Consensual Condorcet by Positional Domination

I wasn't sure what else to call this, I already described this method as an aside in Condorcet with Borda Runoff, but unlike that method this one seems to be resistant to tactical nomination.
As described, one defines a sequence of "Nthorder Condorcet winners" (assuming they exist in all relevant cases and deferring to another reasonable method otherwise) as being the Condorcet winner when all lowerorder Condorcet winners are removed from the election. Then, the winner is the lowestorder Condorcet winner who has a successor (the Condorcet winner of next highest order) and who positionally dominates that successor.
Just to be clear, what I mean by a candidate A "positionally dominating" a candidate B in this case is that for every rank, there are at least as many voters who placed A at or above that rank as voters who did the same for B. I think that term is used elsewhere to possibly mean something different, correct me if I'm wrong.
The problem with this method is that there may not be an Nthorder Condorcet winner (or substitute) who positionally dominates their successor. In that case, I am suggesting to iteratively ignore the extremal ranks when considering positional dominance until a winner is found.
If this method is indeterminate, some reasonable alternative method will be needed to choose the winner.
Here are a few examples I worked out:
First, if the ballots areC>B>D>A [38%]
A>B>C>D [30%]
A>C>D>B [22%]
B>D>A>C [10%]Then the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary Condorcet winners are A, C, B and D in that order. B is the lowestorder Condorcet winner who positionally dominates their successor, so is elected. One informal interpretation is that candidates A and C were too divisive, and B was identified as a good compromise for a broad supermajority of the electorate (notice that 78% have B ranked in the top two positions).
As a second example, let the ballots be as follows:
A>A'>A''>B>C [40%]
A>A''>A'>B>C [11%]
C>B>A''>A'>A [30%]
B>C>A>A'>A'' [10%]
C>B>A'>A>A'' [9%]The candidates labeled with A are meant to be candidates strategically nominated to crowd out competition against a common platform. Reasonably, the Nthorder Condorcet winners/substitutes in sequence would be A, A', A'', B, C. None of these candidates positionally dominate their successor over all ranks. However, once the most extremal ranks are ignored, B satisfies the criterion and is elected. The strategic nomination tactic failed. An informal interpretation is that this method was in a sense able to navigate the political spectrum and find a relative middle ground candidate. If B were removed from the ballots with all else kept equal, candidate A'' would have been elected, which reflects the majority platform.
As a third example, we can have a less divisive election, such as
C>A>B>D [21%]
A>B>C>D [39%]
A>C>D>B [30%]
B>D>A>C [10%]Clearly the Condorcet winner is A, and the secondary Condorcet winner is C. Candidate A also positionally dominates C, so is elected. An informal interpretation is that the Condorcet winner was not too divisive and won the election with broad consensual support.