@isocratia hmmm I still would like to see an example of the difference. Like I said I think your method is sufficient but I’m not sold yet on the necessary part. It might not matter anyway since sufficiency is by definition good enough! But I’m just curious.
@sarawolk yes more or less a thought experiment, trying to address some dissonance between the possibility of a Condorcet winner having low support and a support (approval) winner being different from the Condorcet winner even when one exists.
In this case, I mean that a candidate is either supported or not supported by a voter according to the support cutoff of their ballot. I’m using the word “support” rather than “approval,” because I don’t think approval is an appropriate word philosophically (or mathematically). The positive emotional connotation of “approve” is all that bothers me. “Support” seems more emotionally neutral and has a mathematical meaning that aligns well with what is happening in the system, for example, “the support of a distribution.”
The quantity of support of a candidate is simply the number of voters who formally support that candidate on their ballot.
Here is another attempt at a modification. In sequence, if there is a Condorcet loser, they are eliminated. If there is no Condorcet loser, a candidate with the least quantity of support is eliminated, with ties broken by rank runoff if possible. Repeat until one candidate remains.
2CV now ensures, unlike any other proposed system, that the winner will, under all circumstances, be one who received at least 51% of 1st or 2nd choice votes.
A voters 2nd choice may be as good as their favorite or almost as bad as their last choice. There's no way to know, so ensuring a majority of 1st and 2nd choice votes is meaningless. Also, in any election where you can support multiple candidates there could be multiple majority supported options. The key is to find the one with the most support by looking at strength of support and/or number of voters who prefer them, ideally both.
I think we've already gone in circles about your other responses in previous conversations so I won't repeat that again here.
Here's a simple example to show proportionality. This example works the same no matter what the measure of support. Basically, all these measures are clones of STV but without vote splitting. The measures I'm talking about are score, smallest pairwise win, and strongest beatpath. Also, I should say that I don't really know if the measures would work for sorting.
2 parties: A, B.
quota: 50 voters.
The votes are A 55, B 45.
The best quotas of 50 voters give A 50 and B 45.
A gets a seat. The quota of 50 A-voters are removed.
Now we count the remaining voters, A 5, B 45.
B gets a seat.
@masiarek I really like a new method that takes some time to understand. It's called a dodgson-hare synthesis
Abstract: In 1876, Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll) proposed a committee election procedure that chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists, and otherwise eliminates candidates outside the Smith set, then allows for re-votes until a Condorcet winner emerges. The present paper discusses Dodgson’s work in the context of strategic election behavior and suggests a “Dodgson-Hare” method: a variation on Dodgson’s procedure for use in public elections, which allows for candidate withdrawal and employs Hare’s plurality-loser-elimination method to resolve the most persistent cycles. Given plausible (but not unassailable) assumptions about how candidates decide to withdraw in the case of a cycle, Dodgson-Hare outperforms Hare, Condorcet-Hare, and 12 other voting rules in a series of spatial-model simulations which count how often each rule is vulnerable to coalitional manipulation. In the special case of a one-dimensional spatial model, all coalitional voting strategies that are possible under Condorcet-Hare can be undone in Dodgson-Hare, by the withdrawal of candidates who have incentive to withdraw.
Under IRV, B will win this election. That doesn't pass "majority rule, which ensures the election of a candidate from the majority coalition while preventing opposition voters from influencing the choice of candidate from the faction they oppose."
As I've thought about it more, if there's a Condorcet Winner, then cloning is irrelevant under Ranked Robin, making it an unreliable strategy.
It's not just about strategy though, as said above. A potentially "wrong" result could still happen by accident.
Also, basically all Condorcet methods fail Participation. It comes with the territory.
Yes, it's very hard for methods to pass it in general. So relative to other Condorcet methods this doesn't count against Ranked Robin.
Moreover, focusing on pass/fail criteria is the issue that caused voting enthusiasts not to achieve real-world progress for 200 years. The question is not "Does this method pass this criterion 100% of the time?"; the question is "How well does this voting method perform on this metric in practice?". Considering that cloning is only helpful under Ranked Robin when there's no Condorcet Winner and that scaled elections without Condorcet Winners are incredibly rare and difficult to predict, I see it as a nonissue.
I agree that overall performance (however one might measure it) isn't necessarily the same as just how many criterion boxes you can tick. However, if a method does fail a criterion, it still doesn't look good if there is another method that is as good elsewhere that also passes this criterion.
And just to set the record straight, I think Approval and Score are great methods. I absolutely support them and would be very happy to see their use in public elections.
That's good. I think they and Condorcet methods have merit.
I started on some simulation code. The simulation in it is incorrect and even then, only attempted to address one voting system. The parts of the program where it collects the problem definition from the user/researcher and abandons the simulation if it is still running when the researcher changes the problem (which can require so little action as moving a slider control), work correctly. However, since the start of 2023, I have been acting out an obsession with rewriting the underlying computer-sciencey stuff as cleaner code (but not changing the basic strategy).
@jack-waugh I agree soundly with you. There are many ultimately nihilistic profit seekers who are driving destructive tendencies of the global market, and that’s a full euphemism. It isn’t clear whether that nihilism is actually a value construct (well, it seems if anything to be quite rightly the opposite of one, really) or whether it’s due to a typical lack of awareness or contemplation. But a third alternative is also available, which is a simple (and in enough cases, severe) deficiency in moral character.
Another related topic I consider in this area is the attention economy. You allude essentially to addiction and what I don’t have vocabulary for beyond “post-modernist consumerism.” In my opinion, global attention is a public good that is now being subjected to the tragedy of the commons, and that is all resulting from a de-compartmentalization of access points to attention. It’s also another prisoner’s dilemma. Space and time no longer serve the functional roles of localizing attention to natural social public spheres and communities, and this only drives the lack of awareness and other issues related to mental health (I.e. attention starvation on a global scale, with concomitant depression, I.e. “influencers,” onlyfans, TikTok, etc.). More and more pornographization, commodification and exploitation of human life, even people exploiting themselves.
The only thing I can see that could possibly supplement those barriers is either an artificial enforcement of barriers (a frightening thought) or awareness and personal character. In other words, externally imposed barriers, or barriers of personal choice. Interesting times we live in. Anyway I’m glad at least that others can see this is all more than “just” a moralistic issue.
On a side note, while we’re at the water cooler, I will just mention that I watched a portion of the first Republican candidate debate. I will summarize my thoughts as, “Wow.”
Condorcet method, so the main thing (in my view) to look out for is whether or not its cycle-resolving rule makes it immune to turkey-raising or not.
I've heard that a few Condorcet methods are immune to turkey-raising but I don't have more info about this.
Perhaps, in the event of a false Condorcet cycle generated by tactical voting, the smallest-margin victory will always belong to the "turkey".