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  • RE: Testing.... voting widget plugin dev

    @rob said in Testing.... voting widget plugin dev:

    134: a[5] b[4] c[2] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    64: a[5] b[4] c[3] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    94: a[3] b[5] c[4] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    [ballots "tsfasdft123": 737475]
    
    posted in Meta/Forum Business
  • RE: Testing.... voting widget plugin dev
    134: a[5] b[4] c[2] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    64: a[5] b[4] c[3] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    94: a[3] b[5] c[4] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    [ballots "test54345634563": 737475]
    
    posted in Meta/Forum Business
  • RE: Testing.... voting widget plugin dev

    I'm just curious if quoting will mess things up

    [scoreballots]
    134: a[5] b[4] c[2] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    64: a[5] b[4] c[3] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    94: a[3] b[5] c[4] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    70: a[2] b[2] c[5] d[2] e[0] f[0]
    63: a[0] b[0] c[0] d[3] e[4] f[5]
    55: a[0] b[0] c[1] d[3] e[5] f[4]
    55: a[0] b[1] c[4] d[3] e[5] f[3]
    

    @rob said in Testing.... voting widget plugin dev:

    @rob

    [scoreballots]
    134: a[5] b[4] c[2] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    64: a[5] b[4] c[3] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    94: a[3] b[5] c[4] d[1] e[0] f[0]
    70: a[2] b[2] c[5] d[2] e[0] f[0]
    63: a[0] b[0] c[0] d[3] e[4] f[5]
    55: a[0] b[0] c[1] d[3] e[5] f[4]
    55: a[0] b[1] c[4] d[3] e[5] f[3]
    
    posted in Meta/Forum Business
  • RE: New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins

    @multi_system_fan Well our differences aren't that we disagree on methods, it is that we disagree on whether the voters should actually vote on the method with each election. That seems very different, but ok.... yeah there is fragmentation polarization and vote splitting in this community, as ironic as that seems.

    I have proposed for a long time that we hold regular votes on methods. I'm currently working on building out some tools so we can do it right on this forum. It would have happened a lot quicker if I was running the forum, as I was going to do until things went off the rails, but Jack seems to be giving me access to what I need.

    (here's one place were I mention it)
    https://forum.electionscience.org/t/new-home-for-this-forum-community/720/49?u=robbrown

    I can also see a day where we hold regular votes within the forum. Like to vote for “election method of the month” or whatever. There are all kinds of creative things we can do. The reasoning for this should be obvious. One, we get to use the methods we talk about. Two, we gradually move toward consensus, rather than so much going round and round.

    I've also been in the space a long time, and I agree with your frustration that things haven't happened more quickly. It's great if we keep proposing new methods, but we also have to have a good filtering process.

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations
  • RE: STAR vs. Score

    Edit: I just noticed this is a reply to something from 24 days ago. Weird. Anyway, in case you still think this...

    I'm well aware of the Gibbard Theorem. Did Gibbard also provide the profound insight that even if you wear a seatbelt, you can die in a car crash? 🙂

    Just because perfection isn't attainable doesn't mean everything is equal. Some systems are highly resistant to strategic voting, some far less so. I believe any Condorcet method would result in the vast majority of voters putting no effort into strategically altering their vote from what it would be if they were simply trying to honestly express their preferences. And for those few who do try to be strategic, the vast majority of them would not gain any benefit from doing so.

    Also, and probably more importantly, under such a system parties would have little incentive to strategically nominate, by reducing the number of candidates from their party to one.

    beating around the bush and if you know of a case where STAR outperforms plain Score, exhibit such a case

    I've given one, please stop saying I haven't. Nader vs Bush vs Gore is an obvious one. I feel like I already explained it pretty well, but in case you didn't get it, I'll have another go.

    Under Score, Nader being on the ballot would have caused many "N>G>B voters" to lower their score for Gore, so they could express that they prefer Nader to Gore. In other words, he'd be a spoiler just as he was under FPTP. (this would further mean that candidates like Nader would have felt pressure to do like all the others on the left did, which is run as a Democrat. Same would apply to right-leaning candidates. Which would leave the two party system entrenched)

    Under STAR, all people whose preferences were N>G>B would be able to a) express that they like Nader more than Gore, in case Nader became a front-runner against Gore, and b) give 100% of their voting power to Gore, if Gore and Bush were front runners.

    The problem with Score would be an even bigger problem in elections where the three front runners were closer (e.g., where lots of people thought Nader could actually win), or in elections where voters were less informed as to the likely outcome, such as local elections.

    In the case of Perot - Bush Sr - Clinton, STAR would likely have allowed Perot to win, I suspect it would have been a much tighter 3-way race. People such as myself would have given Perot a 5, Clinton a 2, and Bush a 0. A lot of other people would have given Perot a 5, Bush a 2, and Clinton a 0. (note that Perot was a true centrist, in that he was almost equal in his appeal to Republicans and Democrats) Under Score, voters would have probably been foolish to not give one o the major party candidates a 5, since they'd be scared that Bush and Clinton would be front runners and they'd be wasting voting power. (as happened with FPTP)

    In both of those races, under STAR, there would be very little incentive to vote with anything other than honest preferences. They would not have to worry about which two of the three would be front runners, since they'd be able to give the full power of their vote to their preferred of the front runners. Not under Score.

