<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[“MARE,” a Two-Round Voting Method Design Framework to Reduce Strategic Incentives]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto">I’ve been considering generalizations of <a href="https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/626/score-smith-validation-voting-ssvv" rel="nofollow ugc">SSVV</a> designed to improve robustness against strategic voting, and landed on the following design outline for a voting system, which can be called “MARE,” standing for “<strong>M</strong>ajoritarian vs. <strong>A</strong>lternative with <strong>R</strong>escue <strong>E</strong>lection.”</p>
<p dir="auto">I tested this framework using limited simulations of strategic voter behavior, and found significantly improved outcomes against benchmarks. For example, successful burial rates dropped from ~15% to ~7%, with &gt;50% of buried Condorcet winners being rescued. This needs further investigation and more rigorous analysis.</p>
<p dir="auto">The idea is as follows: in the first round, voters submit rank-score ballots, which determine two sets of candidates: a Majoritarian set M, and an Alternative set A.</p>
<p dir="auto">For example, M could be the Smith set or Bipartisan set. A could be the Approval winner set or the IRV winner set.</p>
<p dir="auto">Next, voters are given information about M and A. For example, M may be made public. A may also be made public, or some relevant statistics about A may be made public. For example, maybe instead of revealing the score winner, only the score is shown.</p>
<p dir="auto">The key is, voters can use the information about M and A to do two things at once: (1) vote for whether to proceed by electing a candidate from A, or a candidate from M. And (2) possibly submit a “Rescue” signal, designed to counter burial tactics that may have manipulated M.</p>
<p dir="auto">For example, the Rescue signal may be implicit, as the M-outsider with the highest top-rank support among outsiders. The design goal for the Rescue signal is to re-introduce a buried candidate into M with high efficiency, without ruining a sincere election. The cost is strict Smith compliance (although, if the Smith set is already manipulated and insincere, that may not be a bad thing).</p>
<p dir="auto">If the electorate chooses M, then the pre-specified completion rule is run on M with the Rescue set R. For example, Benham could be run on M, and the winner could go head-to-head against a winner in R.</p>
<p dir="auto">Otherwise, if they choose A, then the pre-specified completion rule is run on A.</p>
<p dir="auto">The goal of MARE is to enable information/incentive engineering by selecting the rules for M, A, and R. In some experiments, I had M be Smith, A be IRV, and R be top outsider. There are various other considerations to explore within this framework. I just wanted to share it to see if others wanted to experiment with simulations.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/627/mare-a-two-round-voting-method-design-framework-to-reduce-strategic-incentives</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2026 03:32:49 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/627.rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 19:38:21 GMT</pubDate><ttl>60</ttl></channel></rss>