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    • J

      Setup for Simulating in a Browser
      Tech development • • Jack Waugh

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      J

      @carlschroedl Thanks for the links.

      Neither respondent to my question above interpreted it the way I meant it. I kind of wish I had withdrawn the question.

      I wrote, "So, a question I have is of whether to provide a way that the user could access several named slots in the volatile memory, each slot to have a complete assignment of values to parameters. The alternative would be to just have a single slot."

      My current plan is just to offer a single slot and the text will probably be just a presentation in JSON of a tree format peculiar to the particular simulator.

      Here is the data schema for a problem definition in the simulator. It is in a notation peculiar to my technique. Therefore, it would require verbal explanation to be understood by anybody other than me.

      const model = u.Model.new( ['entities', 'VotingSystem', 'Election', 'Candidate', 'Faction', 'Slider']

      The "entities" in the data model, in the sense of an entity-relationship diagram, are Voting System, Election, Candidate, (voting) Faction, and Slider.

      The importance of sliders is that slider controls affect the counts of voters in voting factions. This allows the researcher to try a whole spectrum of different balances in the counts of people holding certain valuations of the possible electoral outcomes. The researcher can try different balances by manipulating the sliders. The simulator will respond as quickly as it can, to, at every moment, the most recent manipulation.

      The next section just has to do with how the rest of the code can see and manipulate the problem-definition data model.

      , [ 'rootConnected', ['candidates', 'Candidate'], ['factions' , 'Faction' ], ['sliders' , 'Slider' ], ['elections' , 'Election' ], ] , ['rootConnected fixed', ['votingSystems', 'VotingSystem']]

      The next section describes the many-to-one relations among the entities.

      , ['||---o<', ['VotingSystem', 'votingSystem', 'elections', 'Election']]

      The above says there is a one-to-many relationship between voting systems and elections. A given election follows only one voting system, and a voting system may be followed by zero to infinity elections.

      , [ '>o---|| $ ||---o<', [ 'Candidate', 'candidate', 'candidateFactions', 'CandidateFaction', 'candidateFactions', 'faction', 'Faction', ], [ 'Election', 'election', 'electionFactions', 'ElectionFaction', 'electionFactions', 'faction', 'Faction', ], [ 'Faction', 'faction', 'factionSliders', 'FactionSlider', 'factionSliders', 'slider', 'Slider', ], ]

      The above describes three many-to-many relationships.

      There is a many-to-many relationship between candidates and factions, and the join-relation between them is called CandidateFaction. In these joint names, I stuck to alphabetical order. That is why I did not call this one, for example, FactionCandidate.

      There is a many-to-many relationship between elections and factions.

      There is a many-to-many relationship between factions and sliders.

      The next section describes some attributes that some of the entities have.

      , [ 'attributes', ['Candidate', [['name', {initValue: ""}]]],

      Every candidate has a name.

      ['Faction', [ ['name', {initValue: ""}], ['constantSizeTerm', {initValue: 1e4}], ]],

      Every faction has a name and a constant size term. The size of a faction (meaning the count of voters in it) is calculated as the sum of the constant term with the products of the slider positions with coefficients recorded in the join relation between the factions and the sliders.

      ['CandidateFaction', [['affinity', {initValue: 0 }]]],

      Each faction has an affinity toward each candidate. I normalize these, so you can use whatever scale you want.

      ['Slider', [ ['tag', {initValue: ""}], ['value', {initValue: 0 }], ]],

      Each slider has a "tag", which is basically a name. I used the term "name" for the names of persons and groups, and "tag" for inanimate things like sliders and elections. In either event, the tag or name identifies the individual thing or person.

      The value field reflects the slider's current position. Zero is the middle position, -1 is the extreme left, and 1 is the extreme right. These do not necessarily represent political "left" and "right", although you can use one that way if you wish. Sliders happen to appear in a horizontal position, so "left" and "right" describe the positions of their ends relative to one another.

      ['FactionSlider', [['coefficient', {initValue: 0 }]]],

      At the intersection of a faction and a slider, there is a field for the coefficient of the slider value for when the program is recalculating the faction size.

      [ 'VotingSystem', [ ['evictAllElections', { initValue: function () { if ('VotingSystem' !== this.class.name) throw Error("Expected a voting system."); Array.from(this.elections).forEach( election => { if('Election' !== election.class.name) throw Error("Expected an election!"); election.delete() }); },}],

      Oh, well, I threw some executable code in the middle of the declaration of the schema; that probably wasn't necessary. The code is necessary, but I could have put it somewhere else in the source code, besides in the middle of the instructions to the model builder for establishing the entities and the relationships among them.