    (all that said, I think STAR doesn't do so well if there are more than 3 viable candidates, which is why I prefer Condorcet.... but still, STAR is dramatically better than Score at reducing strategic incentives)

    posted in Single-winner
  • RE: S-2-1

    @jack-waugh I prefer Condorcet methods over non-Condorcet methods. And for Condorcet methods, the simpler the better.

    3-2-1 isn't particularly interesting to me, although if it started getting traction I'd give it more of a look.

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations
  • RE: S-2-1

    @jack-waugh said in S-2-1:

    Scores are really an interval scale, not a ratio scale.

    Intervals are problematic as well.

    Endorse/Compromise/Oppose

    I don't see how "compromise" makes sense in that context. If you are a someone who likes Nader best, Gore second best, and Bush the least, giving Gore a score of "compromise" doesn't make sense to me.

    These instructions (and "naming") work for me, for cardinal ballots on the left and ranked ballots on the right. I particularly like the way, for the cardinal ballots, they tell the voter to give their favorite 5 and least favorite a 0, so there is no implication that the scores have absolute meaning. They also say "best" and "worst" rather than something like "like" and "dislike".... again, indicating that the scores are relative to the field of candidates rather than absolute expressions of how the voter feels about each candidate.
    STAR_v_RCV.png

    Nonetheless, for a ton of reasons, I think cardinal ballots should be treated as is they are ordinal, except in the (hopefully) rare exception of having no Condorcet winner.

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations
  • RE: S-2-1

    @jack-waugh said in S-2-1:

    he whole idea of giving an "honest" rating in Score represents a failure to think realistically.

    Ok..... I'd say this is exactly why purists seem to prefer ranking. When ranking candidates, there is zero ambiguity as to what is meant by an honest ballot.

    Well I should probably say "near zero", since someone will argue that. But I think most people will agree that "I like A more than B" is not ambiguous, while "I like A twice as much as B" is.

    If you look at what 99% of partisans say on Facebook and the comments of Youtube, you have to notice that it is motivated by hatred and fear of the "other side".... I suggested the marketing names I did to let these people know that we understand how they feel and we have the solution to their needs.

    And yet you say "Voting behavior in the US is mostly based on hatred and fear, as it should be."

    I don't get it. You WANT to embrace that mindset?

    Facebook YouTube etc is just as broken as our voting system. People who post the sort of comments you describe aren't representative of typical people, since the vast majority of typical people steer clear from participating in the cesspool that is Facebook and YouTube comments, at least in places where things get political.

    Regardless, if you consider "Tongue kiss" to be a good way of marketing a voting system.... uhhh. Ok.

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations
  • RE: S-2-1

    @jack-waugh said in S-2-1:

    So that's why I think that out of 100, the compromise should get 99 and the most-hated should get zero. To put strong differentiation between them under the control of the voter.

    Are you going to tell the voters that "love" and "dislike" are assigned nearly identical scores? While expecting them to vote as if the names accurately reflect how they are to be interpreted?

    Your suggestion makes me want to just go with ranking, rather than scoring, because it demonstrates just how meaningless the scores are. Giving them numbers that don't in any way correspond to the names really highlights the exact reason score voting rubs me the wrong way.

    I like score ballots just fine, I just don't like using all the information in them so directly, especially not in ways that are so "subject to interpretation" on the part of each voter. Among other things, that makes the system highly unstable.

    I think there are plenty of good ways that arrive at those middle ground candidates that bring out neither hatred nor worshipful devotion and blind loyalty. Ways that are game theoretically stable, and don't rely fooling people as to how their votes are to be interpreted.

    BTW, I think we'd be much better off taking discussions of fascism, genocide, etc to forums other than this one. Sure, it's very relevant that our country is highly polarized, and we'd like to reduce that through better voting methods. But getting more specific than that will only drive away the kind of people we'd like to have here, and attract partisans and, frankly, conspiracy-minded crackpots. Can I request we tone that sort of stuff down?

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations
  • RE: New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins

    @multi_system_fan said in New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins:

    I expect after a few election-cycles voters would relax about it

    Sure, but it would never get to that because it would never get adopted.

    I'm all for us holding regular votes for voting methods, so after a few cycles we start to reach agreement. (hopefully)

    But I think we'd be foolish to try to bring the public too far into that, especially in a way that they have to "vote for what to do when voting-methods disagree" with every election. Honestly I have a hard time imagining that most voters would even have an opinion on it, unless for some reason they were told that one method or another favored their preferred candidate.

    posted in New Voting Methods and Variations