Condorcet with Borda Runoff
@andy-dienes I think you may have sent this or a similar paper before, and I did enjoy it and would definitely like to read about this concept again, I think something like it is a good idea.
This idea is quite similar to MARS. And in the examples you list, MARS would yield the same results each time (assuming a range 0-3). The main difference is that it seems you imply strict rankings. This creates a teaming effect. The A voters fail to win strategically, because of the number of candidates supported by the other group, not because of a resistance to polarization inherent in the method. When you think about it, it's quite odd if a majority has no way to vote that ensures them winning (majority criterion).
@casimir I don't think avoiding the majority criterion is odd if it means that the slim majority is required in some way to make concessions to the minority and thereby somehow build a broad supermajority consensus. Unfortunately you are correct that this method is vulnerable to strategic nomination and trying to address that while preserving "minority consent" gets complicated. Sometimes I think that single-winner systems are not ideal at all, and it would just be better to have proportional representation and some kind of sortition system.
I don't think avoiding the majority criterion is odd if it means that the slim majority is required in some way to make concessions to the minority and thereby somehow build a broad supermajority consensus.
Let's say the electorate is split into polarized groups of 52% and 48%, each of which is thoroughly unwilling to compromise with the other. Do you agree that the larger group should get to choose the winner? Supermajorities just aren't possible all the time, and it still doesn't make sense to try to force the issue in a single-winner method.
it would just be better to have proportional representation and some kind of sortition system.
yes yes yes. this is precisely what I mean by suggesting the philosophy guide the design at a higher level than actual algorithm mechanics.
@andy-dienes oh absolutely, when there is no hope of compromise the majority should win out, there isn't a better option. In my opinion that's the worst-case scenario. Ideally there would be some mechanism of finding some level of supermajority consensus if one exists. I think the path of least resistance for the majority to take control should be for them to make reasonable concessions to the minority whenever possible. They could in principle take control by force, but hopefully they won't be motivated enough to do that.
I was trying to think of finding the primary Condorcet winner A, and then ignoring the ballots that rank A as highly as appears and finding the "minority" Condorcet winner B, then doing some kind of comparison of the rankings between the voters who marked A as highly as appears and the voters who marked B as highly as appears. But that's probably getting too complicated.
I was trying to think of finding the primary Condorcet winner A, and then ignoring the ballots that rank A first and finding the "minority" Condorcet winner B, then doing some kind of comparison of the rankings between the voters who marked A first and the voters who marked B first. But that's getting too complicated.
I mean, this is basically what IRV does though lol (and as it happens, IRV has one of the strongest 'veto powers' aka minority protection of any voting method)
@andy-dienes that is sort of what IRV does, but I think it's a bit different from what I'm considering since IRV doesn't operate on Condorcet winners but rather on elimination by anti-pluralities. For example, if the "majority" and "minority" Condorcet winners were identical, the election could end.
rob Banned last edited by
IRV doesn't operate on Condorcet winners but rather on elimination by anti-pluralities.
A better IRV could work by elimination of candidates remaining after eliminating pluralities. Or by elimination of candidates remaining after eliminating candidates remaining after eliminating anti-pluralities.
(I'm saying that converges quickly on Condorcet winner if they exist, if they don't exist, it converges on the Condorcet-iest candidate)
@andy-dienes said in Condorcet with Borda Runoff:
Supermajorities just aren't possible all the time, and it still doesn't make sense to try to force the issue in a single-winner method.
I’m not sure I understand the manner in which it doesn’t make sense. Can you explain why it doesn’t make sense to try to elect a candidate that is not highly divisive whenever possible?
rob Banned last edited by rob
Can you explain why it doesn’t make sense to try to elect a candidate that is not highly divisive whenever possible?
I personally think a method should indeed do that, but trying to label that a "supermajority" might be misleading or at best, vaguely defined. Supermajority what? Supermajority might indicate something like 70%, but the other variable is "degree of approval." So does it mean something like, over 70% thinks they are pretty good, as opposed to a simple majority where over 50% thinks they are awesome? If so, I would describe that as the system "favoring moderate candidates."
Regardless, I still suspect that a Condorcet compliant method will accomplish such a goal (favoring moderate candidates) better than any given method that isn't Condorcet compliant -- at least if you also want to avoid strategic manipulation and all that ugliness.
Notice that FairVote's primary complaint about Condorcet systems seems to be almost the exact opposite of yours. They think that Condorcet systems favor moderate candidates too much. (Then again, maybe you consider "moderate" to be significantly different from "supermajority support". I am considering them roughly the same, if I properly understand what you mean by "supermajority.")