      ['setDefaultElections', { initValue: function () { const election = this.class.model.Election.new({ votingSystem: this, }); election.insert(); },}], ]], ] );

      More code.

      Outside of the above exercise of notation, I also associate a single field to the problem model as a whole, and that field holds the random seed. I think the voting systems should be modeled in a deterministic manner, but the voting decision procedures (i. e. conversion from affinities to ballots) must sometimes appeal to random numbers. The use of a seeded generator makes all experiments exactly repeatable.

      A data model that is constructed in conformance to an entity-relationship diagram, where many-to-many relationships are included, might not in a single, obvious, canonical way, lend itself to representation in serializable form. However, it's certainly possible to come up with several ways that one could be serialized, so that the full model could be recoverable from the serialized form.

    • B

      Does participation imply monotonicity?
      Voting Theoretic Criteria • • BTernaryTau

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      ?

      You are def not the first one to ask this: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s003550100128.pdf Here they give a few examples that participation does not imply monotonicity.

    • Marylander

      We should probably have a status update at some point
      Forum Council Meetings and Agendas • • Marylander

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      rob

      @cfrank said in We should probably have a status update at some point:

      The tabulation method cannot be centrally controlled as long as the votes are public. The only thing I want the council to possibly do is make an effort to verify, organize and present the results. We do definitely want a way to organize and separately analyze different groups of ballots.

      I hear ya, I'd just hope that could all happen transparently in the forum threads. Any results I posted would link to something like this, where people can paste in ballots, analyze the code, fork the code, etc, so any forum user could check my work (and if they wantm retabulate them in different methods or filtering voters by origin, etc). https://codepen.io/karmatics/pen/ExKZVjM

      I mean, I don't care if council members want to come in and verify them, but I honestly doubt they'd want to do it as anything other than regular forum participants. This stuff just seems to lend itself to forums

      I could see this leading to something more official.... built in widgets and visualizers, pinned threads, permanent pages, etc, and in that case it makes some sense for the council to be able to approve things, but let's just see how this goes first.

      Hopefully if the council does meet soon, they can concentrate on the issues such as entry point, categories/tags, etc... changes that @Jack-Waugh will need to make and I think he wants others to make the decisions before doing so.

    • J

      A Municipality in Latvia Provides Equal Votes
      Current Events • • Jack Waugh

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      culi

      Not sure about the specific implementation, but at least mathematically it's also equivalent to combined approval voting (i.e. -1, 0, 1).

    • C

      Structure of a Voting System
      Philosophy • • cfrank

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      C

      @andy-dienes I think in principle alternative dynamical rules could vary as much as different voting systems vary from each other already, and the benefits of utilizing adaptive procedures would need to be balanced against the detriments to complexity.

      I defined one method before that uses past election data or predefined distributions to measure a formal construct of consensuality among the candidates, and then chooses the highest scoring candidate according to that metric. The distributions could be fixed, or could be updated to include or adapt to newer election data in any prescribed way that seems reasonable.

      I think the specific kind of procedure would depend on the kind of information that is being utilized.

      As an explicit example that I considered, for a score system I defined a candidate to be "(S,P)-consensual" if that candidate was scored at least an S by at least a P-fraction of the electorate. Then I defined the (S,P)-set of candidate C as the collection of all (S,P) such that C is (S,P)-consensual, and essentially measured the “size” of their (S,P)-sets.

      The way of measuring the size used probability distributions for the fraction of the electorate that scored a random candidate at least any fixed score.

    • ?

      An Argument for MES
      Proportional Representation • • A Former User

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      @dominikpeters Thanks for the information on this. Do you think that MES + completion is a good method for electing a committee of a fixed size or do you think a single method that works without an add-on would be better?

    • rob

      Under what scenarios will the Smith set differ from Copeland set?
      Single-winner • • rob

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      Ted Stern

      @rob, Score Sorted Margins is mentioned on the Approval Sorted Margins page on electowiki.org as a variant.

      Forest Simmons invented ASM, and I just extended it to scores.

    • J

      Ease of Teaching Tactics
      Voting Theoretic Criteria • • Jack Waugh

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      J

      @rob If I finish this friggin' software, we may find out.

    • J

      Search Engines
      Issue Reports • • Jack Waugh

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      rob

      @jack-waugh said in Search Engines:

      Currently, the arrangements for my death estate are nowhere near properly set up

      No pun intended, but involving estates and such seems like overkill.

      There are so many simpler ways to do things. If this forum had 100,000 users, it might be different. If you died and no one had access to your account and you hadn't given out a contact of your next of kin, you know what would happen? We'd just stop using the forum. It isn't the end of the world.

      It could be as simple as getting new free email and godaddy accounts that you share the password with another person, and just sign an agreement with them that neither can change the password without agreement from the other (unless the other dies or doesn't respond for a long time).

