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    ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.

    New Voting Methods and Variations
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    • GregW
      GregW last edited by

      @toby-pereira said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

      What we really need (and which is unattainable right now for most methods) is to see what would happen in real life elections with real voters.

      To test any system in real elections we need to make the claim that the “new” system is better than the current system.

      That is not a high bar, as the current system is plurality voting. IRV is also a competitor.

      We may not have a firm handle on how good ABC or BTR-Score are, but we can say they are better than the choices above.

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      • L
        Lime @Toby Pereira last edited by Lime

        @toby-pereira said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

        What we really need (and which is unattainable right now for most methods) is to see what would happen in real life elections with real voters. Not under the assumption that a particular simplistic strategy model gives good results, and not even that the game theoretically optimal strategy leads to good results, but that real life voter behaviour would lead to good results.

        Technically yes, but I'd feel very uncomfortable with any method where the game-theoretically optimal strategy leads to bad results, even if experiments showed the method doing well. I'd be worried voters just haven't figured out the correct strategy yet, and as soon as someone explains it to them all hell will break loose.

        This is how Italy's parliament got so screwed up. They had a theoretically proportional mechanism that can be broken. It looked fine at first—because it took Berlusconi 2 or 3 election cycles to recognize the loophole and exploit the hell out of it.

        So, in other words, you need an actual proof, not just "well, when I tried a couple strategies..." Otherwise, you'll find out 5-10 years later that there's some edge case where your method is a complete disaster, and after the whole IRV fiasco, electoral reform will end up completely and thoroughly discredited. (Italy went back to a mixed FPP-proportional system after the screwup.)

        GregW 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 1
        • GregW
          GregW @Lime last edited by

          @lime said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

          I'd feel very uncomfortable with any method where the game-theoretically optimal strategy leads to bad results, even if experiments showed the method doing well. I'd be worried voters just haven't figured out the correct strategy yet, and as soon as someone explains it to them all hell will break loose.

          Are you uncomfortable with BTR-Score? As a Condorcet method, it should be safer than most new systems. It would elect the “beats all” winner if there is one. Otherwise, it would elect someone from the Smith set.

          As with any cardinal system, one side could decide to always bullet vote giving their favorite the highest rating and everybody else 0. The punishment would be harm to their second choices.

          Would this be more, or less of a problem with BTR-Score?

          Do you see another possible weakness? If so, how bad?

          BTW VotersTakeCharge.us is under construction.
          For a sneak peek, use the following login:
          user: flywheel
          Pass: squalid-fiction

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          • L
            Lime @GregW last edited by

            @gregw said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

            Are you uncomfortable with BTR-Score? As a Condorcet method, it should be safer than most new systems. It would elect the “beats all” winner if there is one. Otherwise, it would elect someone from the Smith set.

            The problem is with strategic voters. Lots of Smith-efficient methods do really badly when voters are strategic, unfortunately, including the ones I listed (Ranked Pairs & such).

            GregW 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 0
            • GregW
              GregW @Lime last edited by

              @lime

              Perhaps testing voting systems is analogous to testing digital security, let people try to hack a new voting system. Computer simulations would be one method of hacking, creative humans, another.

              Yes, real political elections are the best tests, but we have to get there from here.

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              • K
                k98kurz @GregW last edited by

                @gregw there is a cyber security technique called "fuzzing" in which attacks are simulated with random data. The VSE simulations seem to provide a framework for fuzzing, where in this case the random data would be some kind of strategy. Developing a genetic algorithm to evolve a strategy that breaks a system would be an interesting side project. When I get the spare time and energy, I'll see if I can cook one up and set up a computer to just chug away at it until I have some results. (I wrote and published a library called bluegenes in case anyone wants to try stapling libraries together before I get around to it.)

                GregW C 2 Replies Last reply Reply Quote 2
                • GregW
                  GregW @k98kurz last edited by

                  @k98kurz said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

                  Developing a genetic algorithm to evolve a strategy that breaks a system would be an interesting side project. When I get the spare time and energy, I'll see if I can cook one up and set up a computer to just chug away at it until I have some results.

                  A great idea! To determine the best voting systems, we need to find the weaknesses of each voting system. Better testing methods are key. A tool like you propose would be invaluable.

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                    cfrank @k98kurz last edited by

                    @k98kurz it’s really great you’re working on these kinds of reinforcement learning methods in this field, definitely something both very interesting and that can give us insight into how these systems work. Looking forward to hearing about any of the work in this area!

                    score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]

                    GregW 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 0
                    • GregW
                      GregW @cfrank last edited by

                      @cfrank said in ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.:

                      it’s really great you’re working on these kinds of reinforcement learning methods in this field,

                      Actually I do not have the mathematical expertise. If my new nonprofit, Voters Takes Charge, (under construction at voterstakecharge.us password no longer needed) receives generous support we may be able to commission such work.

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                      • J
                        Jack Waugh last edited by Jack Waugh

                        I think I like it.

                        ABC || DEF

                        A Stein
                        B Williamson
                        C West
                        D Kennedy
                        E Harris
                        F Trump

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                        • wolftune
                          wolftune last edited by

                          I wish this investigation had included BTR-RCV

                          (side-note: don't call it BTR-IRV, that includes "runoff" twice and is less-clear as a name)

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                            Casimir @Ex dente leonem last edited by

                            @ex-dente-leonem
                            I wanted to create some figures for an article on MARS voting that I plan to write, but fail to run vse-sim. Is it okay for you when use your results?

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                              Jack Waugh last edited by

                              This post is deleted!
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                                Jack Waugh last edited by

                                This post is deleted!
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                                  Isocratia last edited by

                                  Does anyone know if BTR-Score is immune to turkey-raising / DH3?

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                                    Casimir @Isocratia last edited by Casimir

                                    @isocratia
                                    Good question. According to Electowiki:

                                    Methods that pass dominant mutual third burial resistance [DMTBR] provide no incentive to bury under a dark horse.

                                    Following the argument here it is clear that BTR-score fails DMTBR

                                    In election (A) and (B) A wins. In (D) the winner is C, but in (E) the winner is A again. (I assumed score from 0 to 2.)

                                    where A is the CW, and so (E)->(D) is a DMTBR failure.

                                    But this does not exclude the possibilty that the score part reduces the strategic incentive to bury.

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                                    • J
                                      Jack Waugh last edited by

                                      How should ABC voting treat unmarked candidates?

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                                        cfrank @Jack Waugh last edited by cfrank

                                        @jack-waugh I think anything except the minimum for unmarked candidates makes it too easy to mark bullet burials. But I don’t know.

                                        score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]

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