@toby-pereira See the "effective power" more as something over time. So for the random ballot, with a guaranteed 51% of the vote you'd be in power 51% of the time, but with a guaranteed 51% of the vote in a majoritarian system, you'd be in power 100% of the time. I'd gestured at this by saying "if you have 51% of the vote you are in power 100% of the time", but I'll make this all a bit clearer if I use this graph again in the future.

@brian-lackey I think the main point is to use this to prompt IRV advocates to look at this issue, yes. I do not have plans to spend lots of time making this happen myself though

@mkeypaige A lot of those topics have Wikipedia or Electowiki pages, which describe them quite well, and there are also YouTube videos which discuss a lot of them. Some of the later stuff I wouldn't even know what they are. But I'll give you some links.

Ranked voting - Wikipedia

Plurality system (also known as First Past the Post) - Wikipedia, CGP Grey video

Ranked Choice Voting (also known as Instant Runoff Voting, Alternative Vote among others): Wikipedia, CGP Grey video

Condorcet methods: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video

Borda Count: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video

Majority criterion: Wikipedia, Becky Moening video

Unanimity criterion: Wikipedia article on Pareto Efficiency, Eric Pacuit video

Condorcet winner criterion: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video

Monotonicity criterion: Electowiki article, Becky Moening video

IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) criterion: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video

Manipulability: Wikipedia article on strategic voting, Katherine Heller video

Random dictator: Wikipedia article, Carneades.org video

Approval voting: Wikipedia, CGP Grey video

That's the first section covered. Let me know if this is useful at all and I can get some links for the others.

@jack-waugh I think anything except the minimum for unmarked candidates makes it too easy to mark bullet burials. But I don’t know.

Who knows how the Gibbard theorem applies to ABC voting? In optimizing my vote, how do I take into account the stances of the other voters? Assume I know them perfectly. Do I maybe exaggerate support for a compromise candidate from D to C, with a metered probability?

@masiarek this may be slightly tangential, but another consideration for the future is making sure any encryption in voting systems is also quantum secure.

@wolftune IRV wasn’t largely in the public consciousness of the USA until groups like FairVote started promoting it in the 1990s. It took a decade for acknowledgment of the system to grow, and by then it had subsumed the name “ranked choice.” So it wasn’t as if people made a concerted effort to change the widely accepted name in that case. In fact, I would say more people try to reverse the name change, because it’s a presumptuous moniker that obscures other ranked choice systems.

Anyway, maybe there are examples. But I doubt whether they were efforts not in line with the mainstream or status quo.

@cfrank @Jack-Waugh Drumming short slogans without clear definition or explanation can be problematic. Even "one ballot per voter" could lead to people insisting that all offices and questions, up for vote on the same day being crammed on one sheet of paper. Or originalist judges going back to little ball used for secret voting as the definition of ballot. We need to remind people that a vote: is the opinion of one member of a group, used in an effort to determine the opinion of the group, on a matter that they are trying to make a decision upon. The more often people are exposed to longer explanations of what a vote is, the less they will assume a narrow definition based on exposer to only one voting method.

@cfrank I agree this is probably unnecesary conflictive, so I will avoid a discussion on that by editing the post.

Still, the two articles are to related for puting them in different threads.

@lime I think that since multiwinner elections are generally for electing legislatures, we can say that generally the goal is for the set of winners to be able to vote on laws in such a way that the laws passed maximize voter utility (i.e. come closest to their preferences on the issues). Now since this is difficult to simulate, how about simplifying it down to an election-based process: have the winners of the multiwinner election conduct a single-winner election among themselves to choose a leader (presumably using whatever single-winner voting method the original multiwinner election's voting method simplifies to), and then see how much utility the original voters in the multiwinner election receive from that leader compared to the amount of utility those original voters would get from the leader they would have elected if they had themselves voted in the single-winner election.
Essentially, test how much utility voters would get from the Prime Minister chosen by Parliament versus their utility if they directly elected a President instead.

The same idea is covered at [https://rangevoting.org/BRmulti.html](link url)

@casimir again this is just a criticism of the law and the judgment made about it: I still think even their reasoning (in bold) is pretty absurd. It means essentially that any system whatsoever that gets put into use is automatically constitutional, regardless of any negative or unexpected consequences, even those that directly contradict the letter of the law 😂 So what is the point of the law? It seems only to prevent the use of unconstitutionality to enact technical voting reform.

@casimir said in BTR-score:

That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable.

Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent.

Thank you, your quote helped the article, a plurality votes as a limited resource does explain some of the current rancor.

People diss voting systems that have not yet been used in public elections, even though the two systems with the most current use, plurality and IRV, have been found wanting.

I've said previously on this group that non-deterministic elections can be a good way to simplify proportional representation. It doesn't have to be as crude as simple random ballot where you have one representative per constituency selected by the drawing of a single ballot. As I said here just earlier this month:

Proportional methods tend to just be more complex by their nature. But if you allow them to be non-deterministic then that goes away. E.g. COWPEA Lottery which uses approval ballots. Or if you have a region that elects, say, 6 candidates, voters just rank their top 6 candidates. Then you consecutively pick six ballots at random and elect the unelected candidate that is highest ranked on that ballot.

This type of method, while it doesn't guarantee a very proportional result in each region, would actually give better proportionality nationally than deterministic methods that use these smallish regions (like STV), and they also keep the election candidate-based, which other nationally proportional methods tend not to.

Random ballot with just one representative per region guarantees that honest voting is the best strategy, but I tend to think that it becomes too lotteristic at that point. With e.g. five or six chances to be elected (as in the above methods), particularly popular candidates would not be on such a knife-edge of being elected.

I also think that non-deterministic methods send out a good message - that there are no "safe seats", and that representing the electorate is a privilege and not some guaranteed right.

So while non-deterministic methods might be a tough sell, I personally prefer them for national parliaments.