However I think it's still useful to study such methods, as you never know how voters' moods will change, and maybe a simpler method like one I listed can act as a stepping stone towards a more complex one.
Yeah, I'm ok with that. There's certainly nothing wrong with studying them, and it seems to be a good method if complexity isn't an issue.
And I totally understand why they published it the way they did. If all they did was provide a reason to switch to a better existing method, well.... that would be a pretty lame academic paper.
I just felt that their lead up was very good, they called out two real problems with IRV, then suggest that there are only two options:
we must consider which of the following approaches is preferable:
(1) deciding almost every election in a simple way—just elect the Condorcet winner—and rarely applying a more complicated backup plan, perhaps more complicated than IRV, or
(2) deciding many elections with a fairly complicated iterative elimination of candidates and transferring of votes, which may cause controversy when failing to elect a candidate who beats every other?
Without mentioning a third:
3) deciding almost every election in a simple way—just elect the Condorcet winner—and rarely applying the tried and tested IRV method
I should add, there are two kinds of complexity. IRV is complex in that it goes through this messy process which seems to delay election results (presumably because of its lack of precinct summability? I mean, computers are fast so that alone shouldn't be an issue. )
But IRV is easy enough to explain, and it has already been put into legislation, so all you have to do is copy and paste from, say, San Francisco's law.
The other kind of complexity is what we have with Stable Voting. It is recursive and seems pretty hard to explain, especially in a way that can be put into legal code.