@toby-pereira Anything can be argued and counter-argued in court, but my assessment above is based on what a fair and likely ruling would be, in my professional opinion.

I'm not a lawyer, but have been studying these things for years and we did win the case in the Oregon Supreme Court against the Oregon Legislative Council which found that RCV's ballot title in Oregon was misleading and inaccurate as it pertains to RCV's majority winner claims, though there is apparently no mechanism anymore to enforce such a ruling.

Two confounding data points:

RCV has spent years making the argument that RCV guarantees majority winners. That's directly at odds with an argument that it guarantees plurality winners. Ironically, there's a solid case to be made that due to exhausted ballots it guarantees neither. The Constitution of Maine Article IV, Section 5 requires that winners be elected "by a plurality of ALL votes returned.” In cases like these where the wording is explicit that it's "all" votes "returned" or all votes "cast" RCV is eliminated from compliance by the existence of exhausted ballots alone.
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@sarawolk I can envision a natural progression as: (1) implement straight approval, (2) eventually indicate the shortcomings of approval in guaranteeing election of Smith set candidates, (3) reform to include a ranked primaries to restrict to the Smith set before the final approval vote.

I agree it is not feasible to implement the kind of change needed for the mentioned kind of system all at once.

If approval were established somehow, the (rational, IMO) debate relevant to (2) and (3) would probably be about majoritarianism versus participation and maybe some tactical considerations.

Your point about tie-breaking is fair. For example, why not use Bucklin voting restricted to the Smith set, adjusting ranks to include only those candidates, which is similar to your suggestion. One major reason in that specific case is because it fails independence of clones.

I’m not necessarily just after a simple tie breaker. My concern is with reconciling majority cycles, which can destabilize the system. Something like approval in a second round enables the competing majorities to compromise more directly with full information. Otherwise a true majority may feel jilted by an arbitrary tie breaking rule.

@gregw I think Condorcet is great when a Condorcet winner exists, but when one doesn’t exist it’s really troublesome. Ideally, we would have a method to check whether one exists without unearthing the Condorcet cycle that reveals the jilted majority upon the choosing of any winner, but that is essentially impossible.

I think it makes sense to do Condorcet//Approval, in two separate rounds, the approval round restricted to the Smith set. But two round voting outright is a difficult sell in the USA (even though two-round voting is pretty common all over the rest of the world…).

People try to put the two together in a single round vote, but the strategic incentives of casting rank and approval/score indications on the same ballot cause issues.

My personal belief is that this system of two-round voting for single winner elections, I.e. approval conditional on already knowing the Smith set, would be most ideal. I think actually implementing the approval aspect first however is an easier sell than implementing the Condorcet aspect first. I can envision a natural progression as: (1) implement straight approval, (2) eventually indicate the shortcomings of approval in guaranteeing election of Smith set candidates, (3) reform to include a ranked primaries to restrict to the Smith set before the final approval vote.

I feel even having rank/Smith-based primaries makes way more sense than what we have if the subsequent system is approval. There’s no issue with vote splitting in that instance, and it fits at least partially into the political system we already have (although this would also require substantial changes).

@cse4129 no problem, that’s what forums are for! Your idea is good, it just happens it was already invented. It also does have some problems/failed properties, though (like any method).

For example, it isn’t Condorcet compliant or Condorcet loser compliant, and it fails participation. It doesn’t satisfy independence of clones either, and it fails various other binary criteria. That doesn’t mean it’s a bad method, but it means it can occasionally produce pathological results. It satisfies the majority winner and majority loser criterion, and later-no-help.

There’s a “mind map” I made some years ago of some of the best-known/characterized voting systems in terms of the binary criteria they satisfy and fail in that discussion above. Probably nowadays I would make a better one (I might at some point). I should have done something like PCA or a graph embedding, but I tried to make that map before I knew about those analysis methods.

@jack-waugh I’m imagining the decisions could be automated by making assumptions about the group utility and computing the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game.

The deepest problem there is the utility function, since it would be an aggregate utility of some kind that we would have to presume emerged somehow from the individual utility functions of the voters that constitute the group.

All of that is definitely questionable, I don’t believe in utility functions, but I’m unsure how else to proceed in putting this kind of situation into an analytical framework.