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    Advocacy Tailored to Location

    Advocacy
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    • J
      Jack Waugh last edited by Jack Waugh

      I'm suggesting this strategy for changing the laws around single-winner elections:

      for a given locality, if they have already taken on the expense of the logistics of IRV, then promote Score{1, .99, .01, 0} else promote Approval.

      STAR, Score, Approval, cardinal Condorcet [10]; equal-ranked Condorcet [6]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [4]; everything else [0].

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      • J
        Jack Waugh @Jack Waugh last edited by Jack Waugh

        For non-equally-spaced Score schemes, I'm suggesting the following system of letter grades:

        • A = 1
        • B = .99
        • C = .9
        • D = .5
        • E = .1
        • F = .01
        • G = 0

        A system omitting C, D, and E would use letter grades ABFG. The middle letters would be reserved for possible expansion of the system for if people complained that it had insufficiently fine granularity.

        STAR, Score, Approval, cardinal Condorcet [10]; equal-ranked Condorcet [6]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [4]; everything else [0].

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        • N
          NevinBR last edited by NevinBR

          @Jack-Waugh said in Advocacy Tailored to Location:

          for a given locality, if they have already taken on the expense of the logistics of IRV, then promote Score{1, .99, .01, 0} else promote Approval.

          Without detracting from your goals here, I think it is worth considering a much smaller incremental change for places that already have IRV, which nonetheless solves significant problems and improves outcomes of elections.

          The IRV halting condition is: “If one of the remaining candidates has more than half of the remaining votes, they win.”

          That could be modified to: “If one of the remaining candidates would defeat all of the others head-to-head, they win.”

          This small change turns IRV into not only a Condorcet method, but in fact a Smith method. The winner is guaranteed to be in the topologically highest strongly-connected-component of the pairwise results graph.

          From an advocacy and education perspective, I suggest using the term “clear winner” in place of “Condorcet winner”. Then the new halting condition can be expressed succinctly as, “If one of the remaining candidates is a clear winner, they win.”

          This phrasing also makes it easier to explain the problem being solved: the standard IRV method can fail to elect a clear winner. With this change to the halting condition, we can guarantee that won’t happen.

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          • J
            Jack Waugh @NevinBR last edited by

            @NevinBR, where I said "they have already taken on the expense of the logistics of IRV", I should have said "they have already taken on the expense of the logistics of IRV, but have repealed IRV."

            STAR, Score, Approval, cardinal Condorcet [10]; equal-ranked Condorcet [6]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [4]; everything else [0].

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            • J
              Jack Waugh @Jack Waugh last edited by Jack Waugh

              I'm becoming more and more convinced that people can't be convinced that Approval is expressive enough. I think it probably is, but it's extremely hard to get across. And I am not 100% sure that Approval is really as expressive as I have been arguing that it is. Maybe there is a hole in the argument that I have been advancing. So I'm thinking we should advocate for Score with finer granularity in the single-winner cases, unless the local activists argue that it's just a nonstarter logistically. How about using a range with seven values? I suspect that spacing them according to a logistic function would work best strategically, but that's impossible to explain to people, so how about seven values equally spaced then?

              STAR, Score, Approval, cardinal Condorcet [10]; equal-ranked Condorcet [6]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [4]; everything else [0].

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