Posts made by GregW

Opps – Correction

I made a mistake in an earlier post on this thread:

I stated that in a BTR-Score election with a 3-way cycle, the highest seed in the cycle would have a 50% chance of winning, and the two lower seeds would each have a 25% chance of winning.

This is incorrect. The highest seed in the cycle would always win.

Consider this BTR-Score tournament with a 3-way cycle:

Candidate A is the highest seed in the cycle.
Candidate B is the 2nd highest seed in the cycle.
Candidate C is the 3rd highest seed in the cycle.

In every such election, B and C will face off in the tournament; the winner will then face A in the deciding contest.

In a 3-way cycle, each of the candidates wins one match and loses one match to the other two candidates. The winner of the B vs C contest uses its only win to prevail; therefore, that winner has no chance of defeating A.

2 Possibilities:
A > B > C > A - B beats C then B loses to A
C > B > A > C - C beats B then C loses to A

A BTR-Score election with a Condorcet winner rewards majority.

A BTR-Score without a Condorcet winner rewards utility.

It would be possible, but extremely weird, for a BTR-Score election to have a 3-way cycle that does not include the top seed, the candidate with the highest total score.

Thank you for the plan!

Maximal Lotteries has unprecedented criterion compliance but we will need some human progress before we get the public to buy in.

The benefits of Maximal Lotteries are impressive. What would be the basic procedure to use Maximal Lotteries in a public election?

Thank you for the help!

Maximal Lotteries and BTR-Score
In the case of a BTR-Score election 3-way cycle, the probabilities of winning for each of the three candidates are set in stone. The survivor of the first N - 2 rounds (N = number of candidates) of the bottom 2 runoff tournament has a 1 in 4 chance of winning. The candidate with the second highest total score (2nd seed) also has a 1 in 4 chance. The candidate with the highest score (top seed) has a 2 in 4 chance of winning.

A Maximal Lotteries vote with a 3-way cycle should produce is more nuanced set of probabilities. Maximal Lotteries also has impressive criteria compliance. Significant improvements over BTR-Score. Unfortunately, I do not understand Maximal Lotteries enough to sell it to the public. Can you point me in the right direction?

Approval Voting
Approval voting is a great method; it asks one critical question: do you approve of this candidate are not?

I believe that BTR-Score is an easier sell because it enables more voter expression. It has more sizzle. In an Approval race you can only indicate your favorite candidate by approving that candidate only; too much like plurality. More expressive voting methods like BTR-Score provide more information about voter preferences to the public, the press, and politicians.

You might recall that I created an election reform website, VotersTakeCharges in 2024. It did not fare so well. In the spring of 2025, I tried Voters.News, not much better.
Recently, I combined election reform, including campaign finance reform (the Montana Plan to eliminate corporate election spending), with economic reforms at Voters.Army. This is more popular.

I am advocating for BTR-Score for single-winner elections, but I need some help with a few questions:

Who invented BTR-Score, and how can I contact this person?
Would BTR-Score be a good way to choose four candidates in a blanket primary?

If so, would the BTR tournament need to be run four times (removing the winner each time)?

A proportional method might be fairer, but I place a high value on simplicity, and I see a need for a diverse set of winners to advance to the general election. I am trying to provide an alternative to Top 4 primaries. A Top 4 ballot initiative lost in Colorado in November 2024.

Thank you, Greg Wasleski

Why I advocate for BTR-Score

One big reason: in August, the Denver City Council came one vote short of sending Ranked Choice Voting to the voters for City Council elections (6 votes for, 7 against). I think that BTR-Score is at least one vote better than RCV.

My Criteria for Single Winner Voting Methods:

Fairness
Reliability
No Favorite Betrayal
Compliance with state constitutions that require election winners to have the highest, greatest, largest number of votes, or a plurality of the votes.
High Voter Expression
Simplicity, Easy to Explain
Sizzle, Easy to Sell

BTR-Score is easy to explain, and the voters’ ability to rate all candidates gives it plenty of sizzle. After a quick BTR-Score explanation, you can add history and prestige with a sentence or two about Ramon Llull and the Marquis de Condorcet.

Of all the voting system criteria, Condorcet speaks most directly to fairness and reliability. A candidate who beats all other candidates one on one should win. If a “beat all” candidate loses, people will bitch, and rightfully so. In elections with no “beats all” winner, BTR-Score will elect a deserving winner, the winner of the runoff tournament, in a fair and transparent manner.

Yes, as a hybrid model, BTR-Score will fail more than a few important criteria; however, I believe it will be fair and reliable. High voter expression, simplicity, sizzle, and no favorite betrayal are critical to the adoption of a new voting method in the United States.

Concerning Utility and Majority:
Assuming a three-way cycle, the top seed of the BTR tournament will have a 50% chance of winning. The other two candidates have a 25% chance of winning as they must face each other to have a shot at the top seed. This gives the highest utility candidate an advantage, but each contest in the tournament is a two-candidate plurality vote (a majority vote if you ignore the ballots that rate the two candidates equally).

Ranked Choice Voting eliminates ties on the ballots, but it is not a true majority system because some of the ballots may be spent before the winner is determined, and the capricious way that some second-choice votes are counted and some are not.

