<![CDATA[Consensus Choice, a new (2024) and simple Condorcet voting method]]>Better Choices for Democracy offers Consensus Choice as an alternative to plurality voting and Ranked Choice Voting.

Like BTR-Score, Consensus Choice combines Condorcet fairness and reliability with simplicity and a reasonable argument for state constitutional compliance.

The creator of BTR-Score, Nicolaus Tidman, is on the Better Choices board of directors. Former Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia is a key backer.

How it works: Consensus Choice flier

  1. Candidates from all parties compete in an open blanket primary. The Better Choices website gives little detail about the primary. Perhaps it will favor wealthy and well-financed unaffiliated candidates like the Top Four and Final Five primaries (more below).

  2. Voters rank all candidates

  3. Candidates are compared head-to-head, like a round-robin tournament. Pairwise wins and losses are determined from each ballot.

  4. The results from all the ballots determine who wins each match of the round-robin tournament.

  5. Most Wins, Smallest Loss - If a candidate beats all the other candidates one-on-one, that candidate wins. If there is no “beats all” winner, the candidate with the most wins is elected. In case of a tie, the candidate with the smallest head-to-head loss versus other tied contestants wins. Thus, the candidate closest to a Condorcet win is elected.

For me the big question is - Would the “smallest loss” tie breaker comply with state constitutions that require election winners to have the “largest,” “greatest,” or “highest” number of votes or a “plurality of the votes”? Would love to hear your opinion.

Most Wins, Most Wins on the Ballots - An alternative to the “smallest loss” tiebreaker: go back to the ballots and elect the tied candidate with the most head-to-head victories against the other tied candidates. This method considers every head-to-head match of tied candidates from every ballot. Would this better comply with state constitutions?

As a hybrid Condorcet method, Consensus Choice will fail some voting criteria. Please comment if you see a particularly troubling failure.

Concerning primary elections:
More info on Top Four and Top Five primaries. For a blanket primary designed to be fair to all candidates, check out Neutral Open Primaries. That should be enough shameless plugs for my website.

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/607/consensus-choice-a-new-2024-and-simple-condorcet-voting-methodRSS for NodeFri, 17 Apr 2026 15:57:14 GMTThu, 16 Apr 2026 00:50:25 GMT60<![CDATA[Reply to Consensus Choice, a new (2024) and simple Condorcet voting method on Thu, 16 Apr 2026 18:04:04 GMT]]>@gregw I think Condorcet is great when a Condorcet winner exists, but when one doesn’t exist it’s really troublesome. Ideally, we would have a method to check whether one exists without unearthing the Condorcet cycle that reveals the jilted majority upon the choosing of any winner, but that is essentially impossible.

I think it makes sense to do Condorcet//Approval, in two separate rounds, the approval round restricted to the Smith set. But two round voting outright is a difficult sell in the USA (even though two-round voting is pretty common all over the rest of the world…).

People try to put the two together in a single round vote, but the strategic incentives of casting rank and approval/score indications on the same ballot cause issues.

My personal belief is that this system of two-round voting for single winner elections, I.e. approval conditional on already knowing the Smith set, would be most ideal. I think actually implementing the approval aspect first however is an easier sell than implementing the Condorcet aspect first. I can envision a natural progression as: (1) implement straight approval, (2) eventually indicate the shortcomings of approval in guaranteeing election of Smith set candidates, (3) reform to include a ranked primaries to restrict to the Smith set before the final approval vote.

I feel even having rank/Smith-based primaries makes way more sense than what we have if the subsequent system is approval. There’s no issue with vote splitting in that instance, and it fits at least partially into the political system we already have (although this would also require substantial changes).

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4168http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4168Thu, 16 Apr 2026 18:04:04 GMT<![CDATA[Reply to Consensus Choice, a new (2024) and simple Condorcet voting method on Thu, 16 Apr 2026 03:23:21 GMT]]>Concerning
Most Wins, Smallest Loss
VS
Most Wins, Most Wins on the Ballots;

We need a tiebreaker that can pass constitutional muster. Can either pass?

In our divided times a voting method needs Condorcet fairness and reliability to survive. One mistake can create a lot enemies for a voting method. Both rating and ranking give voters a stronger voice. We learn more about the voters’ intentions.

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4167http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4167Thu, 16 Apr 2026 03:23:21 GMT<![CDATA[Reply to Consensus Choice, a new (2024) and simple Condorcet voting method on Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:10:56 GMT]]>@gregw hm I’m just not sure how well-studied this method in particular is, as in, why it needs to be “most wins, fewest losses.” It makes as much intuitive sense as anything else, and it’s Condorcet so that’s fine.

Also it’s obviously susceptible to potentially unfortunate results when the Condorcet winner does not exist (which the above has ignored in their last step of the “how it works” section as “the candidate who beats all the others wins.”)

I still think rank-based methods are going to be much more difficult to gain firm ground on than approval. IRV got some traction but now it’s facing backlash (some rightfully so). Approval on the other hand seems relatively hard to argue against. I think it would yield a more lasting forward step.

]]>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4166http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/4166Thu, 16 Apr 2026 02:10:56 GMT