as well as the 2 candidates who then end up in the automatic runoff). Also, falling back to score is not something I would view as a problem The problem is that if you end up in Score Voting then you might as well use Score Voting from the start, which is simpler (but has its downsides).

@Jack-Waugh, Thanks for working through all these examples. I, too, had some questions about the GF vote, or the more general instructions regarding always voting for every alternative subjectively preferred over the focus. For a GF vote to be instrumental in impeding termination, the G vote total would have to be at least a strict majority (that is: F > half, because equal to half is not sufficient), and the F vote total would have to be the maximum vote count and exactly equal to the G vote total. Thus it is possible for a GF vote to hinder termination. However, in addition to G blocking termination, G is preferred by the voter over F, so G blocking theloop termination with F as the final winner is also indicating the possibility for G to be a later focus and possibly a better final outcome. For testing purposes I wrote voter-agent code for voting to stop the loop. This strictly speaking is not part of SAVE, but it does indicate what I think voters might do. Each voter-agent has a property called indifference, which is a fraction between 0.0 and 1.0. At 0.0 the slightest difference matters, while at 1.0 the voter is totally indifferent to the alternatives. All voters start at 0.0 and increment their indifference value (1) every time the focus is a Condorcet winner (because if we cannot improve upon a Condorcet winner we will eventually accept it), and (2) whenever the focus subjectively improves after having first moved away (when the focus move away, such as when in a majority cycle, we also want to be more accepting, but only as we're coming back). These are the five basic reasons for an agent to vote for the focus: Ideal - the focus is close to the voter's subjective ideal alternative. Cluster - the best and the worst of the most recent focus alternatives are really close together. Top-half - the spread between the best and the worst is moderately close (3x indifference) and the focus is in the top half of that spread. Limited-gain - the focus is close to the upper limit to any potential future gains. Peak - the focus is as good or better than a focus that was followed by a movement away from the agent's idea. All of these conditions except Peak use the indifference value. The conditions are ordered from most difficult to satisfy to the easiest to satisfy. The reason I bring this up is because I think voters might well vote for loop termination on the off-chance they can get a better result more quickly. Which implies a vote to terminate usually does not mean "I really want to terminate now" but instead is the kinder and gentler "it is okay to terminate now". Under those circumstances, the GF vote is perfectly reasonable, and supports the possibility of termination without foregoing the chance to influence the next focus choice.

@SaraWolk Nevertheless, you have not as yet provided an example, starting with voter desire, and leading to different outcomes between STAR and Score.

For any thought you may have in mind and want to communicate, there must be a clear way to express it in plain English. I find it frustrating that your response is to leave out some of the ideas you tried to articulate. I guess it is better to be somewhat "incorrect" than to be bullied into silence by a pedant. Maybe I am underestimating the ability of readers to see the intent behind writing that looks to me not to be availing itself of the precision that our glorious language offers. OK, here's a pretty credible-looking reference that says you are right and I am wrong on "forums".

@Marylander said in Approval vs. IRV: [IRV] will strike out everyone but the top two, then pick the most preferred candidate between the two. The current system does that just fine.

@Psephomancy and @BTernaryTau, if you are willing to be available in case anything happens to me, to try to help the forum council maintain technical control of the workings underlying the forum, please send your public keys for SSH in the format used on typical Linux-based systems. If you are used to using PUTTY (an SSH tool for Microsoft Windows), I think it uses a different format for the keys, and I don't know how to convert them.

@Psephomancy said in Waterfox: I guess I should have specified "Waterfox Classic". It still doesn't work there. Solved.

I'm not sure why we can't have proxy representation; it seems to me to give the people more power than merely filling seats does. But anyway, assuming proxy is off the table, what is the most important criterion for choosing among proportional voting systems?

@robertpdx said in Vote for 2 then Instant Runoff: "Vote for 2" is a standard, well-accepted method for choosing two winners. And a runoff is the standard, well-accepted method for deciding between two candidates. So I propose to combine those two steps into a single election. Right, well, that's an interesting point. If Vote for 2 then Instant Runoff can be sold to Joe Sixpack on account of its being based on well-accepted methods, but Approval cannot, because it is novel, then getting something better than FPtP/IRV in place may be better than nothing, in helping to replace the omnicidal regime with a people's regime.

