As far as I can tell, the "score interval voting" described in the second post avoids 1. clone spoilers/teams 2. favorite betrayal 3. chicken dilemma (under strategy) and is the only method I know of which does (besides maybe MCA-P and MCA-AP?). For it to pass CD I assume that voters will fully support their favorite and fully betray their friend in the second round, then they can fully support both in the first round.
This doesn't formally satisfy the chicken dilemma criterion, as the formal definition requires that the defecting party does not win. However there is almost no incentive to defect and I think that in practice that would be sufficient to prevent the CD. The CD criterion requires a strong Nash equilibrium, but here we have a weak Nash equilibrium (see end of first post).
Why should this be important?
Spoilers reduce the number of candidates running. In the extreme you end up with two candidates. FB paired with an environment which makes it seem like there are only two viable candidates will also lead to two party domination. In a chicken dilemma voters individually have the incentive to defect which may lead to the majority to fraction and lose. When the chicken dilemma is not addressed, then it could devolve to a tactic where one fraction of the majority defects and the other fraction supports them to avoid the greater evil. Which again resembles the lesser of two evil problem.
Like plain score, interval voting is very well behaved regarding many criteria. I didn't check that thoroughly but think that the list below is 95% correct.
It passes:
clone independence, favorite betrayal, monotonicity, summability, LN-Help, cancellation, reversal symmetry, consistency, IIA (like score, assuming voters don't normalize)
It partly satisfies:
chicken dilemma (see above),
LN-Harm (for the first round only)
It fails:
CW, CL, Smith, majority, plurality
Note that the failed criteria are restrictions on who the winner should be, while most of the passed criteria are about strategic voting and strategic nomination. I would argue (which may be another post at some point) that the winner definitions shouldn't be viewed as strict criteria to pass 100%, but goals to approach. One could also define that the utility winner should always be elected, which could only be satisfied by some pure cardinal methods, but instead we look at VSE and see that Ranked Pairs performs well on this metric. So instead of the Condorcet criterion I would rather look at Condorcet efficiency.