<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Multi-winner]]></title><description><![CDATA[Multi-winner]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/category/14</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Sun, 10 May 2026 08:12:58 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/category/14.rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 09:40:45 GMT</pubDate><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[Before a Real Runoff]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/6">@jack-waugh</a> I don’t know much about PR, but this is an attempt to balance seats by considering party affiliations without stuffing clones. <a href="https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/299/pr-with-ambassador-quotas-and-cake-cutting-incentives?_=1712309724365" rel="nofollow ugc">Can PR be improved with “Cake Cutting” incentives?</a></p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/480/before-a-real-runoff</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/480/before-a-real-runoff</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[cfrank]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 09:40:45 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Biproportional representation as a means to prevent bullet voting]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/135">@matija</a> Ahh, I think I understand what you meant better now. Still, I'm not sure where the incentive for bullet voting comes from (at least in a realistic situation); approval thresholding is a more common (and more realistic) strategy for informed voters.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/447/biproportional-representation-as-a-means-to-prevent-bullet-voting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/447/biproportional-representation-as-a-means-to-prevent-bullet-voting</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Lime]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 04 Feb 2024 23:53:43 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Vertical composition of multiwinner approval methods]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto">@isocratia said in <a href="/forum/post/2904">Vertical composition of multiwinner approval methods</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p dir="auto">My basic use-case for this technique is when the first phase is simple bloc approval voting that filters out anyone with more than, say, 75% disapproval (this threshold is a parameter), and the second phase is some proportional approval voting method.</p>
</blockquote>
<p dir="auto">I would do the opposite: filter out anyone who would skew proportionality then apply a single winner method.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/422/vertical-composition-of-multiwinner-approval-methods</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/422/vertical-composition-of-multiwinner-approval-methods</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Matija]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2023 12:10:41 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Tweet by Star Voting regarding Multi Winner Voting]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/7">@sarawolk</a> said in <a href="/forum/post/2419">Tweet by Star Voting regarding Multi Winner Voting</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p dir="auto">Equal Vote as an org doesn't endorse any systems that don't eliminate vote-splitting and/or that waste ballot data, so MMP and STV don't pass our minimum bar but 'terrible' is a strong word. There are clearly pros and cons.</p>
</blockquote>
<p dir="auto">Hi Sara,</p>
<p dir="auto">Point of clarification. My quote labels Party List and Single Member Plurality as terrible not MMP. I don't think that is too strong of a work for them (speak as me not as a director of equal vote. MMP is mediocre.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/339/tweet-by-star-voting-regarding-multi-winner-voting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/339/tweet-by-star-voting-regarding-multi-winner-voting</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Keith Edmonds]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2023 05:45:51 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Early Elimination in STV]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto">Hi All,</p>
<p dir="auto">I was wondering if anyone has written or thought about early elimination of candidates for the single transferable vote method.</p>
<p dir="auto">I am aware STV is not precinct summable, nor can it be made precinct summable, because the outcome relies on the flows of ballots. However, I can imagine situations in which, even with only some ballots received, it's mathematically impossible for certain candidates to reach quota, and so we might wish to eliminated them early.</p>
<p dir="auto">Unfortunately, depending on the counting method, even the order in which candidates are eliminated can affect the outcome of STV. So I suppose I'm actually looking for an answer to the question: is it possible to tell when a candidate can't win and can't change the count by being eliminated later, and if so, how.</p>
<p dir="auto">Also, a related second question: I believe I have heard that the Meek counting rule makes elimination ordering not matter, but I can't find a source. Is this true, and if so, could someone point me at a good proof as to why this is so.</p>
<p dir="auto">Thanks!</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/309/early-elimination-in-stv</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/309/early-elimination-in-stv</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[v.jackson]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 27 Nov 2022 11:21:06 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Defining &quot;degree of representation&quot; in multi-winner elections]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/52">@toby-pereira</a> I totally agree with you here. And a point to supplement or maybe just reiterate your stance on “benevolent dictators,” there’s a definite survivorship bias there. The business dictators who fail don’t show up in the news, while the ones who succeed are often lauded as geniuses without due regard for the role of pure luck or factors totally unrelated to their supposed acumen. The same goes for stock market investors—many who come out on top end up believing they have a special intuition to “outsmart” the market, but when compared with randomly generated portfolios, their inclinations usually fare no better, and often do worse (due to their relative lack of diversity, they are not as robust against market volatility).</p>
<p dir="auto">So basically, when uncertainty is involved, failure doesn’t always indicate a poor strategy, not any more than success indicates a good one. This reduces my confidence that business dictatorships actually tend to promote the success of a company.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/296/defining-degree-of-representation-in-multi-winner-elections</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/296/defining-degree-of-representation-in-multi-winner-elections</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[cfrank]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 06:07:55 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Precinct-summability through seat capping]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a href="https://bternarytau.github.io/miscellaneous/voting-theory/precinct-summability-through-seat-capping" rel="nofollow ugc">Seat capping</a> is a technique I've been working on developing for a little while now. It allows various multi-winner voting methods, including many proportional methods, to be made precinct-summable by limiting the number of seats that the voting method can fill. Many specific instances of seat capping have been discovered by others, but to my knowledge I am the first person to generalize this insight to a wide variety of voting methods, including allocated score (the current STAR-PR proposal), sequentially spent score, reweighted range voting, harmonic score voting, and Bucklin transferable vote.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/195/precinct-summability-through-seat-capping</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/195/precinct-summability-through-seat-capping</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[BTernaryTau]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Mar 2022 15:27:35 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title><![CDATA[Executive Voting]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p dir="auto"><a class="plugin-mentions-user plugin-mentions-a" href="http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/uid/6">@Jack-Waugh</a> I think you are talking about <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Bloc_voting" rel="nofollow ugc">Bloc Score</a> which would be easy to tabulate in excel. However, we want a system which gets a <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Stable_Winner_Set" rel="nofollow ugc">stable winner set</a>.  I do not know how to do any of the standard ones in excel in a simple way.  I wonder what system Clay implemented. It might have been <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Reweighted_Range_Voting" rel="nofollow ugc">RRV</a>.</p>
]]></description><link>http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/83/executive-voting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/83/executive-voting</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Keith Edmonds]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 13 May 2021 20:05:32 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>