Here is an example with three candidates and a comparison with the results of other methods:

7: A>B>C

6: B>C>A

2: C>A>B

In this case, there is no Condorcet winner. This new method by Tideman, his older method Ranked Pairs, IRV, Dodgson and Young voting all agree with the ranking A>B>C.

A and B are both Bucklin winners, so depending on how a single-winner is chosen it could give A>B>C or B>A>C. Black voting (AKA Condorcet/Borda) on the other hand ranks B>A>C.

An argument against the ranking B>A>C is that if C were removed, A would beat B, meaning that using Black voting has made C a spoiler for A. In any case it isn't actually clear which ranking is preferable, the ambiguity is related to the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.

]]>https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/230/bottom-two-runoff-condorcet-irv-hybrid

]]>Generally speaking, he endorses any kind of Condorcet method; for a while he and another world-class economist had together written some essays proposing what is essentially Copeland//Borda (now rebranded by EVC as Ranked Robin)

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