<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[ICA&#x2F;ICT&#x2F;SICT - So what about &quot;improved Condorcet&quot; methods?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto">I recently read more about the class of "improved" Condorcet methods. Which use the <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Tied_at_the_top" rel="nofollow ugc">tied at the top</a> rule to redefine the notion of a Condorcet winner. It is claimed that this fixes favorite betrayal and possibly the chicken dilemma, while also being close to Condorcet methods.<br />
This seems promising, so I wonder why there isn't much talk about them. Even from a practial viewpoint they are easier to explain than for example Schulze, or Smith//score.</p>
<p dir="auto">In particular I am talking about <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Improved_Condorcet_Approval" rel="nofollow ugc">Improved Condorcet Approval</a> and <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Symmetrical_ICT" rel="nofollow ugc">Symmetrical Improved-Condorcet-Top</a>.</p>
<p dir="auto">The first article also describes a variant:</p>
<blockquote>
<p dir="auto">The above definition defines t[a,b] to be the number of voters tying a and b in the top position. ... However, it might be more intuitive, and preferred, if t[a,b] were defined rather as the number of voters ranking a equal to b and explicitly voting for both.</p>
</blockquote>
<p dir="auto"><em>Why</em> would that be preferred? And does this only work when explicitly ranking/approving both, or also for bottom ranks? In that case one could state the rule as just: "A candidate is unbeaten if there is no other candidate that is ranked higher by more than half of all voters." Which also would be easier to calculate and visualize.</p>
<p dir="auto">Is there any reason not to extend ICA to ICscore using a rated ballot? ICscore could then be easily explained as "Rate all candidates on a scale from 0 to 5. Remove all candidates where some other candidate is preferred by more than half of voters. Of the remaining, elect the one with highest score."</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/104/ica-ict-sict-so-what-about-improved-condorcet-methods</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 20:36:07 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/104.rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><pubDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2021 22:57:53 GMT</pubDate><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[Reply to ICA&#x2F;ICT&#x2F;SICT - So what about &quot;improved Condorcet&quot; methods? on Sat, 07 Aug 2021 18:27:49 GMT]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/41">@Casimir</a> said in <a href="/forum/post/469">ICA/ICT/SICT - So what about "improved Condorcet" methods?</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p dir="auto">Why would that be preferred? And does this only work when explicitly ranking/approving both, or also for bottom ranks? In that case one could state the rule as just: "A candidate is unbeaten if there is no other candidate that is ranked higher by more than half of all voters." Which also would be easier to calculate and visualize.</p>
</blockquote>
<p dir="auto">If ties count in favor of both candidates when they are compared, then at the bottom ranks, voters would want to make up a ranking for those candidates just because it would hurt whoever is put lower in the ranking.</p>
<p dir="auto">Generally, this system reminds me of a system I thought about a while ago but I don't know if I wrote about it anywhere. (The thinking behind them is basically the same.) It works like Minimax Condorcet with co-equal ranks, but there is an approval-like cutoff in the ranking. For tied candidates above a ballot's cutoff, the ballot counts for both candidates in that pairwise matchup. For tied candidates below a ballot's cutoff, the ballot counts against both candidates in that pairwise matchup.</p>
<p dir="auto">Ultimately the thing that I really don't like about that system is that the notion of a coequal ranking is deceptive: coequal rankings sound like they are intended to indicate that you support both candidates equally, but the system is designed so that they really serve a strategic purpose.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/513</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/post/513</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Marylander]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 07 Aug 2021 18:27:49 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>