@lime said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
@toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:
By the way, COWPEA fails the multiwinner Pareto criterion in the example I gave above, so might have core failings as well. Certainly in the IIB version of core (where you ignore voters who are indifferent between competing sets and just look at the proportion who favour each one of those who have a preference), it would fail. But I don't see this as a failing of COWPEA, just a different PR philosophy.
This is a much bigger hangup for me personally. If everyone agrees a different committee would be better, then leveling-down (making some people worse-off, just to make the outcome more equal/proportional) strikes me as wrong.
Right, but it's debatable whether a voter's utility is purely determined by approved candidates elected. A voter is better represented in parliament if they share their representative with fewer other voters. So in the example up the thread:
250: AC
250: AD
250: BC
250: BD
2: C
2: D
A and B are more attractive options to most voters.