Condorcet // Score
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Collect Score-style ballots on the range {100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}.
Every precinct should publish the sum of the scores for each candidate and the summed preference matrix reflecting the votes in that precinct. It doesn't matter whether the lower triangle of the matrix is used. If it is, the effective preference between candidates i and j is M[i, j] - M[j, i].
If there is a Condorcet winner, elect her or him.
Otherwise, elect the Score winner.
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@jack-waugh I'm not sure I'm convinced by those specific scores being allowed but not others. Also, there is also Smith//Score, which I would consider to be superior. It elects the score winner of the Smith set. Under Condorcet//Score, the winner could be a candidate outside the top cycle.