I do not consider a plurality election with a top two runoff to be a true majority election because there are two separate sets of voters voting on separate days. Also, I do not believe in Santa Claus, although he did finish sixth in the first round of the infamous 2022 Alaskan Congressional special election (top four primary with an RCV final). BTW The winner, Mary Peltola, is running for the US Senate. It could be an extremely important race.

@toby-pereira

I greatly appreciate your work!

Is this correct?
"COWPEA is the only method that is fair and consistent, but it may be the most difficult to sell to the public."

Thank you, GregW

@cfrank

Link fixed, I got a little sloppy with the paste.

Score Voting Methods - Score, STAR, and BTR-Score

@wolftune

BTR-Score is easier to explain than IRV. No need to talk about transferring votes.

Rated methods are generally simple, here is may take on a few:
Score Voting Methods – Score, STAR, and BTR-Score

@casimir said in BTR-score:

That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable.

Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent.

Thank you, your quote helped the article, a plurality votes as a limited resource does explain some of the current rancor.

People diss voting systems that have not yet been used in public elections, even though the two systems with the most current use, plurality and IRV, have been found wanting.

@casimir said in BTR-score:

I've argued here that it might be more useful to promote a spectrum of compatible methods (approval, score, STAR and BTR-score in this case).

I have quoted your Hiveism Substack on VotersTakeCharge.us.

"Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent."

The is a great explanation of the weakness of plurality voting.

If the is a problem, or if you would like me to change how I credit this please let me know.

Thanks, GregW

@cfrank said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

it’s really great you’re working on these kinds of reinforcement learning methods in this field,

Actually I do not have the mathematical expertise. If my new nonprofit, Voters Takes Charge, (under construction at voterstakecharge.us password no longer needed) receives generous support we may be able to commission such work.

@gregw

The login is no longer required!

@k98kurz said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

Developing a genetic algorithm to evolve a strategy that breaks a system would be an interesting side project. When I get the spare time and energy, I'll see if I can cook one up and set up a computer to just chug away at it until I have some results.

A great idea! To determine the best voting systems, we need to find the weaknesses of each voting system. Better testing methods are key. A tool like you propose would be invaluable.

@lime

Perhaps testing voting systems is analogous to testing digital security, let people try to hack a new voting system. Computer simulations would be one method of hacking, creative humans, another.

Yes, real political elections are the best tests, but we have to get there from here.

@lime said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

I'd feel very uncomfortable with any method where the game-theoretically optimal strategy leads to bad results, even if experiments showed the method doing well. I'd be worried voters just haven't figured out the correct strategy yet, and as soon as someone explains it to them all hell will break loose.

Are you uncomfortable with BTR-Score? As a Condorcet method, it should be safer than most new systems. It would elect the “beats all” winner if there is one. Otherwise, it would elect someone from the Smith set.

As with any cardinal system, one side could decide to always bullet vote giving their favorite the highest rating and everybody else 0. The punishment would be harm to their second choices.

Would this be more, or less of a problem with BTR-Score?

Do you see another possible weakness? If so, how bad?

BTW VotersTakeCharge.us is under construction.
For a sneak peek, use the following login:
user: flywheel
Pass: squalid-fiction

VotersTakeCharge.us is under construction.
You can have a sneak peek with this login.

User: flywheel
Pass: squalid-fiction

Articles have been posted. We need feedback, constructive and destructive criticisms welcome! Feedback forms are posted for each article.

Highlights include the establishment of the Second Law of Economics and an article about Top Four blanket primaries as proposed in Colorado ballot initiative 310.

@toby-pereira said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

What we really need (and which is unattainable right now for most methods) is to see what would happen in real life elections with real voters.

To test any system in real elections we need to make the claim that the “new” system is better than the current system.

That is not a high bar, as the current system is plurality voting. IRV is also a competitor.

We may not have a firm handle on how good ABC or BTR-Score are, but we can say they are better than the choices above.

@ex-dente-leonem

Ex dente leonem gave these instructions for ABE voting:

Rate each candidate from A to F, A being best and F being worst.

Candidates receive 1 point for each A, B, or C rating and 0 points for each D, E, or F rating.

Equal ratings are allowed. Unrated candidates are automatically rated F.

An explanation for voters:

*The points seed a tournament. The first game matches the candidates with the two lowest point totals.

In each game, the A, B, C, D, E, F ratings determine which candidate is preferred by each voter. If you gave candidate Mike a D, and candidate Tim a B, your vote would go to Tim.

The winner would face the candidate with the next lowest number of points. This is repeated until the survivor meets the candidate with the highest number of points in the final game to determine the winner.

A spoiler effect is nearly impossible with ABC voting.*

ABC is one notch more complex than BTR-Score, which is quite simple as Condorcet methods go.

Is “nearly impossible” a fair statement?

What other benefits should we highlight for the public?

Were you using Jonathan Quinn’s VSE?

Thanks for the great thread.

@lime

I do not understand this part:

Use quadratic voting to pick the best remaining candidate. (Rebrand it as equal-weight voting, by framing it as taking each ballot and dividing by its "weight"—i.e. sum of squares.)

@lime said in score interval: score with additional protection against the chicken dilemma:

Here's a particularly simple and attractive method:

Eliminate all candidates scored below 50%.
Use quadratic voting to pick the best remaining candidate. (Rebrand it as equal-weight voting, by framing it as taking each ballot and dividing by its "weight"—i.e. sum of squares.)

Unfortunately I do not understand this. A simple as possible explanation might help.