      The only reason a lawyer is needed is if anyone contests it.... but who is going to do that? Nobody cares that much about this forum.

      Seriously, you are making things WAY to complicated. This sort of thing is done all the time.

    • A

      "None of the Below"
      Voting Theoretic Criteria • • AnnieK

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      @sarawolk said in "None of the Below":

      If 'None of the Below' wasn't able to stop the count then it could only block one seat from being filled. I agree that's a simpler and more transparent implementation, but it seems like the intention is to be able to block multiple candidates if needed.

      I think I mentioned in my post above that you could have "none of the below" (NOTB) standing effectively as multiple clone candidates. For example, it's a 5 seat election using score ballots. Whatever score someone gives to NOTB counts towards 5 clone candidates. So it's effectively a party vote for the NOTB party.

      Or if it's ranked ballots, it would just take up 5 spaces in your rankings. So if your rank was 1. NOTB; 2. John Smith, it would actually be 1-5. NOTB; 6. John Smith.

    • A

      Good simple semi-PR methods?
      Proportional Representation • • AnnieK

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      L

      @anniek said in Good simple semi-PR methods?:

      A group I'm tangentially connected to has decided to switch from sequential proportional approval voting to cumulative voting (voters are given a number of points equal to the number of seats, and each voter can give any amount of their available points to one or more candidates). I'm concerned because I have heard that cumulative voting is susceptible to vote-splitting and bullet voting. Where can I learn more about these effects in cumulative voting?

      The main problem with cumulative voting is what happens if they don't do bullet voting. Cumulative voting produces kind-of-proportional representation if voters are strategic and perfectly informed, because minority groups can coordinate to bullet-vote. However, too much honest voting by these groups can easily result in a bare majority sweeping all the seats; in other words, requires some very complicated coordination (especially in small elections).

      I don't think there are any proportional methods simpler than SPAV except party-list representation, or possibly sequential Ebert (although I'd consider sequential Ebert about as simple as SPAV).

      Have you asked what makes this group think of SPAV as "too complex?"

    • M

      Some political groups within Slovenia are pushing for MMP with runoff election
      Nation specific policy • slovenia • • Matija

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      M

      The governing coalition opted for true open lists. Phragmén-MMP would be better because most of us like the idea of independent candidates.
      Though open lists are still better than MMP with runoff.

    • B

      The Bill of Rights for Voting Equality (without the reasons)
      Nation specific policy • voting methods • • BRVE62

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      J

      I generally support the BRVE.

      Something I question about it is what strategy should advocates use to try to get more people on board more or less, and to try to get it implemented.

      Let's suppose for example that advocates say to members of the general public, "May we please have a statement of agreement from you for this entire slate of proposed laws?"

      Then I for example am going to see that for a single-winner office, the BRVE calls for Score or Approval voting. I think that Score would be an adequate solution and Approval would be a vast improvement over status quo. However, I also think that STAR would be an adequate solution. If I endorse the BRVE, does that mean I am opposing STAR?

    • C

      Score Difference Stratified Condorcet
      Single-winner • • cfrank

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      C

      @lime I see, so this would be used in absence of a Condorcet winner like for a ranked pairs resolution?

      I was trying to think about burial but I don’t think my method addresses it quite as I conceived. My reasoning was that, by replacing absolute score differences with their more robust percentiles, burial (and bullet voting) strategies will suffer from severely diminishing returns compared with less risky and more honest ballots. For example, burying a second-favorite below a turkey to support a first favorite probably won’t significantly improve the score percentile provided by that voter to the first favorite’s runoff with the second favorite, but will significantly improve the chances of the turkey winning. This makes dishonest burial more severely punished and risky, meaning that fewer rational voters will choose to do it. Also, the effects of the fraction that do will be significantly reduced, since they will not only be fewer in number, but the magnitude of their indicated score differences will be majorly reeled back upon being replaced by their percentiles relative to the more honest bulk.

      At the same time, the method is not restricted to Condorcet compliance, since, for example, it is possible for a [1-sqrt(1/2)]~0.2928… fraction minority of voters to overrule a sqrt(1/2)~0.707… fraction majority as long as the whole minority has the top quantile of absolute score differences and all of them have the same sign. That is the smallest possible minority that can overrule a majority in this method. It’s in one sense a generalized, more flexible extension of some of the reasonable measures we already have in the legislative houses, where for example a supermajority (2/3) is required for certain decisions.

      Alternatively, each absolute score difference percentile could be measured relative to the distribution of all absolute score differences across all differences. The data set would consist of N*K(K-1)/2 values where N is the number of voters and K is the number of candidates.

    • ?

