Group Details Private

Global Moderators

Forum wide moderators

  • RE: On one-sided strategy

    @lime Could you give a more fleshed-out example of what might happen in IRV with one-sided strategy? And under Condorcet (whichever versions you think might be illustrative).

    posted in Single-winner
  • RE: Cumulative voting: more popular in corporations than in politics

    @k98kurz Cumulative voting for committees is very like single non-transferable vote (and First Past the Post for single-winner). As said, it fails independence of clones, and it requires much more precision strategic voting to get any sort of sensible result.

    posted in Proportional Representation
  • RE: Optimal cardinal proportional representation

    @Lime As mentioned upthread, there is the probabilistic transformation as well, which you might prefer from the point of view being discussed. I'm not a big fan of it though.

    @toby-pereira said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:

    There is also the probabilistic transformation, which I see as inferior to KP as well. Someone might give scores of 9 and 1 (out of 10) to 2 candidates A and B respectively. KP would split the voter as follows:

    0.1: -
    0.8: A
    0.1: AB

    The probabilistic transformation would give:

    0.09: -
    0.81: A
    0.09: AB
    0.01: B

    posted in Proportional Representation
  • RE: Optimal cardinal proportional representation

    @lime said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:

    @lime said in Optimal cardinal proportional representation:

    One possible model is one where the score of each candidate is the probability they'll agree with the voter on some vote, and the objective would be to choose the committee that maximizes the probability of a majority vote on any given issue agreeing with a majority vote by the whole population.

    (Oh, quick note @Toby-Pereira : I think this is a good example of why perfect location or scale invariance may not actually be ideal. If you rescale every voter's ballot to fall between 50% and 100% instead of 0-100%, that might indicate a meaningfully different situation.)

    Yes, that is a way that someone could vote. However, I wouldn't see it as some sort of objective standard, so would still see scale invariance as desirable. I think you mentioned this point previously in a discussion about normalising ballots, and I didn't get round to responding at the time.

    The method being discussed renormalises using ratios when candidates are eliminated, so if someone gives scores of 1 and 0 (out of e.g. 5) to two candidates, this could later become 5 and 0 after some elimination, whereas scores of 5 and 1 would be locked in as that. However, even if it is assumed that people vote in the manner you described, I still don't think this is good voting method behaviour. If I give scores of 5, 1 and 0, I would still prefer the 5 to the 1 by more than I prefer the 1 to the 0, and I think voters generally would not be happy that they lose some of the normalisation power in the 5-1 situation but not in the 1-0 situation.

    posted in Proportional Representation
  • RE: Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise

    @cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

    @jack-waugh @ChocoPi in BTR, it is already impossible for a Condorcet winner to be eliminated, yes?

    That's what I thought, so sticking a Condorcet check on should make no difference.

    posted in Election Policy and Reform
  • RE: Does it really matter that a candidate with 52% support wins over a candidate with 51% support?

    @cfrank said in Does it really matter that a candidate with 52% support wins over a candidate with 51% support?:

    @toby-pereira do you mean for the percentages to be reversed? As in, a candidate with 49% support may as well beat a candidate with 51% support? I think the specialness of >50% is that the voters who support that candidate outnumber those who don’t. My opinion is it’s definitely clear that a candidate with 51% approval should beat a candidate with 49% approval.

    Yeah, I did mean for the numbers to be reversed! I would say if it's OK for 48% to beat 49% or 51 to beat 52, then it's also OK for them to straddle the 50%.

    Obviously in plain approval voting, then it's just total approvals that wins so it's not an issue. But with e.g. a ranked method that has an approval cut-off, other things are looked at. But if you have a clause that says if a candidate uniquely gets over 50% approvals then they are elected, you would end up with unsatisfactory discontinuities in the method - weird, abrupt cut-offs where the result can suddenly flip.

    Edit - It would result in failures of Independence of Irrelevant Ballots as well. Just sticking in some new ballots that don't approve any of the frontrunners can shift someone below 50% and cause them to lose if they only won by the >50% clause in the first place.

    posted in Philosophy
  • RE: Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise

    @cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

    I’m also considering what @SaraWolk suggests, namely that another method like RCV (IRV) might be a more practical conduit for change, even though it is significantly less ideal.

    I'm not recommending RCV (IRV). I think it's oversold, broken, and extremely damaging to the voting reform movement.

    I recommend STAR, Approval, and Condorcet, and support a number of others.

    posted in Election Policy and Reform
  • RE: Does it really matter that a candidate with 52% support wins over a candidate with 51% support?

    There are methods where voters rank candidates and also have an approval cut-off, so the winner isn't necessarily the most approved, but is also dependent on the ranks in some way.

    But one thing I would say is that with approval voting, I don't see getting over 50% as anything particularly special. If it's OK for a candidate with 51% to beat one with 52%, then it's also OK for a candidate with 49% to beat one with 51%.

    Edited to put the numbers the right way round.

    posted in Philosophy
  • RE: Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise

    @toby-pereira The lay person audience is already more familiar with RCV than IRV, if you add in jargon (like Instant Runoff Voting/IRV) or even use multiple terms for the same thing, you lose people and use up cognitive load that you want to save for your actual points.

    It's bad enough that there isn't a single clear term for Choose One Voting/ Plurality/FPTP.

    My advice is to call the ranked ballot family of voting methods "Ranked Voting", call IRV "Ranked Choice Voting" and call FPTP "Choose One Voting".

    In academic contexts, we should also use these common words but then have the technical names in parenthesis. The target audience for this stuff is groups like LWV who form non-expert volunteer committees to get up to speed and study reforms before making recommendations that carry massive weight.

    This is another reason to not rebrand Approval, which already has a clear and self explanatory name.

    posted in Election Policy and Reform
  • RE: Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise

    @sarawolk said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

    @cfrank I say Ranked Voting to be more inclusive of ranked methods. (Ranked Choice/RCV is IRV and also sometimes STV).

    Sidenote: Since advocates call IRV RCV, but academics and electoral theorists call it IRV, they have a firewall between the method and its scientific criticisms.

    That's a problem and I strongly encourage us to all start calling it what they call it so the algorithms and search engines connect the two.

    I think a better compromise might be to call it IRV but mention that some people call it RCV in brackets, so it's still linked for search engine purposes.

    posted in Election Policy and Reform