Please register to join the upcoming virtual Equal Vote Symposium! equal.vote/evs
We will have chat and break-out rooms to allow ample opportunity to engage.
We're excited about the guest panelists we have lined up, along with the chance to meet with other people who love this topic.
A group I'm tangentially connected to has decided to switch from sequential proportional approval voting to cumulative voting (voters are given a number of points equal to the number of seats, and each voter can give any amount of their available points to one or more candidates). I'm concerned because I have heard that cumulative voting is susceptible to vote-splitting and bullet voting. Where can I learn more about these effects in cumulative voting?
The group is moving away from SPAV because they want something that is simpler to administrate, but they still want some amount of proportionality. Are there any methods which are proportional or semi-proportional without needing to go through many rounds (and that have fewer problems than cumulative)?
I belong to an org whose bylaws allow either IRV, STV, STAR Voting, bloc multi-winner STAR Voting, STAR-PR (aka Allocated Score), or RRV. (It's a lot, I know.)
A bylaws change is being proposed which would include a "None of the Below" option for any election using any of these methods. As I understand it, "None of the Below" would behave like one of the candidates. If "None of the Below" wins a seat, then the tabulation stops and no further seats are filled for that race.
For single-winner elections, I believe the effect would be identical to "None of the Above." The seat might remain empty after the election. For multi-winner elections, any number of seats might remain empty after the election.
Are there any unintended consequences that could arise from this proposal, for either single-winner or multi-winner elections? Either IRV or STAR? For example, would there be incentive to bullet vote or to min/max?
Please register to join the upcoming virtual Equal Vote Symposium! equal.vote/evs
We will have chat and break-out rooms to allow ample opportunity to engage.
We're excited about the guest panelists we have lined up, along with the chance to meet with other people who love this topic.
Magnus Jonsson is trying to join the forum but isn't able to validate his email. Is there a way to get the email re-sent? https://twitter.com/jmagnusj/status/1728925015859732480
@matija Thanks, I'll look into it.
A group I'm tangentially connected to has decided to switch from sequential proportional approval voting to cumulative voting (voters are given a number of points equal to the number of seats, and each voter can give any amount of their available points to one or more candidates). I'm concerned because I have heard that cumulative voting is susceptible to vote-splitting and bullet voting. Where can I learn more about these effects in cumulative voting?
The group is moving away from SPAV because they want something that is simpler to administrate, but they still want some amount of proportionality. Are there any methods which are proportional or semi-proportional without needing to go through many rounds (and that have fewer problems than cumulative)?
I belong to an org whose bylaws allow either IRV, STV, STAR Voting, bloc multi-winner STAR Voting, STAR-PR (aka Allocated Score), or RRV. (It's a lot, I know.)
A bylaws change is being proposed which would include a "None of the Below" option for any election using any of these methods. As I understand it, "None of the Below" would behave like one of the candidates. If "None of the Below" wins a seat, then the tabulation stops and no further seats are filled for that race.
For single-winner elections, I believe the effect would be identical to "None of the Above." The seat might remain empty after the election. For multi-winner elections, any number of seats might remain empty after the election.
Are there any unintended consequences that could arise from this proposal, for either single-winner or multi-winner elections? Either IRV or STAR? For example, would there be incentive to bullet vote or to min/max?