• For tie-breaking, I propose that among the candidates in the tie, the one who wins a Score election from the original ballots wins the election. Best would count as 5, and Worst would count as zero. But if a ballot did not use the full range once the eliminated candidates are struck from it, it is linearly expanded to use the full range.

  • @Jack-Waugh
    Assuming to use tie procedure 2, the worst that can happen in the case of cycles is that some of the few candidates belonging to the cycle receive [worst] instead of intermediate ratings.
    This is if the voter can predict that there will be a cycle and which candidates will belong to it (it's not easy).
    If they don't know which candidates belong in the cycle, then minimizing is very risky because it also remains true that in case of not tie, minimizing to [worst] is senseless.

    Given these votes:
    A [best] B [3] C [2] D [worst]
    A [worst] B [2] C [3] D [best]
    When it comes to the management of the tie (procedure 1), the 2 candidates with the most [best] are held, so A and C are in tie.
    With tie procedure 2, the 2 candidates with least [worst] are held which are B and C, which however result in tie (if there was only B, I would have to keep B and one between A and C in tie).
    You always end up with a tie (it makes sense), even if there is still an imbalance towards certain candidates (those with intermediate ratings) rather than towards others.
    However, tit-for-tat is not a criterion that I value very much (and I also point out that it only fails in the case of tie, otherwise it's satisfied, unlike FPTP which always fails).

    Score for tie
    If I use Score, I introduce the min and max strategies in case of tie, while with my procedure only one of the 2 strategies can be valid in case of tie.

    I will inquire about KP voting.

  • @Jack-Waugh
    I have read KP and partly agree.
    You look for a half way between IRV and AV.

    S-TM instead is an half way to other methods:

    • If everyone in S-TM voted with [worst] and [best], it would become AV.
    • If everyone in S-TM voted with intermediate ratings, it would become Score.
    • Condorcet (pairwise comparisons) to mix AV and Score.
    • in case of tie, all candidates but 2 are eliminated on which the comparison is then made , similar to STAR.

  • what exactly do the letter S-TM stand for?

  • Am I right in suspecting that both in S-TM1 and S-TM2 there could be ties that are not resolved with the suggested Tie-breaking rules.
    For instance for S-TM1 : when there are 20 candidates and 5 of them have the same sum of (adjusted )scores while 3 of them have also the same number of ratings [best] and 2 of them also have the same number of ratings [ worst]

  • on wording:

    • add something like: this is intended as a single winner method
    • "The candidate who wins in the most pairwise matches wins." better: "The candidate with the highest sum of points wins"

  • @Essenzia I see what you are saying but this normalization is complex. The STLR is simpler to understand and would help people vote better. STLR comes with a clear and clean scale.

  • @multi_system_fan
    Yes, there are unresolved tie cases as in any voting method. The important thing is that they are sufficiently rare.
    If 1000 or more voters vote, it is extremely rare that multiple candidates have the same number of [best] or [worst] just as it is extremely rare in AV that multiple candidates have the same number of votes.
    Frequent tie cases to be solved are those caused by condorcet cycles and for those the solution is proposed.

    "The candidate with the highest sum of points wins" is not the method I am proposing. With a similar process, there could be many more min-max strategies.

    The benefits of STLR and STAR fall with the clones, becoming Score Voting. I don't think the added complexity of such methods is worth it in the long run (given that in the long run, political factions would understand this clone problem and exploit it to their advantage).

  • @Essenzia I do not think that the clone problem can be exploited. There will always be an individual who wants to win. If there was two candidates supported by the largest bloc of about 40% of the voters they would still fight with eachother. They would try to find more and more supporters by adjusting their platform. This means that it is not a Nash equilibrium and that the candidates would drift towards more and more support.

    It is important to realize that in a system without vote splitting the power of parties would be greatly reduced.

    Also, falling back to score is not something I would view as a problem.

  • @Keith said in S-TM:

    If there was two candidates supported by the largest bloc of about 40% of the voters they would still fight with eachother.

    Yes, but they would still both be supported by that 40% because they both don't want to do things that make them lose that block.
    Positive the fact that they try to have the block bigger and bigger, but if the block is for example "Republican", it will remain "Republican" (as well as the 2 candidates who then end up in the automatic runoff).

    Also, falling back to score is not something I would view as a problem

    The problem is that if you end up in Score Voting then you might as well use Score Voting from the start, which is simpler (but has its downsides).

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