@jack-waugh said in Quantile-Normalized Score:

Which voters are going to have their votes diluted by such a procedure?

In reply to this, you might be interested to note that, based at least on my own observations of the symmetrized version, it is the bullet-voters and min-maxers who will have the advantages of their tactical behavior reduced in favor of a broader consensus, in a fashion very similar to what would be expected in a Condorcet method. However, the method is not Condorcet compliant, I found a counter-example.

Plurality has a spli- vote problem, which is why we need a Progressive Primary. But, lacking that, the Green Party & their nominee are the obvious natural combining point for Progressive votes

…& any forum that includes voting strategy doesn’t need to avoid voting-strategy specifics.

@democrates I would ask them what they mean by "mob rule". How could it be detected, and why is it a problem.

@cfrank said in Arguing for Equality:

lol

I wish it were a laughing matter. I judge that this exact PD has caused political decisions that put the state of humanity, the state of the artifacts that some humans control, and the state of the environment such that an analogy of a train speeding toward a bombed-out bridge over the Danube holds true, and the momentum may be such that no measures that can possibly be recruited will suffice to save anyone.

Yes, in party-list PR it would be good to allow us to vote for 2 parties…our favorite (but maybe not seat-winnable), & a seat-winnable party we like.

I prefer that. But it would be regarded as a complication. Anyway tradition wanted to discourage small parties. The option to vote for two parties would be rejected as a complication.

For a first PR proposal, just propose ordinary list-PR, like 2/3 of the world’s countries use.

Later we can propose the 2-party option.

@mendicant As I mentioned in another thread recently there is this score/MMP system, which I also made a video of.

Basically, you give a score to all the candidates standing locally, and can also give a separate score to any parties or independent candidates standing in the wider region.

The local candidate with the highest score (or STAR winner or whatever) is elected. Then the local areas are combined into one larger region for the top-up phase, A voter's party scores are given to all candidates standing for that party outside their local area. The rest of the seats are allocated in the most proportional way possible given those already elected. Probably using something like Phragmén.

Works with approval voting too.

@michaelossipoff Great. But I think readers are likely not to notice the activity in this thread, which started as a set of proposals about forum governance by a participant now banned. To try to get more attention, let's move the discussion of voting on voting systems to https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/466/polling-ourselves . I posted my updated nominations there, for one of the categories. Thanks for reviving the topic of voting on voting systems.

@jack-waugh said in Super-STAR: Dynamically rescaled score runnoff:

@lime said in Super-STAR: Dynamically rescaled score runnoff:

@kaptain5 The ideal would be to find a somewhat-objective normalization with a mechanism like quadratic voting or VCG. Each voter has to "pay for" their rating points by giving something up (like votes they could cast in another election).

No, because that's exactly the problem with choose-one plurality. I have as a voter the right to support and oppose so many candidates via my vote as I support and oppose in my political stance or judgment. Choose-one plurality single-winner voting says I have to pay a "cost", which is the entirety of my precious vote, as soon as I support one candidate. Support and opposition must be free of cost, because I am a citizen and deserve a full vote, the same as any other citizen.

I think the thread you linked is based on a misunderstanding. The quadratic voting penalty is applied across different races, not in the same one. So, for example, you can either cast 10 votes for President, or you could cast 5 for President, 5 for Governor, 5 in some ballot initiative, and 5 in Congress. (Adds to 100.)

The squared-cost penalty is chosen so you'll honestly reveal your relative preferences across different issues, under an impartial culture model. I assume you could do better than an impartial culture model, but the point is more that you should be able to trade influence across decisions to have a bigger impact on the issues where your preferences are stronger.

@toby-pereira Yes, and if only extremists show up, they deserve the power.

@matthewmvp said in Hybridizing SPAV?:

According to my wikipedia education, one of the issues with SPAV compared to PAV is that it is a 'greedy algorithm' that only looks at the most locally optimal solution.
Now SAV considers the whole field at once but doesn't fix under and over votes.

AFAIK Sequential SAV and Sequential PAV are the same procedure, which is actually the trick I use to explain SPAV more intuitively: I describe SAV, then explaining how SPAV fixes the spoiler effect in SAV.

Did you read the SAV Wiki article in the past week or two? I tried explaining this way of thinking about SAV in the article to make it simpler, but might have unintentionally made it more confusing instead of less.

I vote red.

The governing coalition opted for true open lists. Phragmén-MMP would be better because most of us like the idea of independent candidates.
Though open lists are still better than MMP with runoff.

@lime I don’t think any of the points are actually valid except the last one, with the addendum that Democratic representatives are just as likely to stall or derail voting reform efforts, because they also benefit directly from lack of accountability to public interests.

@toby-pereira

Yes, but the big winner, so far, in the burial-deterrence category, is RP(wv), which isn't a new-invention method, but, rather is a traditional, classical, immensely popular & high-prestige method.

FairVote claims that "RCV" doesn't have a spoiler problem. It most blatantly does.

FairVote claims that your ballot will help your 2nd choice if your 1st choice doesn't win. False, & FairVote knows that.

FairVote says that it isn't known whether Condorcet has a spoiler-problem.

No, actually MinMax(wv), & then Smith//MinMa(wv) were introduced 35 years ago, & their strategy-properties were well studied & well-known at the time. It was known even then, that the wv Condorcet methods, which also include Schuilze & RP(wv) meet Minimal-Defense, & that truncation by only one faction can't take the win from a CW.

Those things have been well known among Condorcetists for 35 years. No, Condorcet(wv) doesn't have a spoiler problem,

But FairVote has a dishonesty problem.

@toby-pereira said in Easy-to-explain Proportional (Multiwinner) elections:

By the way, Satisfaction Approval Voting can only be described as semi-proportional. You're wasting part of your vote on candidates that aren't elected. It's like SNTV except that you can split your vote up. They both have similar problems to FPTP.
They might be easy to explain, but they're not worth explaining!

You're right, of course, but that's why I like to bring up SAV as an "obvious" system with an obvious flaw (spoilers). Then I explain how PAV/SPAV fix that flaw with a minor change--split a vote only after a candidate is elected, not before.

@toby-pereira On a ranked ballot you can't show if a 2nd choice is as good as a 1st choice or as bad as a last choice. In practice, ranked methods have to constrain how many candidates can be ranked. There are a few different ways you can look at it, but here's why I think it's the most expressive on the table (excluding cardinal methods with a bigger range)

the ability to vote on every candidate no matter how many there are, The ability to show preference order The ability to show degree of support on a 6 rating scale.