Proposed options for "voting on voting methods"
multi_system_fan last edited by
@rob no, I read about it somewhere but can't find it....
Jack Waugh last edited by Jack Waugh
Can we have Reverse STAR as an option?
rob last edited by rob
@jack-waugh This one? https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/130/star-like-method-reverse-star
That falls under "cardinal-condorcet." (Condorcet compliant methods with score ballots)
It's basically Copeland//score ... since it does pairwise wins first, of those tied for first place, elect the one with the highest score tally. But if there is a Condorcet winner, that will be the winner and the score tally is never looked at.
I think it is a good method, if cardinal ballots are possible and if precinct summability is important. (if precinct summability is not important, and a little complexity is ok, I think it would be better if it normalized the ballots after eliminating the copeland-losers).
Are you ok with it just being a subset of cardinal-condorcet (which also includes Score Sorted Margins)? I'll bet is is really, really hard to find a scenario where the results would differ between various cardinal-condorcet methods.
@rob I think this collection of voting systems would be great as the candidate pool for the vote on voting methods, although personally I will have to do some reading about the distinctions between some of the different Condorcet methods. We may also include distributed voting because it is another distinct framework that increases the diversity of the candidate pool, and another system I would want to include is Bucklin voting, which is a non-Condorcet method somewhat similar to ranked-IRV but without vote transfers. I also think including some method that produces a metric combining score/rank and statistical dispersion (variance/IQR) to choose the winner would be good, and possibly for/against because again it increases diversity.
I think a separate vote on preferred Condorcet tie-breaking methods (given that a Condorcet method is being used, of course) would be interesting as well, since this is also a central topic in voting theory literature whether or not a Condorcet method is preferred in the first place.
Less importantly maybe, we could have a vote about tie-breaking methods in general. The book "Economics and Computation" (edited by J. Rothe) suggests that it "may also be appropriate to not implement a specific tie-breaking rule, but to randomly choose one from several 'reasonable' tie-breaking rules" (p. 250).
rob last edited by rob
@cfrank I'll make sure to include Bucklin.
The book "Economics and Computation" (edited by J. Rothe) suggest that it "may also be appropriate to not implement a specific tie-breaking rule, but to randomly choose one from several 'reasonable' tie-breaking rules
Ewwww. Not a fan of random anything.
My current thinking on Condorcet is that, preferable to finding the Condorcet winner directly and then doing something else if there is none, is to have a singular mechanism that determines the winner (always, unless there is a "true tie" which becomes less and less likely with large numbers of voters), that just happens to be Condorcet compliant. BTR-IRV is a good example. My intuition is that it is less likely to provide an incentive to strategically try to create a cycle, if a cycle isn't really a major "thing".
Anyway, that's probably just semantics (as to whether it is a tie breaker) and straying a bit from voting on voting methods.