Great. I updated it as suggested. If Connor and David approve it as well we can call it done and check the Code of Conduct off the list.

@Marylander "The emails appear to be coming from theory@votingtheory.org" -- Yes, I set that. They have to come from some e-mail address, even if it doesn't make particular sense to reply to that address. Maybe I should set up a "no-reply@votingtheory.org" address.

@SaraWolk Test 2 nesting replies

@SaraWolk said in Calling for the Next Council Meeting!: I propose we meet next on Wednesday Feb 17th, at 7:30 Pacific. Hi All, I'm confirming and reminding you all that we have our next forum meeting tomorrow at 7:30 PST. Privacy policy. Ready for review. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QzZp2QAsP60Ti1WWPk29Q8dInGIM2l438rcJDZLd2Ug/edit?usp=sharing Terms of Service. Ready for review.: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AlnP1gvvc986n0iiYYkA0Tc9L33erbxDftM7sX5ypz4/edit?usp=sharing Code of Conduct. Ready for review.: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ExGrryHIFOjSfPiTtHYBRPw7GQY8lRsCfWiWsLEsImc/edit?usp=sharing Please invite people who would make great moderators. See you there! Join Zoom Meeting https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89174966453 Meeting ID: 891 7496 6453 One tap mobile +13462487799,,89174966453# US (Houston) +16699006833,,89174966453# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 929 205 6099 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) Meeting ID: 891 7496 6453 Find your local number: https://us02web.zoom.us/u/ksaEry1kk

@Marylander They would require separate work iff they are in separate formats. Maybe we need to ask stakeholders for a rating of the value of each type of archive, grouping them by format if any two of them have the same format.

@tec said in Proxy: This seems a lot like liquid democracy, Schemes involving proxy power indeed resemble one another to at least that degree, that they involve proxy power. I would like readers to evaluate them separately, and not tar one with the drawbacks they see in another. And in particular, I live in the US, and am concerned about the effect on the world of US politics, and I would like other US residents to weigh in on my suggestions. I propose that proxy would only be given in voting booths, with the same ballot secrecy as US people are accustomed to for voting on who can serve in office. And the opportunity would only come up every two years. Proxy could not be revoked except on those opportunities. This would limit the overhead costs of communication and certification of the expressed wills of the citizens. It would limit the risk of votes and proxies being coerced out of citizens. Here is another variant of my proposal, which could reduce overhead. Instead of having to go to the polls once to allocate space in the legislative chamber to representatives and returning to the polls to give proxy to someone from among those seated, with this variation, only one visit to the polls per election season would be necessary. Voters would fill out two sections on the ballot. The top section would list the candidates and invite approval or disapproval of each for seating. In the bottom section, the voter would list candidates in order of that voter's decision about giving proxy. The highest candidate on the voter's list who is seated would receive that proxy.

I added a sentence on explicitly opting in to email notifications under section 1. From what I read I think we may need this in there for legal reasons. "If you create an account on the Website, you are explicitly authorizing the Forum to send you emails regarding forum activity and updates. You may opt out of most email notifications at any time."

I put in a scheme to renew the TLS certs regularly, but won't know until about March whether it works.

Let's just make all the Council members admin/moderators. Connor, I'm not clear on what you're suggesting for default notification settings? On? Off? I did some reading up and it looks like some places have laws that people have to explicitly opt in for all emails, and I think that's maybe why we can't find default settings to change that.

In conversation after conversation about the single-winner context, my interlocutors express doubt in the importance of balance. In defending my position that balance matters, I invite you to join me in analyzing how Choose-one Plurality Voting empowers the ruling class. In talking about such an analysis, I will highlight a role played by lack of balance. I contend that this role is central to the mechanism. Background readings: The "Cash3" document by Warren D. Smith, Ph. D. "The Equal Vote" by probably substantially Mark Frohnmayer and his father. The "Prisoner's Dilemma" thought experiment and paradigm for real experiments, from Game Theory. [More later.]