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  • RE: STAR vs Condorcet vs IRV vs Approval

    The first two voters fail to use the endpoints of the range available to them. Do you expect such behavior in political elections that matter? I think comparisons of voting systems based on hypothetical examples should begin with the voters' valuations of the possibilities normalized. I don't know that it's worth studying examples where voters voluntarily give up power. We as students of these systems need all the time and attention we can put on cases where the purpose of the election is to resolve strong political disagreement among the voters. We need elections to work well when the voters are struggling for political power. Such voters would use the endpoints of the range unless they are not properly informed as to how the system works.

    posted in Single-winner
  • RE: score voting is king, condorcet not so much

    @clay Some interesting stuff there. It's been said that score suffers worse with one-sided strategy than other methods. That is - if the supporters of one candidate strategise more than the supporters of another, then the result will be more skewed (favour the strategisers) under score than some other methods. Would you agree with that, and do you see it as a problem?

    posted in Voting Theoretic Criteria
  • RE: Merits and Demerits of Compulsory Voting

    @toby-pereira that’s a great point. But say that were an “abstain” option. Then being compelled to enter a voting booth may put a person who would only have cast a nontrivial ballot if convenient into a position where they’re likely to cast that ballot anyway, because the inconvenience becomes a sunk cost.

    In that instance, participation in the social sense would be compulsory, but not in the formal sense. At the same time, it makes the choice to abstain a more directly interpretable act of protest. In principle, abstain options could even include rationale. If abstaining were still formally allowed, I’m not sure I would find it unappealing if showing up to vote (or submitting a mail-in ballot) were like filing taxes.

    posted in Nation specific policy
  • RE: Merits and Demerits of Compulsory Voting

    I think the argument is that it gives a more representative parliament and helps fight against voter apathy.

    But I'm not sure I buy this. If people are only voting because they have to, the extra votes will come more from people who don't feel they have anything invested in any of the candidates winning, so the extra votes are more likely to be "noise".

    Also, voter apathy is a thing. It's a worry that people don't feel engaged with the political system, and aren't moved to vote for any of the candidates. By forcing people to vote, you're simply hiding that. Knowing that only x % of people vote in an election should be a alarm bell to try and engage these potential voters. But if you force people to vote, you don't know how many of them are just voting under duress.

    posted in Nation specific policy
  • Merits and Demerits of Compulsory Voting

    As many of you may know, Australia has implemented compulsory voting. This measure dramatically increased voter turnout and appears to have improved representation for less affluent citizens. It also obviously had influence on policy.

    My first instinct was that compulsory voting violates individual expressive freedom and political choice, and may be impractical. If an electoral system is ineffective or corrupt, coerced participation removes abstention as a form of political refusal and institutional rejection.

    However, I think it is better to understand the evidence and the actual tradeoffs involved. I am wondering whether, and to what extent, compulsory voting addresses concerns about representation, justice, and effective government compared with voluntary voting.

    Does anybody have a more refined understanding of its implications?

    posted in Nation specific policy
  • RE: Best Voting Methods for Board Game Vacation?

    @jan This sounds like it could get complicated. However, it doesn't need to be. If everyone is bringing 10 games each, I don't think there needs to be a vote on that at all. People just bring the games that they want to. Essentially everyone gets 10 nominations into the pool that you vote on.

    It might be the case that one person's favourite game is owned by someone else, but they can easily ask to borrow it for their own 10.

    As for what to play, if you are playing a lot of games, I would prefer some sort of proportional system rather than a simple single-winner type vote each time. E.g. If 3 out of 5 players generally prefer one type of game and 2 prefer another type, it makes sense for there to be a 3:2 split rather than the 3 choosing every time.

    You could simply take it in turns to choose. Alternatively I would recommend a lottery method, so that you would get proportional representation over the long haul without having to keep track of what has already happened. I think simple random ballot, where you randomly pick who chooses each game, would be inferior to taking turns. Some people would get to choose more, just by luck.

    But one alternative, which has a balance between randomness and consensus is COWPEA Lottery. Each person approves as many games as they want. Then you pick a ballot at random and if that ballot lists more than one game, you just pick other ballots at random as a tie-break. So if the next ballot approves all or none of the remaining games in contention, you ignore it. Otherwise you eliminate games not approved. Continue until one game is left. If there is still a tie after all ballots have been picked, just pick at random among the remaining games.

    posted in Voting Methods
  • RE: Best Voting Methods for Board Game Vacation?

    Hi @Jan—sounds fun 🙂

    Since there are only five of you, I would not necessarily over-optimize the voting method. The harder problem is probably not the final vote, but reducing a large game list into a manageable and legible shortlist.

    For choosing which games to bring, I would start with a simple structured survey. For each game, collect a few pieces of information, such as owner(s), expected duration, genre, who already knows it, who wants to play it, and maybe a 0–5 interest score from each person.

    Then I would use that information to filter the list before doing any final selection. For example, remove games with very low total interest, games that are too long or too short for the trip, games too many people strongly dislike, or games that duplicate the same niche unless several people want them. If you can define those niches, you could even rank the games in each niche to help with pruning.

    Since you want each person to bring the same number of games, you could then choose the top-rated games within each owner’s collection, with some manual adjustment to avoid too much overlap. Once you have a proposed list, you could also let the group ratify it before finalizing, using a simple majority or supermajority vote (or better yet, unanimous consensus), with room for minor adjustments.

    For deciding what to play once you are there, I’d use something simple: score voting, approval voting, or even “everyone rates their current interest from 0–5, play the highest total unless there is an obvious objection.” Because the group is small and friendly, post-vote discussion is still cheap and probably useful. In the off-chance there’s a stalemate or something, you could have a fallback voting method.

    In other words, I would use voting to organize preferences and as a fallback, not to replace conversation and negotiation. A formal voting method matters much more when the electorate is large, strategic, or anonymous, i.e. when collective conversation is inefficient or unproductive. For five friends, a transparent scoring/filtering process plus ordinary negotiation is probably better than a complicated multiwinner rule, in my opinion.

    Still, using a voting system and seeing how things shake out can be fun in itself. So if you do want to go down that route, I’m sure others here would be able to offer interesting suggestions, especially on the PR front. And if you proceed with any voting systems, it would be interesting to hear about how you decided to manage the selection and any of the results!

    posted in Voting Methods
  • RE: Back to Equal Weighting

    @jack-waugh I'd like to find an explicit example eventually if possible. I haven't fully formalized the criterion as I imagine it yet. In terms of the loose "mere existence" criterion, there are definitely examples, since the modification can be applied to any voting system, and if you consider any voting system non-additive, then we can use that one.
    For the updated concept, I think both the concept itself and the concept of what it means for a system to be additive need improved formalization. Do you think you can suggest what it means for a system to be additive mathematically?

    posted in Voting Theoretic Criteria