      Nonmonotonic methods are unconstitutional in Germany?
      Voting Methods • • A Former User

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      C

      @casimir again this is just a criticism of the law and the judgment made about it: I still think even their reasoning (in bold) is pretty absurd. It means essentially that any system whatsoever that gets put into use is automatically constitutional, regardless of any negative or unexpected consequences, even those that directly contradict the letter of the law 😂 So what is the point of the law? It seems only to prevent the use of unconstitutionality to enact technical voting reform.

    • SaraWolk

      Logging in!
      Welcome • • SaraWolk

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      SaraWolk

      @SaraWolk Test 2 nesting replies

    • SaraWolk

      Calling for the Next Council Meeting!
      Forum Council Meetings and Agendas • • SaraWolk

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      SaraWolk

      @SaraWolk said in Calling for the Next Council Meeting!:

      I propose we meet next on Wednesday Feb 17th, at 7:30 Pacific.

      Hi All, I'm confirming and reminding you all that we have our next forum meeting tomorrow at 7:30 PST.

      Privacy policy. Ready for review. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QzZp2QAsP60Ti1WWPk29Q8dInGIM2l438rcJDZLd2Ug/edit?usp=sharing Terms of Service. Ready for review.: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AlnP1gvvc986n0iiYYkA0Tc9L33erbxDftM7sX5ypz4/edit?usp=sharing Code of Conduct. Ready for review.: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ExGrryHIFOjSfPiTtHYBRPw7GQY8lRsCfWiWsLEsImc/edit?usp=sharing

      Please invite people who would make great moderators.
      See you there!

      Join Zoom Meeting
      https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89174966453

      Meeting ID: 891 7496 6453
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      Meeting ID: 891 7496 6453
      Find your local number: https://us02web.zoom.us/u/ksaEry1kk

    • J

      Proxy
      New Voting Methods and Variations • • Jack Waugh

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      @tec said in Proxy:

      This seems a lot like liquid democracy,

      Schemes involving proxy power indeed resemble one another to at least that degree, that they involve proxy power. I would like readers to evaluate them separately, and not tar one with the drawbacks they see in another. And in particular, I live in the US, and am concerned about the effect on the world of US politics, and I would like other US residents to weigh in on my suggestions.

      I propose that proxy would only be given in voting booths, with the same ballot secrecy as US people are accustomed to for voting on who can serve in office. And the opportunity would only come up every two years. Proxy could not be revoked except on those opportunities. This would limit the overhead costs of communication and certification of the expressed wills of the citizens. It would limit the risk of votes and proxies being coerced out of citizens.

      Here is another variant of my proposal, which could reduce overhead. Instead of having to go to the polls once to allocate space in the legislative chamber to representatives and returning to the polls to give proxy to someone from among those seated, with this variation, only one visit to the polls per election season would be necessary. Voters would fill out two sections on the ballot. The top section would list the candidates and invite approval or disapproval of each for seating. In the bottom section, the voter would list candidates in order of that voter's decision about giving proxy. The highest candidate on the voter's list who is seated would receive that proxy.

    • SaraWolk

      Threaded replies show up both as a threaded reply and at the end of the feed.
      Issue Reports • • SaraWolk

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      SaraWolk

      @Jack-Waugh @Marylander
      Sounds good to me.
      Thanks for looking into it. I don't think it's time sensitive or anything, just thought I'd flag it here as a feature request.

      Nice to have our categories all sorted out so clearly with a spot for these types of questions. 🙂

      I haven't had much time to engage here on the forum since we launched, but I've been sending people over and it seems like there are conversations happening!

      Looking forward to having more time to invest here soon.

    • J

      Who Is Doing This
      Meta Discussion • • Jack Waugh

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      SaraWolk

      When the forum was originally set up Jack just put it all in his own name as a stopgap, but that was never the permanent plan.

      At the last meeting we discussed funds and bookkeeping and managing of that kind of thing and decided to do that through Equal Vote so we don't need a whole separate person/process for treasury and bookkeeping. They also voted to coalition unanimously (I abstained.)

      The other reason mentioned was the "What if I get hit by a bus" issue, so we have been in the process of moving the forum into the fold of Equal Vote assets to ensure that passing of keys can be ensured, and adjudicated if needed, should anything happen to whoever has it in their name currently.

      As part of that I've put in a bunch of hours over the last month on the back end and we now have the url on our the Equal Vote account and are paying for it from Equal Vote. Donations for the Forum can also be made to Equal Vote with earmarking for the Forum if desired. We also obtained a grant from Azure that can pay for the hosting, so the plan is to move the hosting there.

      Again, Voting Theory Forum is still fully autonomous and this is a service that Equal Vote can offer and is happy to provide since we already manage this stuff for a number of other sites in our network.