<![CDATA[STAR vs Condorcet vs IRV vs Approval]]>Bummer - there are no perfect voting methods 🙂

Ballots:
       A,B,C
       1,4,3
       2,3,1
       5,0,4

Winner
  STAR      = A
  RCV-IRV   = B   (differs from STAR)
  Approval  = B   (differs from STAR)
  Condorcet = B   (differs from STAR)

Is this a good commentary:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DVhn9sbPpbXJCjN1fgFZzyKSfFbt97ksXWlh9K1wlOU/edit?tab=t.0

On a different note - it is probably impossible to come up with a contrived example where each method has a different winner - right?

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/621/star-vs-condorcet-vs-irv-vs-approvalRSS for NodeFri, 19 Jun 2026 12:06:03 GMTFri, 19 Jun 2026 04:02:38 GMT60<![CDATA[Reply to STAR vs Condorcet vs IRV vs Approval on Fri, 19 Jun 2026 10:29:16 GMT]]>The first two voters fail to use the endpoints of the range available to them. Do you expect such behavior in political elections that matter? I think comparisons of voting systems based on hypothetical examples should begin with the voters' valuations of the possibilities normalized. I don't know that it's worth studying examples where voters voluntarily give up power. We as students of these systems need all the time and attention we can put on cases where the purpose of the election is to resolve strong political disagreement among the voters. We need elections to work well when the voters are struggling for political power. Such voters would use the endpoints of the range unless they are not properly informed as to how the system works.

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4225http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4225Fri, 19 Jun 2026 10:29:16 GMT